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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses the aesthetic experience of reading in Proust’s A la Recherche du 
temps perdu, with a special emphasis on the Narrator’s proposition that a literary work 
may enable its readers to become ‘les propres lecteurs d’eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610). 
This view prompts two crucial questions about self-understanding through reading: (i) 
what is meant by ‘self’ and (ii) what makes the process of reading literature special, as 
opposed to other aesthetic experiences and the reading of other kinds of texts.
The first part of the thesis focuses on subjectivity and the relation between primary 
experience and mediation in Proust, addressing the underlying tension between two 
views of selfhood in the Recherche – a self which evolves around some kind of essence 
at the centre of experience, and a much more fragmented subject which needs to be 
constantly recomposed. Rather than being an exclusively metaphysical enquiry into how 
subjectivity is presented in the novel, this study focuses, though close analysis of 
Proust’s text, on the ways in which this potential self-understanding can be attained 
through literature; the second part therefore compares reading to other aesthetic 
experiences – those of visual art, music and performance – while the third and final part 
focuses specifically on literature’s communicative possibilities and the different modes 
of reading in the novel.
The thesis argues that the specificity of aesthetic reading is attached to the absence (or 
at least subsidiary role) of material, sensory stimuli from the artwork itself, which 
compels readers’ imagination to work closely with (and largely depend on) their past 
and present experiences outside the text at hand. This collaboration is the germ of the 
Proustian ‘moyen de lire en soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610) as it enables the reader to 
overcome the separation between the actual, direct, affective experience in the world 
and the mediated, reflective experience of the world, and to realise the in-dwelling and 
reciprocal affiliation between the two. 
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ABBREVIATIONS
RTP I = A la Recherche du temps perdu I (Du côté de chez Swann; A l'ombre des 
jeunes filles en fleurs I)
RTP II = A la Recherche du temps perdu II (A l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs II; 
Le Côté de Guermantes I, II)
RTP III = A la Recherche du temps perdu III (Sodome et Gomorrhe I, II; La 
Prisonnière)
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INTRODUCTION
‘Longtemps’ – that is how it all starts, with a word describing an undefined, long-lasting 
stretch of time, followed by the clause ‘je me suis couché de bonne heure’ (RTP I, 3). 
The somewhat strange syntax of the opening sentence in Proust’s A la Recherche du 
temps perdu chains together several singular completed actions in the past (to which the 
passé composé tense usually refers) into a habitual, somewhat indistinguishable 
continuous process.1 Proust’s Narrator goes on to describe the habit of falling asleep 
reading a book and the peculiar feeling of not quite knowing who he is when he wakes 
up (‘Je ne savais même pas au premier instant qui j’étais.’ (RTP I, 5)). The opening 
scene thus throws the reader of the Recherche right into the deep end of the Proustian 
project of understanding the self and introduces, on the very first pages of the book, 
three aspects which are crucial to the present study: the role of ‘unmarked’ everyday 
experiences, reading, and self-awareness.
In this thesis I examine the aesthetic experience of reading in Proust’s Recherche, with a 
special emphasis on the Narrator’s suggestion that a book may enable the readers to 
become ‘les propres lecteurs d’ eux-mêmes’ and to ‘lire en eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610). 
This proposition prompts three crucial questions about the possibility of self-
understanding through reading: (i) What kind of notion of selfhood does the Recherche 
imply? (ii) How does the literary experience differ from other aesthetic experiences? 
and (iii) What makes a reading experience ‘literary’ and ‘aesthetic’ and different from 
everyday communication (written and spoken)?
6
1 The opening sentence of the Recherche has been analysed probably most famously by Roland Barthes in 
Le Bruissement de la langue, Essais Critiques IV (Paris: Seuil, 1994), pp. 313-25.
My approach to these questions is based on an understanding of ‘self’ as an entity which 
is au fond continuous, unified, substantial and at least potentially accessible to 
knowledge. Relying on philosophical hermeneutics, which finds its origins in 
Husserlian theories of ontology and was further developed in the philosophies of 
Heidegger and Gadamer, I align with the view that there is no consciousness without 
being the consciousness of something. I argue that the specificity of literary experience 
is partly related to the absence – or at least subsidiary role – of material, sensory stimuli 
from the artwork itself which compels readers’ imagination to work closely with (and 
largely depend on) their past and present experiences in the world which they inhabit as 
psycho-physical entities. This collaboration between the imagined and the lived 
experience, revealing the affinities (as well as differences) between the other and the 
self, the art-object and the reader-subject, sits at the very centre of the Proustian ‘façon 
de bien lire’ (RTP IV, 490), as it enables the reader to overcome the (artificial) 
separation between the actual, direct, affective experience in the world and the 
mediated, reflective experience of the world.
Proustian subjectivity and the role of art in its formation and sustenance have been the 
focus of a range of studies on Proust’s novel. As Anne Simon notes, ‘the different 
modelizations of [the] Recherche, which at the same time allow Proust to be a formalist, 
a spider stuck in a world of rhizomes, or on the contrary, with Jean-Pierre Richard, 
George Poulet or Gaëtan Picon, a phenomenologist in tune with the physical world and 
referentiality, show just how much the novel is characterised by an extremely broad 
hermeneutic potential.’2 The aim of this study is not to introduce another ‘theory of 
reading’ based on the Recherche but rather to discuss the experience of reading through 
viewpoints which embrace exactly this hermeneutic potential – that is, by emphasising 
the phenomenological congruity between the reading experience and ‘life experience’. 
I suggest this congruity or collaboration reaches far beyond merely sympathising with 
the characters of a book or finding some conspicuous parallels between the story of the 
book and the reader’s own life. The reading experience, like any ‘direct’ life experience, 
7
2  Anne Simon, ‘The Formalist, the Spider, and the Phenomenologist’ in André Benhaïm (ed.) The Strange 
M. Proust (London: Modern Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2009), pp. 23-35. 
The phenomenologically centred studies Simon refers to here are Jean-Pierre Richard’s Proust et le 
monde sensible (Paris: Seuil, 1974), Georges Poulet’s L’Espace proustien (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), and 
Gaëtan Picon’s Lecture de Proust (Paris: Gallimard, 1968).
is also always distinctive on the basis of sensuous and emotional states that we go 
through during the act of reading – states which may often remain ‘unmarked’ for the 
time being but can resurface and be ‘re-experienced’ in retrospect. These kinds of 
sensuous and emotional dimensions are absolutely crucial in the working of our 
imagination and, together with those life experiences of which we are more fully aware, 
they form a foundation for experiencing the new and the unfamiliar; in this sense, the 
experience of a book is never ‘abstracted’ from our everyday life. I do not consider this 
foundation as functioning merely on the basic level of ‘horizon of expectations’ – a term 
introduced in reader-response theories – but instead, in line with Gadamerian 
hermeneutics, as something more intrinsic, more fundamental, and less abstract: 
familiarity which gives rise to certain kinds of instincts (or, in Gadamer’s terms 
‘prejudices’3) which guide the reading experience in the same way that they guide the 
experience of ‘being oneself’.
While I acknowledge the importance of reader-response theories in having drawn 
attention to the reading process in the history of literary criticism, in this study I will not 
use uniformist reader-response theories, such as Wolfgang Iser’s, as a part of my critical 
framework.4 Although these theories examine the process of reading very closely, the 
focus is often still very much on the text – how a text makes people read and how it may 
or may not be affected in the reading process. As my project is concerned with the 
reader’s selfhood, I re-focalise the question related to the relationship between the 
reader and the text and concentrate on the possible ways in which the aesthetic 
experience of reading may enhance the reader’s self-understanding. The aspects of the 
reading experience I emphasise below require the reader to be understood as a 
psychophysical entity in the world; thus the ‘implied reader’ of the uniformist reader-
response theories seems too abstract to be employed in this analysis.
Literature’s communicative potential has been in the focus of various studies of Proust’s 
novel – those by Philip Bailey, Martha Nussbaum and Roger Shattuck, to name but a 
8
3 Gadamer uses the term ‘prejudice’ in the original non-negative sense of the word, referring simply to 
‘conditions whereby we experience something – whereby what we encounter says something to us’. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley, London: 
University of California Press, 1976), p. 9. 
4  Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1978).
few.5 Much of the discussion around the meta-fictional dimension of Proust’s novel has 
focused on the writer’s relation to the work of art, his readership and himself through 
his work; for example David Ellison offers an insightful discussion of the self-creative 
elements and communication with the self through autobiographical writing.6 While the 
possibilities of redemption and self-understanding through art in Proust’s novel have 
been widely studied in the context of the Narrator’s artistic creation and his ‘growth’ 
into a writer, the role of the reader has received far less critical interest until quite 
recently. Earlier, for example Roland Barthes in his Plaisir du texte has examined the 
effects of reading of the Recherche itself, whilst paying less attention to the experience 
of how the reading experience is actually described in the novel.7 Paul de Man’s 
‘Reading (Proust)’ in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, 
Rilke and Proust, in contrast, approaches the reading experience in and of the Recherche 
through predominantly textually oriented analysis, with quite radically deconstructionist 
outcomes.8
In 2009, around the time when I began my PhD project, the considerable emphasis that 
the Recherche places on reading and the experience of the reader within the novel was 
brought into the limelight in two studies on reading in Proust: the wonderful Reading in 
Proust’s A la Recherche: ‘le délire de la lecture’ by Adam Watt and The Syllables of 
Time: Proust and the History of Reading by Teresa Whitington.9 Particularly Watt’s 
study and his linking of reading and involuntary memory as well as his discussion of the 
sensuous dimension of reading have functioned as a valuable source of inspiration in 
writing this thesis. In his book, Watt concentrates on ‘acts of textual interpretation’ in 
9
5 Philip Bailey, Proust's Self-Reader: The Pursuit of Literature as Privileged Communication 
(Birmingham, AL: Summa Publications, 1997); Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Roger Shattuck, Proust's Way: A 
Field Guide to in Search of Lost Time (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000).
6 David Ellison, The Reading of Proust (US: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), pp. 138-42.
7 Roland Barthes, Le Plaisir du texte (Paris: Seuil, 2000). 
8 By ‘textually-oriented’ I refer to the critical approach which prioritises textual elements in the reading 
process. Paul de Man, ‘Reading (Proust)’ in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 57-78. I shall discuss de 
Man’s approach in more detail towards the end of this introduction, in relation to my views on the 
Proustian reading experience.
9 Adam Watt, Reading in Proust’s A la Recherche: ‘le délire de la lecture’ (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Teresa Whitington, The Syllables of Time: Proust and the History of Reading (London: 
Modern Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2009).
the Recherche through close analysis of an impressive number of examples of scenes of 
reading in the novel, viewing the act of reading as epistemic enterprise which ‘permits – 
and indeed increases – acute analytical thinking and sensory receptiveness to the 
phenomenal world around the reader’, while also examining closely the notion of 
‘délire’ – the errors and ‘readerly delirium’ that any reader is subject to in the act of 
reading.10 
Watt’s study thus fully acknowledges and draws attention to a certain kind of 
paradoxicality in the Proustian reading experience, which is epistemically driven but 
may also be fallacious in its attempt to reconcile the inner and the outer world of the 
reader. Watt calls this situation ‘the dilemma of the reader’ and explores ‘the duality of 
corporeal and intellectual experience in reading’ in insightful analyses of the reading 
scenes in Proust – particularly of the passage in Combray in which the Narrator’s reads 
in the garden.11
While my research fundamentally revolves around the same paradox, I approach and 
consider the experience of reading primarily from the viewpoint of its capacity to 
enhance the reader’s self-understanding, with a special interest in the notion of 
Proustian subjectivity. For me, the starting point in exploring the nature of the reading 
experience is to ask how the reader can become ‘le propre lecteur de soi-même’ through 
someone else and enhance his or her perception of the world and of his or her own self 
by initially moving away from the self. While both Watt’s and Whitington’s studies 
explore reading of different kinds of texts (such as letters, telegrams, newspapers etc. in 
addition to literature) as well as reading in the metaphorical sense, I focus on a specific 
kind of reading experience which I call ‘aesthetic’ reading and which, in Proust, is 
mostly presented through the reading of literary texts.12 In order to assess more fully the 
writer-Narrator’s proposition that reading literature can be particularly ‘self-revelatory’ 
experience, in Part Two of this study I also explore other aesthetic experiences in the 
novel (those of paintings, music and performance) comparatively to that of reading. 
10
10 Watt, see e.g. pp. 9, 13, 15.
11 See Watt, pp. 31-38.
12 Further discussion of the term ‘literary’ will follow in Chapter Two.
Another important aspect of this study is distinguishing between conceptual, nominal 
self-knowledge and self-understanding. While I regard the self as something which is at 
least potentially accessible to knowledge, I prefer the term ‘self-understanding’ because 
of the somewhat persistent connotations of objectification and totality that the notion 
‘self-knowledge’ carries. Furthermore, while this study is also concerned with certain 
phenomena of ‘heightened’ consciousness that seem to be achievable through reading, I 
consider these states always together with those elements in the reading process of 
which the reader is not actively ‘aware’, arguing that these ‘unmarked’ experiences play 
a crucial role in the self-revelatory potential of the experience. It is worth pointing out 
here that in this study the role of these latent or semi-conscious elements in the reading 
experience will be discussed primarily through hermeneutic and phenomenological 
perspectives rather than through psychoanalysis. The application of psychoanalytical 
criticism to Proust’s novel has already produced a range of in-depth studies, including 
Malcolm Bowie’s groundbreaking Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction and 
Julia Kristeva’s Le Temps sensible: Proust et l’expérience littéraire.13
Edward Hughes’s study Marcel Proust: A Study in the Quality of Awareness examines 
multiple forms of consciousness as well as the nature of perception and feeling that 
Proust’s work presents, mainly through the Narrator of the Recherche but also through 
Proust’s earlier works Jean Santeuil and Les Plaisirs et les jours and Proust’s Cahiers. 
Hughes follows, through various carefully-chosen examples, the Narrator’s 
philosophical, social and aesthetic development – how he moves from his adolescent, 
somewhat exaggerated adoration of ‘intellectuals’, artists and philosophers (and the 
disappointments to which these idealised conceptions lead) to acknowledging the 
11
13 Malcolm Bowie, Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), esp. pp. 67-98; Julia Kristeva, Le Temps sensible: Proust et l’expérience littéraire (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1994), e.g. pp. 20-36 (‘La lecture de Sand’), pp. 281-86 (‘Perception et conscience selon 
Freud: difficultés de l’identité et de la différence’), p. 368 (“l’association libre” and time). Also Adam 
Watt occasionally discusses the Narrator’s relationship through psychoanalytical terms, for example in 
analysing the mother’s reading of François le Champi in Combray as a ‘primal scene of reading’ and 
viewing Bergotte as a kind of ‘père perdu’ of the Narrator. See Watt, pp. 25-27, 50, 80. Mary Jacobus’s 
Psychoanalysis and the Scene of Reading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) offers an insightful 
psychoanalytical investigation into the effects of the reading experience in general.
triumph of ‘véritable’ sense-impressions over intellectualism in art later on in the 
novel.14 
The idea that our consciousness can be expanded by a literary experience in particular 
has also been explored by E.F.N. Jephcott in his study Proust and Rilke: the Literature 
of Expanded Consciousness. Jephcott calls these kinds of experiences of heightened 
consciousness ‘privileged moments’ – experiences in which ‘both the quality and the 
structure of awareness are changed’.15 According to Jephcott, ‘the qualitative change 
involves a heightening of sensations and of the apparent meaning they convey’ while 
‘the structural change involves a unification of all parts of awareness to form a total 
system’; this system, then, allows our consciousness to operate free from ‘all the 
conditions and limitations of ordinary life’ and leads into disappearance of subject-
object divisions between the one who experiences and the world.16 
When the reader reads ‘aesthetically’, the ‘conditions and limitations of ordinary life’ 
indeed seem to temporarily disappear, but in this study I argue that this freedom from 
the ‘everyday experience’ is, in fact, illusory. Contrarily to Jephcott, I suggest that the 
disappearance of the subject-object division and the self-revelatory potential of the 
reading process is produced by the congruity of the ordinary (often mundane) everyday 
experience and the mediated experience rather than by some kind of escapism (or 
liberation) from the ‘lived’ experience. A ‘privileged moment’ therefore, even if it can 
give us the sense of extra-temporality and universality, cannot merely be produced by 
the text but indeed, as Proust’s Narrator suggests, by descending ‘plus profondément en 
moi’ (RTP IV, 624).
Jephcott furthermore argues that these changes in our awareness during the privileged 
moments lead to ‘disappearance of the separate individuality’ since ‘this climactic 
12
14 Edward J. Hughes, Marcel Proust: A Study in the Quality of Awareness (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 66 (see pp. 62-68 and elsewhere). In his study, Hughes also analyses several 
other characters in the novel – Françoise, the grandmother and Albertine in particular – showing how the 
Narrator’s interaction with them changes, expands and distorts his perception of the world around him as 
well as his ‘interior’ universe and his perception of himself. (See Hughes, pp. 69-73, 77-84 and 132-159.) 
15 E.F.N. Jephcott, Proust and Rilke: the Literature of Expanded Consciousness (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1972), p. 29.
16 Jephcott, p. 28.
moment, however widely individual descriptions of it may vary, is in all cases, in terms 
of the changed awareness of time, space and individuality, essentially the same 
experience.’17 Through close analysis of passages dealing with reading, the memories of 
reading, and the concept of ‘la réalité’ in the Recherche, I argue that instead of leading 
to the disappearance of the sense of the self, these moments of recognising the analogies 
or continuities of sensations in the past and the present do exactly the opposite: they 
point to the reader-subject’s unique way of ‘appropriating’ his or her experiences. 
The feeling of exhilaration one may experience at these moments of ‘heightened 
consciousness’ can therefore just as well be considered as a proof of individuality and of 
a sense of unique existence. The fact that we are able to mark these analogies in the first  
place shows that there must be something essentially shared between the subject who 
experiences now and in the past. This does not of course mean that the ideas and 
sensations that reading evokes cannot also be shared between different readers or 
between the reader and the writer (and in this sense, considered as potentially 
universal). However, the Proustian process of reading ‘en soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610) is an 
inherently individualised one in so far that it cannot happen, as we shall see in the 
coming chapters, without the interaction between the text and the reader’s own unique 
sphere of experience – the transitory emotive and sensuous universe through which the 
reader travels in time. 
Rather than being an exclusively metaphysical enquiry into how subjectivity is 
presented in the Recherche, this study focuses, through close analysis of Proust’s text, 
on the ways in which potential self-understanding can be obtained through the aesthetic 
experience. Part one of the thesis comprises the introduction to the theoretical 
framework I use and examines some underpinning issues related to the question of 
coherent selfhood that in Western philosophy arise particularly after the Cartesian 
separation between the cognitive ‘subject’ and the object-like body. Rather than 
approaching the processes of self-understanding and self-creation through a strictly 
psychological angle, my approach will be more epistemologically and ontologically 
oriented, with a special emphasis on the role of art, and the relation between immediate 
experience ‘in-the-world’ and mediated experience, especially that of a literary text.
13
17 Jephcott, pp. 28-9.
One way to approach the term ‘literary’ and the nature of literary reading experiences is 
to ask what is ‘other’ to literature. In the present study, I consider the phenomenon of 
literature by discussing it in relation to philosophy, other art forms, as well as everyday 
communication in the context of Proust’s novel. As the principal concern of this study is 
to examine the experience of reading in Proust’s novel and the implications of this 
process for the reader-subject, we must start by considering what kind of notion of 
selfhood is implied in Proust’s novel: who or what is the ‘soi-même’ the Narrator refers 
to when he suggests that a book may enable its readers to ‘lire en eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 
610)? 
In chapter one I introduce the general critical framework within which my study will 
explore selfhood, the relationship between ‘primary’ immediate experience and its 
mediation, and the nature of ‘la réalité’ within Proust’s novel. I discuss the development 
of the modernist subject prominently through theories of Descartes, Kierkegaard, 
Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Gadamer, with a special emphasis on the role of 
aesthetic experience in the process of self-understanding. Chapter Two focuses on the 
philosophical implications of Proust’s novel and, more generally, the relation between 
truth and fiction, as well as the relationship between writing and reading, the writer and 
his audience. I approach this relationship through R.G. Collingwood’s theory which, 
especially in its emphasis on the active role of the reader, is in many ways analogous 
with the views that Proust’s Narrator expresses in Le Temps retrouvé.18
In order to explore the nature of the Proustian aesthetic reading experience more 
comprehensively, we need to also consider the ways in which other art forms, such as 
visual art and music, are experienced in Proust’s novel; these comparisons will be 
carried out in Part Two of this study. Chapter Three focuses on the experience of 
paintings and examines the impact of visual art on the Narrator’s perception (both visual 
and psychological) of the world around him. Especially Elstir’s impressionist works, 
which provoke deep admiration in the Narrator, play a significant role in revealing to 
him the significance of sense-impressions in art. However, while visual artworks seem 
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18 For example, Collingwood remarks that the artist ‘must prophesy not in the sense that he tells things to 
come, but in the sense that he tells his audience, at risk of their displeasure, the secrets of their own 
hearts’. Robin George Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 336.
to affect the onlooker’s perception, they also always seem to position the viewer outside 
the artwork and therefore forever represent the vision of the ‘other’. At the end of 
Chapter Three, I discuss this ‘otherness’ aspect in the reception of visual art through 
painting-related imagery in the novel presented, for example in the Bois de Boulogne 
episode – the chronological interval in Du Côté de chez Swann – in which the Narrator 
discusses ‘la contradiction que c’est de chercher dans la réalité les tableaux de la 
mémoire, auxquels manquerait toujours le charme qui leur vient de la mémoire même et 
de n’être pas perçus par les sens’ (RTP I, 414).
In Chapter Four I consider the experience of music and the performing arts, paying 
special attention to the presence/ absence of language in the appropriation of the 
artwork. In Peter Kivy’s words, music can be considered as concept-laden but ‘[these] 
concepts are not expressive of semantic or representational properties’.19 Thus the 
aesthetic properties of a musical piece cannot be analysed on the basis of their content 
or ‘representational’ qualities in the way that for example representational paintings can; 
it seems, rather, that referentiality and meaningfulness in the experience of music 
happens through a more gradual process in which the role of time, repetition and 
memory are heightened. 
The experience of dramatic art, which also features in the Recherche, shares some 
features of music and literature alike, having a textual as well as a performative 
dimension. The coexistence of multiple interpretations (by the actors on the stage and 
the spectator) as well as a specific spatio-temporal context make the experience of 
drama distinctly different from what might be described as a freer and more 
independent experience of reading the text. The Recherche offers an example of the 
clash between these two experiences, which originates in the spectator having 
appropriated the play through reading before seeing it performed on stage: La Berma’s 
performance of Racine’s Phèdre, fervently anticipated by the adolescent Narrator, 
eventually renders him bitterly disappointed. I discuss this incident at the end of 
Chapter Four and suggest this discordance can partly be explained through the 
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19 Peter Kivy, Music, Language, and Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 225.
proposition that language is performative in itself.20 The ‘recipient’ is never merely a 
recipient when there is language involved – he or she is always also an interpreter and a 
(re)creator.21
This suggestion leads us back to consider the Proustian proposition of reading ‘en soi-
même’ (RTP IV, 610) which will be the focus of the third and the final part of the thesis. 
In the last two chapters I discuss the experience of reading in the Recherche and return 
to the questions presented in Part One about subjectivity and the relationship between 
direct and mediated experience. It is worth pointing out here that the thesis will not 
concern itself with questions of literary value, that is, the evaluative basis on which 
some texts may be considered as aesthetically and literally more valuable than others; 
rather, I consider the ‘literariness’ of texts through the mode/s of reading that the reader 
employs. I focus on the ways in which the text becomes meaningful for the reader, 
rather than on some evaluative act performer by the reader, based on the quality or the 
features of the text. 
Chapter Five focuses explicitly on literature’s communicative possibilities and the 
different modes of reading in the Recherche. Through analysing different readers within 
the Recherche – including the Narrator’s mother and grandmother reading Mme de 
Sévigné; Jupien using literary references in his ‘code-language’; the young valet in the 
Narrator’s apartment with a zeal to quote from literary works; and, finally, the Narrator 
himself – I propose that it is the mode of reading rather than necessarily the style or the 
contents of the text itself which ultimately makes the reading experience aesthetic and 
potentially ‘self-revelatory’. 
In Chapter Six I explore the notion of ‘les propres lecteurs d’eux-mêmes’ and, through 
discussing the role of the senses, memory and ‘[la] notion du temps incorporé’ (RTP IV, 
623) in the reading process, I consider the parallels between the process of reading ‘en 
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20 Peter Kivy proposes that a certain kind of fictional reading can, due to its creative dimension, be 
considered as a form of art, or at least as artistic performance in his book The Performance of Reading: 
an Essay in the Philosophy of Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. 29 (passim).
21 A note on the words ‘reception’ and ‘recipient’ in this study: I generally prefer to talk about readers, 
viewers and listeners to emphasise the active role of the one who experiences – and not only active in the 
process of understanding and interpreting the artwork but, indeed, in understanding and interpreting their 
own selves in the process. Aesthetic experience in the present study is considered as a creative process in 
its own right – as Sartre puts it, ‘le synthèse de la perception et la création’. Jean-Paul Sartre, Qu’est-ce 
que la littérature? in Situations II (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 92.
soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610) and the Proustian process of ‘becoming oneself’, which will 
be discussed through close analysis of the opening scene of the novel. I ask whether the 
aesthetic experience in Proust is presented as a trans-subjective state or whether it is, in 
fact, something which revives, reassures and advocates if not an entirely coherent then 
at least a unified selfhood for the reader-subject. 
One of the most radical deconstructionist readings of the Recherche is presented in Paul 
de Man’s Allegories of Reading. According to de Man, Proust’s novel, through its 
imagery, ‘aims at the most demanding of reconciliations, that of motion and stasis’, and 
an attempt at this kind of reconciliation is also immanent in the Narrator, between his 
inner landscape and what is happening ‘outside’ in the world. De Man argues that this 
reconciliation only becomes possible through imagination and specific rhetorical 
devices of language, such as metaphor and metonymy, and that without these devices – 
without the creative interference of language – the outside world (as well as our 
sensuous experiences of it) are considered as something which is bound to repeatedly 
disappoint us and leave us with mere fragmented experience of our existence.22 
However, de Man goes on to remark how not even imaginative use of language can 
fully reconcile the eternal contradiction the Narrator feels between his inner and the 
external world. As the metaphor always includes an element of impossibility, the very 
contradiction remains embodied and manifested in it; this leads de Man to suggest that 
Proust’s text can in fact be viewed as ‘an allegorical narrative of its own 
deconstruction’.23 
While I acknowledge the significance of powerful figurative language and metaphor in 
a novel such as Proust’s (and indeed, in the Narrator’s own ‘theory’ of the relationship 
between ‘la réalité’ and its representation24), my primary angle to self-understanding 
through literary texts is the experience of the reader. What I propose in this study is, 
contrary to de Man, that in an aesthetic reading experience the power to ‘reconcile’ is 
never a property of a text alone but in fact only ever becomes available within a 
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22 de Man, pp. 68-72.
23 de Man, p. 72.
24 ‘Ce que nous appelons la réalité est un certain rapport entre ces sensations et les souvenirs qui nous 
entourent simultanément [...]. rapport unique que l’écrivain doit retrouver pour en enchaîner à jamais [...] 
dans une métaphore’ (RTP IV, 468).
complex and highly subjective process in which the reader recognises the affinity 
between ‘lived’ and ‘mediated’ experience. Both reading and ‘being oneself’ involve 
engagement in a constant process which is both self-reflexive and self-reflective at the 
same time; the attempt to comprehend the self as some kind of fixed entity which can be 
objectively grasped would therefore only produce the same kind of ostensible 
knowledge as talking about a book as an art-object. True self-understanding requires 
constant involvement in a complex process of becoming, in the same way that a book 
can only truly become meaningful through the reading process. 
A text that shows how contradictory elements can co-exist harmoniously may alleviate 
the perpetual striving for immediate access to knowledge and ‘truth’ which Heidegger 
refers to as ‘the metaphysics of presence’.25 In other words, reading a text may reveal to 
us the phenomenological continuity of Being, the inseparability of past and present 
within us, because when we read, the possible ‘reconciliation’ does not happen through 
imagination or intellect alone but also always rises from the reader’s own past lived 
experiences in-the-world – including previously unmarked experiences (such as 
sensuous experiences) that play a crucial role in the way our memory works. The 
Narrator’s remark as to how ‘les idées sont des succédanés des chagrins’ (RTP IV, 485) 
for instance emphasises the processual relationship between the lived experiences and 
their reflection – that is, how ‘direct’ experiences transcend into ideas and lay 
foundations for our subsequent experience. However, ideas are ‘succédanés [de chagrin] 
dans l’ordre du temps seulement’ (RTP IV, 485, my emphasis). Thus, it seems that this 
process of making experiences ‘timeless’ itself requires time, as well as new 
experiences which make us see the past in a new light.
Thus, the notion of selfhood presented in Proust’s novel seems not to be that of the self 
as an essence that simply fixedly ‘is there’ to be objectively grasped and represented, 
since a self understood in those terms would necessarily be ultimately attached to a 
specific moment in time. Rather, this ‘real’ essence can only truly be understood as what 
unifies the experiences of the subject across time, and therefore it can only be accessed 
through an on-going process that binds representation and direct experience together. As 
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25 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, [1962] 1993), pp. 43-50 and elsewhere.
Paul Crowther puts it, ‘our fundamental cognition of the world is not purely 
‘mental’ [but] a function of all our sensory, motor, and affective capacities operating as 
a unified field.’26 This ‘bodily’ dimension and its significance to self-understanding are 
dramatically manifested in the relatively short passages describing the paralysis and 
death of the Narrator’s grandmother, which I discuss at the end of my study. 
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26 Paul Crowther, Art and Embodiment: From Aesthetics to Self-Consciousness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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PART I
SELF, SUBJECTIVITY AND LITERATURE
We make the world our own, with words
and our pointing fingers, perhaps by the pieces
frailest and most dangerous to us. [...] 
See, now together we must bear,
as if the whole, these fragments and parts. 
– Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘Sonnet XVI’ in The Sonnets to Orpheus1
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University Press, 2012), p. 199.
1. Selfhood, Mediation and the Primacy of Experience
In Albertine disparue, the Narrator, who is trying to come to terms with the fact that 
Albertine has left him, breaks into tears at the sight of the barber who has come to cut 
his hair. This happens simply because he has forgotten about ‘le “moi” que j’étais quand 
je me faisais couper les cheveux’ (RTP IV, 14) – one of his multiple selves who has not 
yet been informed about Albertine’s departure. The Narrator takes certain precautions to 
keep any memories of Albertine at bay – for example by seating himself on one of the 
blue satin armchairs on which he never used to sit before, in order to avoid the sight of 
her pianola – but all these attempts are in vain:
Hélas! je ne m’y étais jamais assis, avant cette minute, que quand Albertine était 
encore là. Aussi je ne pus y rester, je me levai; et ainsi à chaque instant il y avait 
quelqu’un des innombrables et humbles ‘moi’ qui nous composent qui était 
ignorant encore du départ d’Albertine et à qui il fallait le notifier; il fallait [...] 
annoncer le malheur qui venait d’arriver à tous ces êtres, à tous ces ‘moi’ qui ne le 
savaient pas encore; il fallait que chacun d’eux à son tour entendît pour la 
première fois ces mots: ‘Albertine a demandé ses malles’ – ces malles en forme de 
cercueil que j’avais vu charger à Balbec à côté de celles de ma mère, – ‘Albertine 
est partie’. 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 14 
The Narrator seems to be facing here a certain lack of cohesion between his past 
experiences – habitual, repeated experiences like getting a haircut – and the newly 
acquired fact that Albertine is gone. What seems to be suggested here is that the past is 
not automatically affected by the present; the different selves that have not yet been 
touched by Albertine’s departure seem to rebel against it by cropping up in different 
contexts, renewing and intensifying the Narrator’s distress.
Out of this situation arises a range of questions concerning Proustian subjectivity, the 
sense of self, memory, knowledge, reality, and the way we appropriate our experiences. 
The passage prompts us to consider, first of all, the way in which the subject here is 
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presented as a composition of multiple selves at different points in time, and the need 
that arises from this multiplicity for communication with one’s own self. It also opens 
up several questions concerning the relationship between primary experience and 
mediation, such as whether we ultimately always need some kind of mediation to make 
our experiences our experiences. It is with these questions in mind that I begin to survey  
the landscape of the Proustian subject in this chapter.
In its presentation of selfhood, Proust’s novel seems to linger somewhere between 
essentialism and a prefiguring of the postmodern dissolution of the subject. The 
Narrator’s multiple selves are not called forth by reminiscing, by conscious thought, but 
by unexpected emotive and sensuous impressions evoked by objects and bodily 
experiences (the sight of Albertine’s pianola, getting a haircut). While the painful task of 
mediating the news of Albertine’s departure to the previous selves seems never-ending, 
these different selves do not seem to exist in total isolation from one another; at the very  
least, they inhabit the same body whose experiences serve as evocation of the past 
within the present. The way in which the conscious, rational mind here, as on so many 
other occasions in the Recherche, is challenged by the primary experience and 
(involuntary) memory manifests in its own right Proust’s detachment from the Cartesian 
division between the object-like body that senses and the cognitive mind as the 
‘subject’ that governs the experience ‘par la pensée’.1
The urge to communicate with one’s own self is manifested in a somewhat more 
positive light than in the above example in the context of the Narrator’s ‘moments 
bienheureux’ which, in turn, signal a strong sense of continuity between the different 
selves. However, even though these instances of involuntary memory seem to produce a 
blissful sense of disclosure, this ‘redeeming’ quality seems to always remain fugitive 
because the Narrator, during these moments, never quite seems to arrive at explanation 
of these experiences. The ‘moments bienheureux’ thus show that while mediation ‘par 
la pensée’ alone seems to remain infertile as far as encompassing ‘reality’ is concerned, 
the mere primary sensuous experiences without mediation, are only capable of 
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producing an intermittent sense of continuity to which we cannot hold on. The situation 
prompts us to ask, then, are there means to overcome this intermittency? 
An answer to this question strongly suggested in Proust’s novel points us in the 
direction of art. Aesthetic experiences are one domain of experience which in Proust is 
celebrated for its capacity to unite the cognitive and sensuous faculties and blur the 
boundaries between mediation and immediate experience. Precisely due to these 
qualities, aesthetic experiences seem to hold a specific potential to create a sense of 
unity in the subject who experiences, and examples of such ‘unifying’ moments will be 
discussed in the coming chapters in the context of visual art, music, performance and, 
particularly, the reading of literature.
The role of art in life has been the object of philosophical investigation since Plato, and 
the significance of aesthetic experience in the formation of selfhood took a particularly 
central role in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with Romanticism and 
German Idealism. The discussion of art and selfhood in the philosophies of Schelling, 
Schlegel, Schopenhauer, and later in Nietzsche, all of whom foreground the significance 
of aesthetic experience as an essential part of self-formation and one of the most 
prominent manifestations of individual subjectivity, has left a distinctive mark on many 
subsequent views on selfhood, such as psychoanalytical theories.2 The discovery and 
creation of one’s own self via aesthetic routes is also prominently present in 
existentialism, starting with Søren Kierkegaard (who despite his theological background 
and emphasis writes very adroitly on the loss of coherence and exterior authority 
affecting the Modernist subject), and continuing strongly in the works of Jean-Paul 
Sartre and Albert Camus. 
Existentialist aesthetics emphasises especially the ways in which experiences of art 
allow the subject to realise how fine the lines between what he knows of the world and 
how he imagines it (or indeed, ‘chooses’ it) actually are. I shall explore this aspect of 
self-formation in section 1.3 below by analysing the ways in which some of the 
characters in Proust seem to use aesthetic experiences to shape their outward 
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Humanities Press, 1992), pp. 170-4. Also Romantic artists such as Wordsworth took great interest in the 
combination of sensuous experience of the world and imagination in the formation of selfhood.
portraiture; there seems to be a difference between this kind of deliberate self-
fashioning and a more open-ended process of self-creation that draws from the aesthetic 
experience by allowing it to kindle the powers of memory and imagination.
To situate Proust’s project in his contemporary context, it was exactly this kind of 
fragmentation of experience within the self that is depicted in the passage above which 
was one of the main concerns of Modernist literature. As Charles Taylor remarks:
[The] turn inward [in Modernism], to experience or subjectivity, did not mean a 
turn to a self to be articulated, where this is understood as an alignment of nature 
and reason, or instinct and creative power. On the contrary, the turn inward may 
take us beyond the self as usually understood, to a fragmentation of experience 
which calls our ordinary notions of identity into question … or beyond that to a 
new kind of unity, a new way of inhabiting time, as we see, for instance, with 
Proust.3
The crucial importance of this new kind of presentation of selfhood, then, was to show 
that subjectivity should not be regarded as just something which simply ‘is there’ to be 
represented but how representation always is an integral part of subjectivity. This 
suggested ‘new kind of unity, a new way of inhabiting time’ in Proust seems to happen 
(at least partly) by dispelling the Cartesian separation between the immediate 
experiences of the object-like body and the mind that mediates, and considering, 
instead, mediation as a part of the experience itself.
1.1. Selfhood: from Cogito to Self-understanding
Despite the indisputably significant role that mediation plays in the Recherche, the 
possibility of self-understanding that the novel implies is based on something other than 
the logic of the Cartesian ‘cogito’: instead of extracting knowledge of one’s experience 
by thinking, the Proustian process emphasises the inseparability of the experience and 
its mediation, and how the sense of understanding oneself (indeed rather than 
‘knowing’ oneself) is attached to a realisation of the affinity between the two. 
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As Taylor notes, in Cartesian philosophy, ‘we have to objectify the world, including our 
own bodies, and that means to come to see them mechanistically and functionally, in the 
same way that an uninvolved external observer would’ in order to arrive at ‘full 
understanding’ of our being.4 Proust puts his finger on the unsustainability of such 
elevation of mind over matter, or at the expense of matter, by portraying several 
occasions in which the material, empirical reality intervenes with our mental and 
emotional states in a crucial way. A madeleine dipped in tea, an uneven paving stone, 
the feel of a napkin against the skin and the clink of a spoon against the coffee cup are 
the most famous examples of such sensuous, ‘direct’ bodily experiences that function as 
the magical key, a ‘Sesame’ proper, in the process of the Narrator’s revelation about ‘le 
temps incorporé, des années passées non séparées de nous’ (RTP IV, 623).5
According to Descartes, we gain knowledge of our being and things in the world not 
through direct experience nor through imagination but ‘par la pensée’ only:
Nous ne concevons les corps que par la faculté d’entendre qui est en nous, & non 
point par l’imagination n[i] par les sens, & que nous ne les connaissons pas de ce 
que nous les voyons, ou que nous les touchons, mais seulement de ce que nous les 
concevons par la pensée’.6 
In many ways, Proust’s novel seems to call into question this idea of immediate, direct 
experience being secondary to thought. In fact, it seems the Proustian subject quite 
simply needs the bodily experience to arrive at any kind of genuine understanding of the 
self. Often the sensuous experiences that yield the Narrator a profound sense of 
existence seem not to be significant or remarkable as such, and it is unlikely that the 
Narrator would go searching for truths or his past from these sources ‘seulement [...] par 
la pensée’, without the sensuous trigger.
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4 Taylor, p. 145 (my emphasis).
5 The Narrator describes the occurrences of involuntary memory through these sensuous experiences 
described above as a kind of equivalent of a magical code which suddenly opens the doors to one’s past: 
‘Mais c’est quelquefois au moment où tout nous semble perdu que l’avertissement arrive qui peut nous 
sauver: on a frappé à toutes les portes qui ne donnent sur rien, et la seule par où on peut entrer et qu’on 
aurait cherchée en vain pendant cent ans, on y heurte sans le savoir et elle s’ouvre.’ (RTP IV, 445).
6 Descartes, p. 157 (my emphasis).
It must be noted that the Cartesian dualism, too, ‘needs the bodily as the Platonic 
[dualism] did not’ since ‘the Cartesian [soul] discovers and affirms his immaterial 
nature by objectifying the bodily’, not through the world of Ideas.7 However, in the 
Proustian universe, the bodily experience and its meaning, such as tasting the renowned 
madeleine, cannot be grasped by objectifying it – ‘la vertu [quality] du breuvage’ (RTP 
I, 45) is to be found neither in the taste nor through analysing the taste or texture of the 
madeleine. Rather, it is within the subject of the experience that the answer can be 
produced – and indeed, produced, not simply reached:
Je pose la tasse et me tourne vers mon esprit. C’est à lui de trouver la vérité. Mais 
comment? Grave incertitude, toutes les fois que l’esprit se sent dépassé par lui-
même; quand lui, le chercheur, est tout ensemble le pays obscur où il doit 
chercher et où tout son bagage ne lui sera de rien. Chercher? pas seulement: créer. 
Il est en face de quelque chose qui n’est pas encore et que seul il peut réaliser, 
puis faire entrer dans sa lumière. 
   A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 45 (my emphasis)
The question of how to arrive at the truth remains with the Narrator for the following 
three thousand or so pages, even though the answer – that the truth is obtainable not 
merely by searching for it but by bringing it into being – is already foreshadowed here. 
Creation here needs to be understood in broad terms: it points to the way a sensation 
moves our ‘esprit’ into a space of disclosure in between the self and the other, the 
familiar and the unfamiliar, and engages us in a creative interpretative process. 
The suggestion that art may help us to understand our own selves – and not necessarily 
what the self is but rather how it comes to being – underlies Proust’s narrative and 
surfaces into explicit statements in some of the passages of philosophical contemplation 
by the Narrator. Aesthetic experiences seem to function in this revelatory way because 
they grant us a certain kind of freedom to move between the imaginary and the real. In 
the present study, the synthesis of the epistemological and ontological (and indeed, also 
of the mental and somatic) dimensions of the self will therefore be argued out mainly 
through close-reading of passages in the Recherche which describe different aesthetic 
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Principles, 1.68, in Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1973), IX-2, 
p. 56.
experiences, together with passages describing the somewhat mystifying experiences of 
‘les moments bienheureux’ and ‘les intermittences du cœur’.
Thus, what primarily differentiates the Proustian view of selfhood from the Cartesian 
cogito is that it is not ‘par la pensée’ only (or even primarily) that we arrive at some 
kind of disclosure of reality and ourselves. Of course, to some extent the outside world, 
things and people in it, need to be objectified and arranged conceptually in order for us 
to be able to carry on with our daily lives.8 But Proust’s novel never fails to emphasise 
that thinking of one’s own self in this kind of objective, conceptual way includes the 
risk of ignoring a vast and rich web of experiences that underlies the conscious, rational 
mind, as well as ignoring the crucial role of emotions and fortuitous impressions in the 
process of understanding the self and the world. As Malcolm Bowie remarks, ‘the path 
towards meaning, or insight [in Proust] is a circuitous one: it is only by paying attention 
to such unworthy and unpromising things as blushes, silences, semantic vacancies or 
redundancies, and involuntary acts that truth may be approached’.9
For example, contemplating Albertine’s departure, the Narrator makes the following 
remark about the difference between reasoning through intelligence and the ‘real’ 
experience: 
l’intelligence n’est pas l’instrument le plus subtil, le plus puissant, le plus 
approprié pour saisir le vrai, ce n’est qu’une raison de plus pour commencer par 
l’intelligence et non par un intuitivisme de l’inconscient, par une foi aux 
pressentiments toute faite. C’est la vie qui peu à peu, cas par cas, nous permet de 
remarquer que ce qui est le plus important pour notre cœur, ou pour notre esprit, 
ne nous est pas appris par le raisonnement mais par des puissances autres.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 7 
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cas arrangée’. Bergson, La Pensée et le mouvant: essais et conférences (Paris: Quadrige/Puf, 1985 
[1938]), p.18, 22 (my emphasis).
9 Malcolm Bowie, Proust, Jealousy, Knowledge (London: University of London, Queen Mary College, 
1978), p. 8.
What is manifested here is the inability to access reality simply through reasoning and 
the elementary role of impression and life experience in the shaping of ‘les 
innombrables et humbles “moi” qui nous composent’ (RTP IV, 13). The ‘facts’ and our 
immediate experiences do not seem to become ‘reality’ automatically when we 
encounter them, but only when they are mediated. Indeed, the facts (‘les faits’) in the 
Proustian universe seem to be perpetually challenged by ‘veritable impressions’ caused 
by primary life experiences that have been segmented in our memory – and these 
experiences need not be particularly significant in any way but can be as basic as getting 
a haircut. 
In the multiplicity of the selves and the need for communication arising from this 
multiplicity, the question arises of what makes an experience real to us and ours in the 
first place? Next, I turn to discuss the relationship between mediation and 
‘dévoilement’ – the disclosure of truth or reality – and consider a more positive 
occasion of appropriating an experience in Proust where the Narrator sees the steeples 
of Martinville ‘anew’.
1.2. The Primacy of Experience and Mediation: ‘Les clochers de Martinville’
The problem of not being able to grasp or interpret experiences to his satisfaction 
simply by thinking about them objectively and trying to comprehend them 
‘intellectually’ follows the Narrator throughout the novel. For example Heidegger 
discusses the failings of this kind of quasi-intellectual approach in Being and Time and 
suggests that mediation, when it reaches overly analytical measures, can in fact prevent 
us from grasping the ‘disclosure’ or ‘unconcealment’ (aletheia) of how things really are 
in the world. According to Heidegger, the only way we may actually feel ourselves 
being a part of the world and coherent is by ceasing to strive for ‘immediate meaning’ 
and instead acknowledging the processual nature of understanding our experiences in 
the world and in time.10 
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In his later essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger modifies his view by 
proposing that mediation through art seems to avoid this problem of detachment from 
the world that arises from treating it as an object and is therefore able to potentially 
enhance the sense of true disclosure of the world and our own selves.11 A similar 
prospect is realised by Proust’s Narrator at the end of Le Temps retrouvé, where the 
solution for this quandary between direct, ‘insignificant’ experiences and the sense of 
their crucial importance (despite their apparent intellectual or philosophical vacuity), 
seems to become at least potentially solvable through artistic creation. 
Just prior to the description of writing the prose poem of the Martinville steeples, the 
Narrator has come to the conclusion that he will never be able to write himself. He is 
convinced that the tantalising sensations caused by things such as ‘un reflet de soleil sur 
une pierre, l’odeur d’un chemin’ (RTP I, 176) can never lead him towards executing his 
literary aspirations, because
ce n’était pas des impressions de ce genre qui pouvaient me rendre l’espérance 
que j’avais perdue de pouvoir être un jour écrivain et poète, car elles étaient 
toujours liées à un objet particulier dépourvu de valeur intellectuelle et ne se 
rapportant à aucune vérité abstraite. Mais du moins elles me donnaient un plaisir 
irraisonné, l’illusion d’une sorte de fécondité et par là me distrayaient de l’ennui, 
du sentiment de mon impuissance que j’avais éprouvés chaque fois que j’avais 
cherché un sujet philosophique pour une grande œuvre littéraire.
      
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 176-7 
This is the starting point of the Narrator’s aesthetic quest, exemplifying also the 
Proustian sense of irony, as it is exactly these kinds of sensuous, direct, everyday 
experiences which are ‘dépourvu[s] de valeur intellectuelle et ne se rapportant à aucune 
vérité abstraite’ and which the Narrator here presents as sources of ‘un plaisir 
irraisonné’ (and of little else) that eventually reveal to him the sense of ‘le temps 
incorporé, des années passées non séparées de nous’ (RTP IV, 623) and provide him 
with a topic for his book. With such a notion of time as its starting point, the Narrator’s 
novelistic project seems to commence under the kind of hermeneutic reflection that 
‘exercises a self-criticism of thinking consciousness, a criticism that translates all its 
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D. F. Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 143-187.
own abstractions [...] back into the whole of human experience of the world,’ as 
Gadamer puts it.12 It is precisely via this kind of ‘self-criticism of thinking 
consciousness’ that the Narrator is eventually able to set out to ‘translate’ this reality 
into a work of art. 
The Martinville episode at the end of Combray describes one of the Narrator’s earliest 
moments of artistic inspiration: the young Narrator feels compelled to put down in 
writing the sensations evoked by the sight of the Martinville steeples. While deep 
philosophical reflection, the progress of thought over the years, and meticulous labour 
at the end of Le Temps retrouvé present one side of the Narrator’s work as a writer, the 
Martinville passage illustrates the other side: the sudden inexplicable urge, inspiration 
born out of direct impressions. This experience makes the Narrator aware of the 
temporality of the experience itself and his own existence (or in Heideggerian terms, his 
Dasein – a being who is constituted by the awareness of its own temporality), and the 
process of creation here seems to in some ways alleviate the anxiety caused by this 
realisation.
Travelling in Doctor Percepied’s carriage, the Narrator perceives the Martinville 
steeples on the horizon – the same steeples he has seen countless times before, but 
which he now, due to the speed with which he now approaches them, sees in a 
completely new way:
Au tournant d’un chemin j’éprouvai tout à coup ce plaisir spécial qui ne 
ressemblait à aucun autre, à apercevoir les deux clochers de Martinville, sur 
lesquels donnait le soleil couchant et que le mouvement de notre voiture et les 
lacets du chemin avaient l’air de faire changer de place, puis celui de Vieuxvicq 
qui, séparé d’eux par une colline et une vallée, et situé sur un plateau plus élevé 
dans le lointain, semblait pourtant tout voisin d’eux. ... [Je] sentais que je n’allais 
pas au bout de mon impression, que quelque chose était derrière ce mouvement, 
derrière cette clarté, quelque chose qu’ils semblaient contenir et dérober à la fois.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 177
It is suggested that this fresh yet familiar impression of the steeples does indeed hold 
(‘contenir’) the potential for some discovery, but also seems to slip away (‘dérober’) at 
30
12 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 94.
the same time: the impression situates itself somewhere between the familiar and the 
unfamiliar and calls for communication between the two. 
Let us start by considering the role of perception here. Maurice Merleau-Ponty views 
perception as something which is always intentional in the sense that it is always 
directed towards something; it does not necessarily require or aim at action (such as 
expression) but always nevertheless registers the potentiality for action.13 Merleau-
Ponty’s approach – especially in marking the significance of the sensuous and bodily in 
both our existence in the world and in the way we become conscious of it – offers a 
valuable alternative to the Cartesian cogito and chimes with the Proustian emphasis on 
the primary experience and impressions in the process of creation. As Dousson remarks 
in the dossier to L’Œil et l’esprit:
Le cogito, c’est l’identité immédiate de soi à soi qui constitue le principe de tout 
rapport au monde comme idéalisme conférant une science élaborée 
indépendamment de l’expérience sensible, car fondée sur des idées innées. ‘Je 
peux’ exprime une sorte de cogito perceptif, qui s’établit […] par l’immersion 
originelle dans le monde qu’est l’habitation.14
      
The Cartesian ‘cogito’ (‘je pense’) is replaced with a perceptive ‘je peux’, which 
operates not merely on the level of the mind but indeed in our direct, sensuous 
experience of the world as well. 
There appears to be some kind of intentionality in the experience of the steeples, which, 
along the lines of Merleau-Ponty’s theory, awaits to be released. What brings the 
Narrator closer to catching this pleasure and stopping it from disappearing is the idea of 
recording the experience, even though at first he seems reluctant to take on this task:
Je ne savais pas la raison du plaisir que j’avais eu à les apercevoir à l’horizon et 
l’obligation de chercher à découvrir cette raison me semblait bien pénible; j’avais 
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believes that on the whole our presentations of the world reveal objective features of it.’ ‘Existentialist 
Aesthetics’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Autumn 2009 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/aesthetics-existentialist/> [Last accessed 20 May 
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14 Lambert Dousson, the dossier to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s L’Œil et l’esprit (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), p. 
87.
envie de garder en réserve dans ma tête ces lignes remuantes au soleil et de n’y 
plus penser maintenant. Et il est probable que si je l’avais fait, les deux clochers 
seraient allés à jamais rejoindre tant d’arbres, de toits, de parfums, de sons, que 
j’avais distingués des autres à cause de ce plaisir obscur qu’ils m’avaient procuré 
et que je n’ai jamais approfondi. 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 178 
The need to understand the unexpected pleasure – and not just this particular moment of 
exhilaration but dozens of similar pleasures in the past – is so compelling, however, that 
instead of merely trying to ‘garder en réserve dans [sa] tête’ these lingering steeples, he 
borrows a pencil and a piece of paper from the doctor and writes down his account of 
the experience. While the task seems ‘pénible’ at first, the Narrator senses an 
opportunity to give meaning, not just to the steeples of Martinville – even though they 
are the cause of ‘[l]e plaisir spécial qui ne ressemblait à aucun autre’ – but in fact to 
‘tant d’arbres, de toits, de parfums, de sons, que j’avais distingués des autres à cause de 
ce plaisir obscur qu’ils m’avaient procuré et que je n’ai jamais approfondi’ (RTP I, 
178). 
On the one hand, these comments seem to suggest that the expression does not simply 
follow the experience, but that the Narrator’s ‘immersion’ in the world – the sense 
of being a part of it in a full and inseparable way – seems to in fact happen 
simultaneously with the act of mediation. The experience here is not something 
regarded as a fixed yardstick against which expression is measured but, on the contrary, 
the expression seems to become an integral part of the experience itself. The direct and 
immediate experience (sensuous perception) alone – despite being ‘fidèle’ (RTP I, 6) 
and the initial trigger in the Narrator’s search for truth here – is not enough to release 
the meaning that the steeples ‘semblaient contenir et dérober à la fois’ (RTP I, 178), no 
more than the ‘esprit’ would ever had been able to grasp this potential of the steeples 
without the immediate sensuous impression. 
On the other hand, however, the writing process seems to be presented here as a kind of 
rupture, which in fact liberates the Narrator from the grasp of the experience itself. 
Having written his piece on the steeples of Martinville, the Narrator describes an intense 
sense of relief, happiness and satisfaction and says:
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Je ne repensais jamais à cette page, mais à ce moment-là, quand, au coin du siège 
où le cocher du docteur plaçait habituellement dans un panier les volailles qu’il 
avait achetées au marché de Martinville, j’eus fini de l’écrire, je me trouvai si 
heureux, je sentais qu’elle m’avait si parfaitement débarrassé de ces clochers et de 
ce qu’ils cachaient derrière eux, que, comme si j’avais été moi-même une poule et 
si je venais de pondre un œuf, je me mis à chanter à tue-tête.
      
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 180
Here the pleasure seems to originate in the ability to record and then let go of the 
experience. However, we must note that this is not necessarily the view the Narrator 
would take later; in Le Temps retrouvé, he talks about the process of writing not as 
recording experiences but as a process of translating them (RTP IV, 469 and elsewhere) 
– a process which always includes an interpretative dimension, never just transparent 
presentation.
What the Narrator comes to understand and emphasises later is that ‘la réalité’ can only 
be found through internalisation, through subjectification of the experience as opposed 
to objectifying it; the aim of his ultimate literary project is not to represent some of his 
own ‘truths’ or universal ‘truths’, to be subsequently grasped by the reader, but simply 
to offer the reader a means to discover their own, by setting them forth to ‘lire en eux-
mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610). This is why he will not ask his readers ‘de me louer ou de me 
dénigrer’ but instead ‘de me dire si c’est bien cela, si les mots qu’ils lisent en eux-
mêmes sont bien ceux que j’ai écrits’ (RTP IV, 610).15 
The finished work (the poem) itself does not get much attention in this passage: the 
Narrator does not relish the text (he, in fact, pronounces that he ‘ne repensai[t] jamais à 
cette page’) but rather looks back, with affectionate nostalgia, to this moment of 
creation, to feeling ‘comme si j’avais été moi-même une poule et si je venais de pondre 
un œuf’ (RTP I, 180). With the broader thematic concern of this study in mind, we may 
consider the end product of this process (the poem) as a kind of transmission of the 
experience to the hypothetical reader. The rather amusing metaphor of laying an egg 
suggests appositely that once the text has been ‘laid’, produced, and consequently exists 
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as an object in the world, it may then, under favourable circumstances, ‘hatch’ and take 
on a life of its own in the minds of its readers. 
This further prompts us to ask whether a similar kind of ecstatic sense of ‘la réalité’ that 
the writing process here seems to produce can also be available – and possibly even 
more readily – to a reader of a book. This is the same question with which the Narrator 
concerns himself much later in Le Temps retrouvé, wondering if it is possible that ‘les 
mots qu’ils [ses lecteurs] lisent en eux-mêmes sont bien ceux que j’ai écrits’ (RTP IV, 
610). The way the Narrator refuses the authority over his future book and prompts his 
readers to attach it to their own sphere of experience serves as one of the most explicit 
echoes of the phenomenological congruity of experience and mediation in Proust’s 
novel.
Just like the Narrator’s process of creation here, the process of self-understanding in 
general, according to the phenomenological approach, starts with simultaneous 
reassurance and bewilderment. This situation is not that different from the one in which 
readers find themselves when they read a book: they may both be heartened by the 
‘recognition’ of themselves in the text and in the world of the narrative, and, at the same 
time, compelled to search for ‘solid ground’ for their experience in-the-world, precisely 
because the imaginary (the world of the book) suddenly feels so ‘real’ and ‘true’. Thus, 
the process of reading, as we cross over between immediate experiences in-the-world 
and the mediated experiences offered by the book, reveals the similarities between lived 
and imagined experience. 
To suggest that experiences of art in the Recherche enhance one’s self-understanding 
and function as an important catalyst in the process of ‘situating’ oneself in the world is 
not, however, the same as to claim that art allows us some kind of immediate access to a 
conceptually comprehensive self. Rather, a work of art seems to pave the way to a 
hermeneutic reflection of who we are and who we are not. It can make us approach the 
familiar (including our ‘ordinary notions of identity’, our ‘nominal’ self) from new and 
unpredictable perspectives, and exactly by revealing what is other or foreign to us, it 
can disclose to us something essential about our selves. 
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In order to explore this self-revelatory potential of aesthetic experience in the coming 
chapters, we must first explore the distinction between the concepts of self-knowledge 
and self-understanding in a bit more detail. Whereas the former seems to be attached to 
conscious self-fashioning or self-portrayal, the latter relates to a far more open-ended 
approach to ‘being oneself’ – one which acknowledges that the self is subject to 
temporal contingency and the chance juxtapositions of experience. Next, I explore the 
difference between, on the one hand, aesthetic experience as a continuous process of 
creation and mediation through which the self comes to being, and, on the other, a rather 
more intentional and controlled portrayal of the self in relation to aesthetic experience.16 
1.3. Choosing a Self? Aesthetic Experience, Self-fashioning, and Self-creation
Through its characters, the Recherche presents different ways in which art and aesthetic 
experience feature in the process of ‘being oneself’. In order to look more closely at the 
Narrator’s suggestion that aesthetic experience may enhance one’s self-understanding, a 
certain distinction needs to be made between aesthetic experience as something which 
allows the subject to ‘lire en soi-même’ and the kind of more deliberate self-fashioning 
through art, done in order perceive oneself or to be perceived in a certain manner. This 
latter form of self-conceptualisation resembles the kind of deliberate ‘portrayal’ of the 
self that derives from the Renaissance ideology of a ‘self-created’ persona, homo 
universalis – a polymath to whom the world was to be discovered, studied and then 
lived in, in a kind of self-sufficient certainty. 
In his book Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Stephen Greenblatt discusses the importance 
of one’s outward portraiture for the Renaissance individual and the Renaissance 
ideology of constructing one’s identity to fit to socially acceptable parameters. He notes 
how ‘in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about 
the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process’.17 The fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries witnessed an increased interest in underlying structures and sign 
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17 Greenblatt, Stephen, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005 [1980]), p. 2 (my emphasis).
systems in society and language, which became acknowledged as crucial factors also in 
shaping the individual. In view of this new kind approach to selfhood, art – and 
literature in particular – became something which ‘crosse[d] the boundaries between the 
creation of literary characters [and] the shaping of one’s own identity’ and with the help 
of which one could move from ‘the experience of being moulded by forces outside 
one’s control’ to the attempts to fashion oneself.18
One of the characters in the Recherche who seems to follow the Renaissance-style self-
fashioning is Mme Verdurin: she is a prime example of a character with an extreme 
interest – if not obsession – in her self-portrayal. Mme Verdurin uses her assumed 
aesthetic superiority, her ‘taste’, as the main currency in establishing and fortifying her 
social position – and frequently also in ridiculing and manipulating people.19 The very 
fact that, in the course of the novel, she moves up the social ladder by marrying the 
Prince de Guermantes and becomes the ‘queen’ of the society she once considered 
boring, out-of-date, as well as intellectually and aesthetically inadequate, suggests Mme 
Verdurin’s initial contempt for high society undoubtedly originates mainly in not being 
a part of it herself, rather than the aesthetic-intellectual void of this society. Although 
the possibility that Mme Verdurin is capable of genuinely appreciating and enjoying art 
is never rejected, the fact that her aesthetic creed is so quickly sacrificed for societal 
cause implies that her acclaimed dedication to art and her principles of ranking people 
according to their aesthetic-intellectual capacities rather than their social position are 
not altogether free from pretence.
In fact, several characters in Proust seem to exercise this kind of ‘self-portrayal’ through 
their aesthetic predilections to some extent. It must be noted, however, that in Proust’s 
narrative the more in-depth ‘first-hand’ accounts of aesthetic experiences are mainly 
those of the Narrator or recounted from the Narrator’s perspective. With the other 
characters, what we usually get is only the way these characters portray themselves and 
their relationship to art in social situations, rather than any actual deep analysis of how 
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feels that her monocracy as the aesthetic ‘director’ of her salon is threatened by Charlus’s presence, she 
convinces Morel that the relationship with the Baron is bound to bring his career to a halt and thus causes 
Morel to break up with him.
art affects their subjectivity. Swann is an exception in this sense, as in Un Amour de 
Swann Swann’s experiences are described in some detail – although still of course 
through the central narrating voice of the Recherche.20
For Swann, too, aesthetic experiences play an essential role in the way he acts and 
thinks. However, unlike with Mme Verdurin, the careful attention he pays to his self-
image is not guided (merely) by the expectations of others but indeed expectations and 
standards he sets for himself. Swann’s self-fashioning, therefore, seems to be something 
of ‘internalised’ quality – how he himself wishes to perceive himself – as opposed to 
Mme Verdurin’s flamboyant, often denunciatory attitude or other examples of aesthetic 
social charades in the novel.21 Nevertheless, Swann’s tendency to aestheticise reality 
often leads him to the verge of self-deception rather than self-understanding: for 
example, when he finds himself falling in love with Odette, Swann feels the need to 
justify his infatuation with this demimondaine and rather unsophisticated woman and 
does so by finding in her the resemblance to Botticelli’s Zipporah.22 
This is an attempt to fit his feelings into his aesthetic ‘framework’: through Swann 
Proust shows how this kind of conscious attempt to connect the aesthetic experience to 
‘real life’ is doomed to fail, or remain superficial, because this means externalising the 
experience and the artwork alike, objectifying them, as opposed to experiencing the 
artwork as a part of one’s own self. Swann’s aesthetic ‘system’ will, as we shall see in 
the coming chapters, occasionally crumble unexpectedly, for example with the powerful 
experience of Vinteuil’s music. The way music mixes together the memory of the 
happier days in Swann’s and Odette’s relationship and the bleak reality of the present 
moment prevents Swann from using it as a tool or as an object and forces him to 
acknowledge the changes taking place in himself.23 
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21 This issue will be discussed further in Chapter Five in the context of different reading modes.
22 See A la Recherche du temps perdu I, pp. 219-22. I will discuss this ‘appropriation’ of Zipporah as 
Odette further in Chapter Three.
23 Swann’s experiences of paintings and music will be discussed in more detail in chapters three and four.
In Proust’s novel, these descriptions of aesthetic experiences of others (albeit often only 
observed from the outside) produce a point of comparison to the carefully depicted 
inner process of the Narrator’s self-discovery and self-creation through art. For the 
young Narrator, the initial predicament in the aesthetic experience is the emphasis he 
places on the intellectual and philosophical contents of the work of art. The young 
Narrator, as Barbara Bucknall remarks, ‘supposes that there are in existence truths so 
elevated that he could never discover them for himself’ and his desire to read is fuelled 
with epistemic aims; however, here the Narrator ‘is making the basic mistake of failing 
to realise that he could never reach [the truths in the books he reads] unless he was 
capable of re-creating them in his own mind, even if the occasion of this re-creation was 
his contact with a book.’24 It is through Elstir’s work (his impressionist paintings in 
particular) that the primacy of impression and the value of sensuous, direct experience 
in art start to unfold and steer the Narrator towards the understanding of ‘la réalité’ as 
something of which we are not only a part but which we also always create. 
Through the Narrator’s first-person accounts, we get to glimpse a more profound and 
‘genuine’ aesthetic self-creation. For the Narrator, art seems to function as a means to 
disclose some kind coherence or at least continuity between different experiences (and 
his different selves), rather than imposing coherence on a self by copying or following 
an exterior model. The kind of ‘outward portraiture’ of the self that some of the 
characters aim at in search of social acceptance can only ever be nominal and temporal 
(as in applicable only to one point in time): using aesthetic experiences as a means of 
social embellishment brings the genuine process of appropriating them to a halt, 
because manifesting one’s experiences in social situations means presenting them as 
instances, in simple temporal succession. The ‘extratemporal’ core of the self – what is 
shared between the subject’s experiences in the past and in the present – can only be 
understood and approached by acknowledging the ongoing ‘metamorphoses’ caused by 
time and experience in the individual.25
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Underneath this discussion lies the broader concern, essential to the development of 
Modernist subjectivity: that of the coherence of the self – or the lack of it. One of the 
hallmarks of Modernism is anxiety that originates in the disappearance of external 
authority in art as well as in life, described by Søren Kierkegaard as ‘freedom’s 
actuality, the possibility of possibility’.26 In the midst of this freedom, understanding 
‘selfhood’ becomes an apprenticeship of a sort, involvement in a constant process 
(which is both self-reflexive and self-reflective at the same time), rather than 
understanding the self as a fixed and uniform entity – very much in the same way that 
‘genuine’ aesthetic experiences in Proust’s novel, rather than providing answers to 
questions already existing, seem to generate new, important ones and continue to ‘live 
on’ in the one who experiences.
Kierkegaard, writing in the heyday of Romanticism, differs from his contemporaries in 
the respect that he undermines the possibilities of art to create coherence through 
representation of ‘essences’ or ‘universal truths’: the truths we can extract from art are 
not planted there by geniuses or authorial powers.27 Kierkegaard foregrounds the 
existentialist crisis of modernity and the possibilities of overcoming this crisis through 
artistic expression. While German Idealism and Romanticism look at the artist as a 
genius who is born simultaneously with his artworks, Kierkegaard already foreshadows 
the Barthesian ‘death of the author’: 
In spite of the fact that a man writes, he is not essentially an author; he will be 
capable of writing the first […] and also the second part, but he cannot write the 
third part – the last part he cannot write. […] For though it is indeed by writing 
that one justifies the claim to be an author, it is also, strangely enough, by writing 
that one virtually renounces this claim.28
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(Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 42. For further discussion of the role of Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
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28 Søren Kierkegaard, On Authority and Revelation, ed. and trans. by Walter Lawrie (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1966), p. 69 (my emphasis).
This kind of approach places a significant emphasis on the role of the reader, which 
makes Kierkegaard’s existentialism specifically relevant to this study and the process of 
becoming ‘les propres lecteurs d’eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610). In Proust, while allowing 
and requiring highly subjective experiences, the reading process, as we shall see, does 
not lead into obstructive subjectivism but in fact seems to point to art’s potential to 
reconcile between immediate and mediated experience as well as between the self and 
the other. One of the ways in which a literary text may reach this affinity, according to 
the Narrator, is ‘le miracle d’une analogie’ that can be created through metaphor (RTP 
IV, 468).
Joshua Landy refers to this emphasis on creativity in any kind of ‘knowledge’ we may 
extract of the self by stating that Proust’s novel recognises ‘the crucial importance of 
fantasy in the process of self-fashioning’.29 ‘Fantasy’, in Landy’s discourse (and Landy 
here is talking about the role of art and of fiction especially in the formation of 
selfhood), refers primarily to the ways we use our imaginative faculties, but his choice 
of word, especially when combined with ‘self-fashioning’, nevertheless echoes the idea 
of the ‘self’ itself being something predominantly fantasised. This comment resonates 
back to the issue that was raised in the beginning of this chapter of how Proust’s novel, 
in its presentation of subjectivity, seems to oscillate between a notion of selfhood that is 
based on some kind of extratemporal essence and a more proto-postmodern view which 
regards ‘coherent’ selfhood as illusory.
Acknowledging that imagination plays a pivotal role in the comprehension of selfhood 
does not, however, mean that we need to treat the self as something predominantly 
fantasised. Rather, the role of imagination can be emphasised through considering the 
self as a progression of selves whose ‘real’ (that is, not fantasised) experiences can only 
come together and be reflected on as ‘my experiences’ with the help of imagination. It is 
this kind of notion of selfhood that I wish to explore in this study, and for these 
purposes, the concept of ‘imagination’ needs to be separated from ‘fantasy’ and 
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University Press, 2004), p.1. Landy uses the term ‘self-fashioning’ in referring generally to self-formation 
or self-conceptualisation, not specifically in the sense of deliberate self-portrayal characterising the 
Renaissance ideology of self-formation, as I do above in 1.4.
approached as something more concrete than fantasy – something which in fact has real 
implications on the life and self-formation of the subject who imagines. 
The difference between fantasy and imagination is described appositely by Iris Murdoch 
who remarks that they are
two active faculties, one [fantasy] somewhat mechanically generating narrowly 
banal false pictures (the ego as all-powerful), and the other [imagination] freely 
and creatively exploring the world and moving toward the expression and 
elucidation (and in art celebration) of what is true and deep.30
     
Murdoch thus links imagination to expression, or at least aspiration toward expression, 
and ‘elucidation’ through exploring the world ‘freely and creatively’. The underlying 
question here is whether one needs to in fact express oneself, to create something, in 
order to celebrate ‘what is true and deep’, or whether the experience of an artwork – 
actively and creatively ‘taking in’ a work of art – can also provide such illuminations.
The crucial role imagination plays in self-understanding can partly be explained by the 
way in which imagination is never ‘external’, something simply fantasised, but always 
draws from our own past experience. The idea that our approaches to art draw 
inherently from our life experience (as well as our experience of other artworks) is a 
common-sense assumption, but one to which Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
has given a convincing critical frame. According to Gadamer’s theory, ‘only the support 
of familiar and common understanding makes possible the venture into the alien, the 
lifting up of something out of the alien, and thus the broadening and enrichment of our 
own experience of the world.’31‘Aesthetic’ reading in Proust’s novel – reading which is 
freed from the objective of immediate rational ‘gain’ or profit – has a significant role to 
play in the process of self-understanding, precisely because it seems to effectively break 
down the (artificial) separation between mediated aesthetic experience and life 
experience by bringing the two together in the reading process. 
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31 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 15.
Thus, in the hermeneutic practise, the function of art is not simply to introduce some 
kind of coherence into the mind of the subject; it may of course do that, but the 
implications of the aesthetic experience span further than this. As Gabriel Josipovici 
notes, Modernist art is concerned with ‘neither illustration nor abstraction but the daily 
struggle of a dialogue with the world, without any assurance that what one will produce 
will have value because there is nothing already there against which to test it, but with 
the possibility always present that something new, something genuine, something 
surprising, will emerge’.32 This kind of openness is exactly what the hermeneutic 
approach emphasises – a genuine dialogue between the familiar and the unfamiliar, for 
which an aesthetic experience may provide an ideal setting in the disclosive [sic] space 
of the ‘in-between’.33 
For the remaining part of this chapter, let us consider this ‘familiarity’ and the disclosure 
of ‘la réalité’ in connection to the Proustian theory of memory, which is most vitally 
characterised by the distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory. While 
voluntary memory is often presented as an (inadequate) instrument for self-formation, 
involuntary memory in Proust features as an elementary force that underlies our 
subjectivity – one without which language, imagination, and to some extent even our 
very basic sensuous perception remain impotent.
1.4. ‘The carrying of concealed weapons’: Time, Memory, and Imagination
As we saw above in the context of the passage from Albertine disparue and the 
Martinville steeples, for the Narrator the process of turning ‘les faits’ (acquired by the 
intellect) and his primary direct impressions (perceived by the senses) into ‘la réalité’ 
necessitates mediation through both imagination and memory. The phenomenological 
premise that even our imagination is ultimately based on the ‘familiar’ and draws from 
our experiences in and of the world seems to find a footing in Proust’s novel, not least 
due to the immense role that memory plays in it. 
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Donald G. Marshall. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1989), p. 295.
The question of to what extent our memories – partly voluntary, partly involuntary – 
make us who we are has been the focus of countless philosophical investigations into 
selfhood for centuries and features prominently in a broad corpus of studies on Proust’s 
novel.34 This concern is central to the philosophy of Henri Bergson whose notions of 
selfhood, memory and time provided the philosophical impetus for Proust in his 
treatment of the subject matter and whose influence I discuss briefly below. As the 
workings of memory are not the main concern of my study, in the following I focus on 
acknowledging some of the ways in which Proust’s novel views memory (and 
involuntary memory in particular) in the process of self-understanding and, in the light 
of discussion, further reflect on the relation between primary experience and mediation.
In Proust et les signes, Deleuze remarks that the resemblances between Proust and 
Bergson’s ways of defining time are not in duration but in memory which is something 
embodied within us: ‘Ce passé ne représente pas quelque chose qui a été, mais 
simplement quelque chose qui est, et qui coexiste avec soi comme [le] présent.’35 
Proust, however, moves beyond the idea of time embodied in us, asking how exactly we 
are able to recognise or access this past within us, examining the potential for such 
processes for example in the context of aesthetic experiences. Joshua Landy suggests 
for the Narrator, ‘involuntary memory is really not memory at all’, since 
when an odour, texture, or sound returns to us a former state, we are not dragging 
into the light a set of impressions that have long since departed but, instead, 
summoning up a part of us that is still very much present within our mind. Only in 
this way is it possible to re-experience from within a situation we approached with 
a radically different set of attitudes, beliefs and desires.36
This observation is, in fact, almost directly the idea Bergson presents in La Pensée et le 
mouvant, where he states that ‘la conservation du passé dans le présent n’est pas autre 
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35 Gilles Deleuze, Proust et les signes (Paris: Perspective critiques, 1976 [1964]), pp. 73-6 (my emphasis).
36 Landy, p. 110 (my emphasis).
chose que l’indivisibilité du changement’37. Our default, according to Bergson, is to 
preserve the past within us, and therefore it is the forgetting of which we actually take 
notice:
La mémoire n’a donc pas besoin d’explication. Ou plutôt, il n’y pas de faculté 
spéciale dont le rôle soit de retenir du passé pour le verser dans le présent. Le 
passé se conserve de lui-même, automatiquement. […] Mais si nous tenons 
compte de la continuité de la vie intérieure et par conséquent de son indivisibilité, 
ce n’est plus la conservation du passé qu’il s’agira d’expliquer, c’est au contraire 
son apparente abolition. Nous n’aurons plus à rendre compte du souvenir mais de 
l’oubli.38
The past being preserved automatically within us does not mean that everything is 
automatically remembered, however.39 As we saw at the beginning of the chapter, the 
Narrator’s selves who are not yet aware of Albertine’s departure keep cropping up 
unexpectedly – and indeed, involuntarily – through ‘la reviviscence intermittente et 
involontaire d’une impression spécifique, venue du dehors, et que nous n’avons pas 
choisie.’ (RTP IV, 14) The force of memory is a volatile force and it works in close 
collaboration with the seemingly insignificant bodily experiences; neither one of these 
dimensions of the self – the memory or the way it is segmented within us through 
bodily traces, can ever be totally governed ‘par la pensée’.40 
Also, if forgetting marks and reveals to us the discontinuity of the self – an upsetting 
realisation that we have been denied access to our past – remembering, in Proust, does 
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such as the body as ‘un vase où notre spiritualité serait enclose, qui nous induit à supposer que tous nos 
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153-4), which I analyse in Chapter Six.
40 This idea resonates with Emmanuel Lévinas’s theory about the memory of the flesh, presented in 
Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l'essence (La Haye: M. Nijhoff, 1974). Deeming the ‘unconscious’ as too 
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or temperature – and that it senses and changes under these conditions makes the body absolutely 
fundamental to the way we inhabit the world and time. In Proust, an excellent example of the mnemonic 
potential of the body can be found right in the opening passage of the novel, when the Narrator, waking 
up from sleep and recomposing ‘les traits originaux de mon moi’ (RTP I, 5-6), refers to the fidelity of the 
body in safeguarding our experiences and doing a better job at it than our ‘esprit’; he describes the bodily 
sensations as ‘[les] gardiens fidèles d’un passé que mon esprit n’aurait jamais dû oublier’ (RTP I, 6). I 
return to this passage and its implications on the Proustian selfhood in Chapter Six. 
not play an unequivocally unproblematic role either. The crucial distinction that is made 
in the Recherche between involuntary memory and deliberate reminiscing is significant 
also as far as the role of memory in the process of understanding ‘la réalité’ and one’s 
own self is concerned. It is suggested on several occasions in the Recherche, as we shall 
see in the coming chapters, that willed, voluntary remembrance and attempts to define 
the self through it, seem to actually take us further away from our genuine experiences 
and our initial impressions. Kierkegaard discusses this same scenario of losing an 
important dimension of an experience by focusing too much on wanting to remember it 
in, attempting to ‘store’ it for the future. He writes:
   
The carrying of concealed weapons is usually forbidden, but no weapon is so 
dangerous as the art of remembering. It gives one a very peculiar feeling in the 
midst of one’s enjoyment to look back upon it for the purpose of remembering 
it.41
This kind of ‘instrumentalisation’ of memory that breaks the present moment by 
reminding us it is passing is frequently present in Proust’s Narrator’s endeavours; he 
often pauses to ‘take in’ experiences or contemplate the motives, reactions and 
intentions of the people involved, but in attempting to find an explanation for one 
mystery or another (Albertine’s behaviour being a recurring example), in his attempts to 
analyse the situation, he often actually ends up not ‘living in the moment’ or enjoying it. 
This urge to remember resonates with Heidegger’s idea of the general human tendency 
towards ‘forgetfulness of Being’ – the way Western thinking is obsessed with the 
present, characterised by the desire for an immediate access to meaning through a 
certain tradition of intellectual (or scholarly) thought and analysis.42 According to 
Heidegger, the ‘metaphysics of presence’ – how we strive for explanation through 
objectifying and labelling our experiences – often stops us feeling in harmony with our 
experience and through it with the world. The alternative to ‘the metaphysics of 
presence’, then, Heidegger suggests, is the experience of phenomenological continuity 
of Being, acknowledging the inseparability of past and present within us. In order to do 
so, we must refrain from ‘subscrib[ing] to a “standpoint” or represent[ing] any special 
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N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. 289.
42 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 43.
“direction”; ‘phenomenology’, Heidegger states, ‘is nothing of either sort, nor can it 
become so as long as it understands itself.’43
With the madeleine, for example, the Narrator feels the urge to interpret these 
experiences intellectually or at least identify the links between the two alike 
experiences. While at this stage he fails to do so and is left with a sense of failure, he 
does already with the madeleine and the tea acknowledge that ‘la vérité que je cherche 
n’est pas en lui [le breuvage], mais en moi’ (RTP I, 45), and furthermore that it cannot 
be reached merely by seeking: ‘la vérité’ cannot to be found ‘out’ in the world, outside 
the self, because a real experience is never fully confined within something external but 
rather in the way we have embodied and encompassed it. Instead of merely 
‘registering’ and finding, in order to arrive at this disclosure, the experience and its 
interpretation need to be considered as two sides of the same coin. While at first the 
magic of ‘moments bienheureux’ seems to reside in the way they appear to make 
mediation futile, the Narrator in fact identifies his ‘extratemporal’ rapture precisely 
through mediation – by connecting the threads between a past experience and the 
present one, by identifying this connection and reflecting upon it.
It is exactly this kind of sense of continuity that the Narrator also experiences in his 
moment of inspiration caused by the Martinville steeples. What seems to create and 
install this ‘bonheur’ in the Narrator is the feeling of the inseparability of past and 
present within him. While with involuntary memory this rapport seems fortuitous and 
fleeting, ‘le miracle d’une analogie’ (RTP IV, 468) will later assist the adult Narrator in 
‘safeguarding’ the way in which the past is present in the present. In order to feel such 
unity and comprehend the idea of embodied time, we must not employ memory as a 
tool with which to plough the layers of the past but rather maintain and fertilise those 
layers through creative association.44 This kind of imaginative process – not just the 
discovery of what was in the past, but, moreover, the creative exploration of how the 
past is in the present (and in us) – paves the way to more than a ‘fantasised’ 
understanding of the self.
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composed of layers of experience – which I shall discuss later in Chapter Six.
In Proust, some kind of genuine understanding of the self seems to become available 
through aesthetic experience, even if this might not mean grasping a totally unified, 
coherent, essentialist subject. A distinction needs to be made, therefore, between 
conceptual, objective self-knowledge and self-understanding as a hermeneutic process, 
the latter of which is what the present study is interested in. The most favourable 
approach for the purposes of this study and the exploration of notions such as selfhood, 
reality, experience, impression and embodiment in Proust, is available in 
phenomenological and hermeneutic aesthetics, which emphasise the human subject as 
an interpreting questioner at the centre of these experiences. The experience of reading 
especially, as we shall see, seems to aid the process of self-reflection by being 
inherently ‘processual’ in nature and based on the collaboration between the subject’s 
direct lived experiences and impressions (and the marks these experiences have left on 
our memory) and the mediation of these experiences through language. When we think 
of the links between the process of ‘being oneself’ and the process of reading literature, 
we see how reading as such a gradual and interpretative process may (instead of being 
escapist and fantasised) occasion some kind of reattachment of the reader to the world. 
This does not mean, however, that the aesthetic experience becomes a simple case of 
self-confirmation. Rather, the true prospect of these experiences, as we shall see in the 
coming chapters, resides precisely in their ability to uncover hidden dimensions of the 
self by engaging the subject in the process of interpretation and mediation. This process 
is prompted by the encounter with something new, unfamiliar, other; in this sense, the 
Proustian aesthetic experience seems to resound with the phenomenological conceptions 
of truth and reality as disclosure or ‘dévoilement’. In Sartre’s terms, ‘dévoilement’ is in 
itself already a kind of mediation, and Sartre acknowledges the problem surrounding the 
idea of ‘pure’ direct perception of something and states that as soon as objects or 
phenomena are perceived and registered by our consciousness they become intentional 
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in some ways: ‘La conscience ne précède jamais l’objet,’ Sartre writes, but ‘l’intention 
se révèle à elle-même en même temps qu’elle se réalise, dans et par sa réalisation.’45
With this processual view of reality and selfhood in mind, let us return to the passage 
quoted in the beginning of the chapter, where the fact of Albertine’s departure seems to 
be repeatedly conflicting with the ‘reality’ of the Narrator’s different past selves who 
have not yet been touched by the present tragedy. These selves are not just ‘former’ 
selves but also ‘habitual’, recurring selves – like the self who is getting a haircut. In 
addition to representing the way in which the subject is composed of different selves, 
each of which surfaces in a specific context, the ‘haircut self’ is a good example of how 
such seemingly insignificant experiences get woven into our subjectivity, contributing 
to ‘des innombrables et humbles “moi” qui nous composent’ (RTP IV, 13) and watering 
down also the Cartesian separation between the mental and the embodied experience.46 
What this passage also manifests is how the various other selves do not just passively 
and remotely linger somewhere behind the current self but indeed coexist within the self 
who presently experiences, which in turn resonates the Bergsonian idea of the past 
being conserved in the present automatically. While the sense of incoherence the 
Narrator feels here cannot go unmarked, it is precisely this incoherence which calls for 
mediation and communication with one’s own self. While the past is conserved 
‘automatically’ in the present (in the form of the Narrator’s former selves that keep 
cropping up in different contexts), ‘le fait’ of the present moment does not automatically 
insinuate itself into the past. In order to become ‘la réalité’, it needs to be made a part of 
the past through mediation, and this is why the fact of Albertine’s departure only 
becomes reality when mediated to all these different selves.47 
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46 The other delightful aspect of the haircut example is the metaphorical dimension: hair as something 
which carries the traces of experience with us – thread within which the lived experience has been 
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47 I return to this distinction between ‘le fait’ and ‘la réalité’ later in Chapter Six, discussing it in view of 
the Narrator’s ‘intermittences du cœur’. (See pp. 187-190).
This mediation does not happen through intellect or through an objectifying ‘pensée’ 
alone but always necessitates ‘la reviviscence intermittente et involontaire d’une 
impression spécifique, venue du dehors, et que nous n’avons pas choisie.’ (RTP IV, 14) 
Understanding oneself thus becomes indeed a process in which the unfamiliar (as well 
as the ‘otherness’ within the self) needs to be allowed to surface in order for us to arrive 
at any true sense of reality and in which the role of involuntary and intermittent 
impressions overrides intellectual deliberation. The Narrator’s remark that we need 
something ‘du dehors’ (RTP IV, 14) to point out to us what lies hidden within ourselves 
is particularly interesting here, and it resonates with the Narrator’s later statements 
about the role of an artwork as an optical instrument through which we read ourselves 
(RTP IV, 610). 
In the next chapter, I examine this seemingly paradoxical proposal the Narrator presents 
in Le Temps retrouvé about the readers becoming ‘les propres lecteurs d’eux-
mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610) through someone else’s text and further discuss the difference 
between writing and reading as (potentially) self-revelatory processes. In addition to the 
reader-writer relationship, the Narrator’s suggestion prompts us to consider the 
relationship between literature, fiction, and truth in general. 
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2. ‘Ce plaisir que j’avais à créer moi-même’: Writing, Reading, and Truths
In Le Temps retrouvé, on his way to a party in the Guermantes house, the Narrator 
stumbles over an uneven paving stone in the courtyard and suddenly vividly remembers 
Venice. He remarks how ‘un azur profond enivrait mes yeux, des impressions de 
fraîcheur, d’éblouissante lumière tournoyaient près de moi,’ and wanting to hold onto 
these images evoked, he keeps, despite the ridicule of the drivers who are watching him, 
balancing himself for a moment on that uneven paving (RTP IV, 445). This memory 
comes in alike manner to the kind of profusion of sensations with which the taste of the 
madeleine restores Combray for him, giving him a sense of extraordinary release from 
his habitual disquiet: 
 
Comme au moment où je goûtais la madeleine, toute inquiétude sur l’avenir, tout 
doute intellectuel étaient dissipés. Ceux qui m’assaillaient tout à l’heure au sujet 
de la réalité de mes dons littéraires et même de la réalité de la littérature se 
trouvaient levés comme par enchantement.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 445
This experience reinstates the Narrator’s desire to explore the ‘sujet de la réalité’ in 
writing, as well as restores his faith in the ‘realness’ of literature itself. A little later, 
when the Narrator is waiting in the Guermantes library to be let into the party, his 
conviction is further supported by a range of similar impressions (produced by the clink 
of a spoon against the coffee cup and the feel of a napkin against his mouth) as well as 
by sensations evoked by browsing in some familiar books he picks up from the shelf. 
After a long period of disillusionment, he suddenly becomes optimistic regarding the 
possibility of mediating experiences in such way that this mediation may allow one 
access to the kind of unexpected ‘bonheur’ that involuntary memory can only ever yield 
transitorily and by chance. What the Narrator comes to realise and what reignites his 
vocation is that this continuity and sense of wholeness is not something that can simply 
be ‘presented’ in a text, but needs to be planted in creative analogies (such as 
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metaphors) which require – like ‘la réalité’ itself – creative ‘opening up’ by the subject 
of the experience. 
This suggestion that a literary text may facilitate our grasp of reality and release truths 
within its readers opens up several questions. In order to explore the paradox of 
becoming ‘le propre lecteur de soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610) through someone else’s text, 
we need first to consider the relationship between literature, fiction and truth more 
generally, and then look at the ways in which Proust’s novel presents the relationship 
between the writer and the reader. If the task of the writer is the veritable translation of 
life into literature, we may ask whether reading, then, can be regarded indeed as 
translation of literature back to life through the reader? As the writing process seems to 
be incessantly shadowed by fortuity and different kinds of emotive restrictions – at least 
as far as the Narrator is concerned – could reading, in fact, in some ways hold a stronger 
potential as a self-revelatory experience than writing?
I consider the writing process here mainly through the Narrator-protagonist and by 
examining the writer-Narrator’s philosophical deliberations in Le Temps retrouvé, 
although we must keep in mind that the Narrator-protagonist does not, apart from the 
Martinville prose poem and his article in Le Figaro, really seem to get much writing 
done in the course of the novel; however, once again the first-person narrating voice 
allows us to examine him more closely than other characters. Reading here will mostly 
be discussed through the Narrator’s propositions regarding the readers of his future 
book. 
A lot of critical attention has been paid to the questions of whether or not the book the 
Narrator embarks on writing in Le Temps retrouvé is in fact the novel we have just read; 
to what extent the Narrator represents Proust the author; and, respectively, whether the 
reader the Narrator discusses in the context of the imminent book is the reader of 
Proust’s novel or, in fact, an ‘imminent’ reader. Joshua Landy for example discusses at 
length the importance of distinguishing not only Proust from his Narrator, but also the 
novel the Narrator is going to write from the Recherche, proposing that there are, in 
fact, three texts that Proust’s reader faces. First, there is the novel by Proust, A la 
Recherche du temps perdu; secondly, we have the ‘memoirs’ of the Narrator, which he 
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has been working on during the narrative of the Recherche and in which he uses his 
experiences in society. (Landy names the Narrator’s memoir My Life, undoubtedly in 
order to facilitate the following discussion.) Thirdly, there is also the impending work of 
art – ‘l’œuvre’ – of which the Narrator talks in Le Temps retrouvé.1 
Landy’s argument is useful in bringing out the difficulty of trying to pinpoint an 
‘implied reader’ within the Recherche; considering this multiplicity of different textual 
and meta-textual layers within Proust’s novel, one cannot really talk about an implied 
reader but rather a series of implied readers. Later on in Chapter Five, I analyse 
different readers within Proust’s novel and examine more closely the different modes of 
reading manifested in the Recherche. In order to explore the specificity of the 
experience of reading literary texts (both from the perspective of the reader and the 
writer) and the communicative and philosophical potential of literary art works in 
Proust, we must begin by briefly establishing what is meant by ‘literature’ and ‘literary’ 
in this study.
In the contemporary critical milieu, the attempts to define literature have not only got 
increasingly problematic, but also in some ways been obliterated. One now somewhat 
dated definition is based on the idea of ‘traditional’ Western literature as a rather 
unspecific but still distinctly prevailing canon of texts. As Nicholas Harrison remarks in 
his preface to The Idea of the Literary, ‘if the term “literary” now has a certain currency 
in preference to “literature” […] it is partly because “literature” is for some critics 
associated with dogmatic or essentialist attempts at definition and with a relatively 
narrow, traditional canon’.2 Many critics with, for example, postcolonial, feminist or 
queer interests have ‘reconsidered the groundings of such a canon, often in order to 
attack it’ and some have even ‘abandoned entirely the study of literary texts’.3 
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To acknowledge the impossibility of formulating clear-cut descriptions of ‘literature’ is 
not, however, to suggest literary texts themselves would be becoming obliterated or 
‘useless’; on the contrary, as Harrison points out, the task of literary criticism is to face 
the challenge that the post-canonical situation throws at it: to examine the ‘real’ ways in 
which literature continues to function in the world. Proust’s Recherche, despite being 
traditionally considered as a part of the Western literary canon, also has qualities which 
make it highly apposite in the post-canonical context, not least due to the way the reader 
is presented in it and the way Proust’s novel emphasises the reader’s role in defining an 
experience as ‘literary’. ‘Literariness’ in the Recherche, rather than being confined to 
certain kinds of texts, seems to depend greatly on the mode of reading.4 Furthermore, 
Proust’s novel itself does not fit in any clear-cut category but represents a hybrid of 
genres: the Recherche is first and foremost a novel but embodies elements of 
philosophical treatise, biography, memoir and so on.  
‘Literature’ in Proust’s novel is not restricted to fiction, drama and poetry, either. In the 
narrative, we encounter autobiographies (such as the fictional Mémoires de Mme de 
Beausergent), the Sévigné correspondence and librettos (e.g. Massenet’s Manon) which 
are all read differently from texts with pragmatic aims such as telegrams, pamphlets, 
letters or newspapers. This meta-textual richness within Proust’s work prompts us to 
consider ‘literature’ as the Recherche presents it as something broader than a certain 
culture-specific selection of texts. Also, keeping in mind the Narrator’s statement that 
true life – ‘la vraie vie, la vie enfin découverte et éclaircie […] c’est la littérature’ (RTP 
IV, 474), any attempts to rigorously define what a ‘literary text’ in Proust is, would seem 
abortive, to say the least. 
Peter Lamarque suggests that, instead of focusing narrowly on (and trying to define) the 
‘concept’ of literature, we should instead examine literature as a phenomenon which 
‘elevat[es] certain kinds of linguistic activities – notably story-telling or poetry-making 
or drama – to an art form issuing in products that are revered.’5 This proposition seems 
to steer back to the idea of canon (especially as Lamarque considers the way in which 
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characters read in the Recherche.
5 Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), p. 8.
texts gain certain ‘cultural significance’ as an inherent part of this phenomenon); 
however, the more ‘personal’ dimension of literary experiences – literature’s emotional 
impact, the effects of reading literature on one’s imagination and the ‘cognitive 
strengthening’ gained through literature – are still considered by Lamarque as the real 
hallmarks of the truth-releasing potential of a literary text.6 My approach to literature in 
this study will focus primarily on this latter dimension: literature as a phenomenon 
happening at the level of an individual’s sphere of experience and in the disclosure of 
his or her subjectivity.7
As suggested in the introduction to this study, one way to approach the phenomenon of 
literature and its impact on individual readers is to consider the specificity of the 
aesthetic reading process through the question of what is ‘other’ to literature. Regarding 
the Narrator’s philosophical contemplations in Le Temps retrouvé, it is right to ask if 
there is a ‘treatise’ or a theory of reading present in the novel, and furthermore how does 
a literary text differ from and possibly improve on a ‘purely’ philosophical deliberation. 
The relationship between literature (and fiction in particular) and philosophy in Proust 
has been valuably discussed in Vincent Descombes’s study Proust: Philosophie du 
roman as well as in Joshua Landy’s Philosophy as Fiction.8 
Even though I do discuss epistemological and metaphysical aspects of the reading 
experience, in the present study the emphasis is primarily on the hermeneutic and 
phenomenological approaches to reading fiction rather than on the philosophy of fiction 
itself. The Recherche offers an exemplary domain for examining the ‘phenomenon of 
literature’ not just in view of its more generic cultural significance but, indeed, in 
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6 Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen. Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Lamarque, The Philosophy of 
Literature, pp. 239, 243, 251-2 and elsewhere.
7 The present study emphasises the idea that a literary text may operate in its readers’ lives as a means to 
enrich their self-understanding; I explore this prospect primarily by analysing how literature functions 
within the world of the Recherche, on the level of the narrative. The philosophical implications of 
Proust’s novel do however unquestionably reach beyond the world of the narrative, and the exploration of 
how the reading experience of Proust’s novel may gain legitimacy in-the-world – that is to say, examining 
the experiences of the actual readers of Proust’s novel – is one domain in which Proust studies could also 
be expanded. The task of bringing Proust ‘back into the world’ has been undertaken for example by 
Véronique Aubouy who in her project Proust lu films different people reading extracts Proust’s novel in 
the most imaginative places. (Aubouy’s project is still ongoing and available at <http://
www.veronique.aubouy.fr/proust-lu.html>).
8 Vincent Descombes, Proust: Philosophie du roman (Paris: Minuit, Coll ‘Critique’, 1987).
exploring the potential of literary experience from the viewpoint of the individual. As 
the germ of this study is the Narrator’s proposition of the readers becoming ‘les propres 
lecteurs d’eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610), my main emphasis will be on the question of how 
fictional texts can evoke a sense of ‘la réalité’ and release ‘[les] vérités profondes et 
uniques’ (RTP III, 882) within the reader. The presence of language is what makes a 
literary experience inherently different from ‘unmediated’ experiences as well as other, 
non-linguistic, aesthetic experiences – not least because of the way in which language 
always bears, implicitly or explicitly, relation to ‘truth’ and knowledge.
2.1. Fictive Texts, Real Experiences: Literature and Truths
Descombes’s study – one of the most in-depth investigations into the philosophical 
qualities of the Recherche – follows the view that 
tous les romans [sont] philosophiques à quelque degré. […] Un roman est 
philosophique s’il manifeste une discipline de pensée analogue à celle qu’incarne 
la philosophie dans la tradition occidentale. Quant à savoir ce qui donne à la 
forme d’élucidation, c’est ce qui reste à déterminer.9
In many ways, the Recherche manifests the idea that literature is philosophy, not only in 
what it makes us think but indeed how it makes us think. Proust’s novel effectively 
shows how a fictional work may communicate impressions which do not as such seem 
to bear great philosophical importance (such as a moment of stumbling over a paving 
stone) but which may, when examined as a part of the individual sphere of experience 
within a fictive framework, create favourable conditions for the reader to realise (their 
own) philosophical insights or truths. 
This idea is embedded in the Protagonist’s apprenticeship. Indeed, the young Narrator 
laments over the fact that he seems to find joy and genuine exhilaration in seemingly 
inconsequential things, but eventually it is exactly these kinds of experiences which 
allow him to engage in deep philosophical reflection. In these passages of philosophical 
contemplation, the Narrator or the narrating voice exhibits more directly – although 
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often through the kind of questioning mode – his philosophical insights and the role of 
the more ‘mundane’ experiences as well as aesthetic experiences in grasping ‘les vérités 
profondes et uniques’ (RTP III, 882).
What makes Proust’s novel so inherently philosophical, according to Descombes, is the 
way in which Proust arranges his text – not just the content or the form of the text but 
the two of them together:
écrire un roman, loin d’être un simple passe-temps ou une évasion imaginaire, est 
justement ce ‘travail intellectuel et moral’ que demande Proust. Or nous cherchons 
ici la philosophie du roman, non dans telle ou telle idée, mais dans ce travail lui-
même. […] On peut dire, je crois, que la philosophie cherche à éclaircir des 
pensées par la voie d’un examen des propositions dans lesquelles ces pensées sont 
communiquées.10
For example, the technique used by Proust of presenting his Narrator as a genuine 
questioner, constantly in doubt and on the qui vive, makes the philosophical agenda of 
the novel a great deal more organic than simply having his protagonist as a mouthpiece 
for Proust’s own philosophical exposition. Indeed, as Margaret Topping remarks, 
Proust, in his presentation of selfhood (as well as other prominent philosophical themes) 
‘is consciously experimenting with different genres, tones and registers, exploiting a 
philosophical unity within aesthetic diversity’.11
The freedom of interpretation allowed by this technique seems to lift a literary work of 
art onto an altogether different affective level; a novel seems to improve on a 
philosophical treatise in tackling traditional philosophical questions – aesthetic, 
ontological, and epistemological – in the sense that it naturally and inherently embodies 
one element which most philosophical studies approach and try to examine objectively, 
although it is an integral part of almost any activity of human thought: namely, 
imagination. 
In view of the Narrator’s discussion of the reader’s role, I suggest that the mode of 
reading could also be added to the list. The truths to be found in literature are not 
56
10 Descombes, p. 71 (my emphasis).
11 Margaret Topping, Supernatural Proust: Myth and Metaphor in A la Recherche du temps perdu 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2007), p. 5.
ultimately truths of ‘intelligence’ or logic planted there consciously by an authorial 
figure or voice, since the ultimate work of art, ‘notre seul livre, le livre intérieur de 
signes inconnus’ (RTP IV, 458)’ already exists within us, affecting the ways in which we 
read. Indeed, it seems that the role of the audience is crucial in releasing the 
philosophical potential of a literary work. 
This suggested truth-releasing potential of literary artworks, fiction especially, prompts 
several questions, however. We may ask, for example, why is it that we become, as 
Walton Kendall puts it, ‘highly charged emotionally’ when reading about fictional (non-
real) characters and situations, even when we know they are not ‘real’ or ‘true’?12 An 
excellent example of such evocative power of literature appears in Sodome et Gomorrhe 
II, where Charlus describes a certain ‘homme de goût’ who, when asked ‘quel 
événement l’avait le plus affligé dans sa vie’ is said to have replied: ‘La mort de Lucien 
de Rubempré dans Splendeurs et Misères [de Balzac]’ (RTP III, 438). According to 
Kendall, in order for the readers to have such cathartic reactions, they in fact need to be 
practising forms of ‘make-believe’ or ‘pretence’ whilst reading.13 This theory supports 
the idea that we need a specific attitude, a specific mode, when reading fictional texts in 
order to experience what we read as ‘real’, without turning into gullible simpletons. 
However, this then leads us to ask: how can we arrive at truths by pretending? If the 
reading of a fictional text requires a certain kind of pretence or make-believe from the 
reader, how can it reveal to us truths or provide us with genuine understanding of 
something? I shall explore this question with specific references to Proust’s text in 
Chapter Five, suggesting that in Proust’s novel, in the most successful ‘moyen de lire’, 
this ‘pretence’ or ‘make-believe’ is not reached by deliberately applying a certain set of 
reading methods – it is not a conscious choice or a technique, but rather something 
which the reader allows in the universe of the text which is free from practical aims and 
restraints. For the time being, however, let us focus on examining the relation between 
an experience in a fictional framework and a ‘real’ experience. 
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Laver, Emotion and the Arts (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), p. 38.
13 Such attitudes which produce ‘real’ experiences will be further explored in the course of this study in 
comparison to impressions and attitudes evoked by non-literary art and below in 2.3 through exploring 
reading and writing as self-revelatory processes.
Defining ‘fiction’ is no more simple a task than to explain what is meant by literature. 
Lamarque suggests fictional texts can be understood in the following way:
How things are described in a fictive utterance determines how things are in the 
fictional world. This is the connection between fictional content and fictive 
utterance. It marks a sharp contrast with non-fiction or truth, for how things are 
(in the world) is not determined by any kind of utterance. This deep dependence 
of the fictional on models of representation is at the heart of the distinction 
between fiction and non-fiction.14
While this argument is seemingly plausible in some ways, the emphasis that Proust’s 
novel places on mediation of primary experience through imagination and memory (as 
discussed in the previous chapter) prompts us to question the view that the way things 
are in the world is ‘not determined by any kind of utterance’. Indeed, such a limited 
view on language’s ontological potential – viewing it as an instrument for description – 
would be vehemently refuted by most Proust criticism published since the nineteen-
sixties, especially in the French-speaking world. This huge corpus on Proust informed 
by structuralism and post-structuralism – including the distinguished œuvre of Roland 
Barthes and Gilles Deleuze15 – regards language not as a means employed by human 
agency but rather as something which underlies and structures all human experience. 
Thus, a wide gulf opens between Lamarque’s proposition and the structuralist and 
poststructuralist tradition that considers reality as entirely constituted by language. From 
this gulf arises, however, another means to approach the relationship between language 
and experience: namely, phenomenological hermeneutics. This practice does not refute 
the possibility that there is meaning in the world without language, but nevertheless 
stresses that language is an essential condition in experiencing this meaning.16 A view 
according to which our very basic existence in-the-world (Dasein) is inseparable from 
‘the world’ is especially prominent in the philosophy of Heidegger, who emphasised 
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15 See e.g. Barthes, ‘Proust et les noms’ in Essais Critiques (Paris: Seuil, 1972), pp. 124-8; Deleuze, 
Proust et les signes.
16 For example Gadamer holds the view that all human thought is ‘language-bound’ and therefore 
language can never simply describe our experience as it is inherent already in the experience itself. 
Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 15. I return to this proposition shortly in section 2.3.
that ‘Being’ and ‘the world’ need to be grasped together, not as distinct entities.17 Thus 
the phenomenological tradition refuses, on the one hand, to present the 
phenomenologically perceptible, material, sensuous world as subservient to language, 
and, on the other, avoids lapsing back to the idea of language as merely descriptive and 
secondary.
Lamarque’s definition of the relationship between fiction and non-fiction also becomes 
problematic regarding the role of the reader, especially if we consider his statements 
against the phenomenological backdrop. Indeed, we may ask: where does the reader’s 
interpretation of the text fit in all this? What is the role of the reader in the seemingly 
neat correlation between a fictive utterance and ‘how things are in the fictional world’? 
And furthermore, whose truths are we talking about? The hermeneutic approach would 
suggest that the reader, in fact, brings the world (‘how things are in the world’, and how 
the reader himself is in it) into the experience and makes it an essential part of the 
experience of the text. Such a process also seems to be the ultimate germ of the 
Narrator’s proposition of reading ‘en soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610). It is with these questions 
in mind that I now turn to examine the relationship between the writer, the text, and the 
reader.
2.2. ‘C’est ainsi que j’aurais dû écrire’: Artistic Expression and the Writer-Reader 
Relationship
In the previous chapter we already touched upon the truth-releasing potential of the 
writing process in the context of the Martinville passage. In the following, in contrast, I 
discuss an occasion (one of many) on which the Narrator fails to mediate his 
experience, and, in the light of this example, consider the ways in which the process of 
reading seems to improve on writing as a self-revelatory experience. Many of the 
comments that the Narrator makes about the reader-writer relationship, especially at the 
end of Le Temps retrouvé, resound with R. G. Collingwood’s theories expressed in his 
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Edition) ed. by Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/heidegger-aesthetics/
> [Last accessed 22 January 2012]
Principles of Art (1983),18 and I begin this section by briefly examining these parallels, 
starting with the creation process.
Collingwood states, for example, that ‘the expression of emotion is not [something] 
made to fit an emotion already existing, but is an activity without which the experience 
of emotion cannot exist’.19 The idea that expression is what allows the emotion to be 
experienced here is particularly interesting; it also acknowledges that the expression is 
much more than a mere embodiment of the writer’s individual feeling – rather it is a key 
to experiencing such emotion. If the artist himself is not aware of his emotion until he 
has expressed it, it seems that the ‘knowledge’ or understanding of the emotion must lie 
not in the expression (the text) but indeed in the process of mediation. This idea 
resonates with the Narrator’s exhilarating moment of inspiration caused by the 
Martinville steeples, after which he feels as if he has ‘laid an egg’ – released the 
potential of the experience by approaching it from within and putting it down in writing. 
Apart from this instance and the sections where the Narrator discusses the composition 
of his oeuvre at the very end of Le Temps retrouvé, however, the Narrator’s writerly 
endeavours tend to be shadowed by a considerable mistrust in his abilities to express in 
words the sense of ‘perpetual adoration’ and bewilderment that life throws his way. As 
mentioned earlier, for the most part of the novel, the Narrator’s anxiety over his own 
artistic abilities prevents him from actually setting to work, and thus we should not 
necessarily deem the writing process as altogether toilsome merely because the Narrator 
regards it as such.
There is, however, another example that implies a certain defeatism regarding the 
possibility of ‘accessing’ the self or communicating with one’s own self through 
writing: it is manifested, in the form of merciless artistic self-criticism, in Bergotte’s 
death scene in La Prisonnière, in which the sick, tired and disillusioned artist has lost 
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seems odd that Collingwood himself mentions neither Proust nor the Recherche in his study, although he, 
as an early twentieth-century Oxonian, must have at least known about Proust’s work.
19 Collingwood, p. 244. Collingwood’s discussion of the task of the writer and his relationship with his 
audience in The Principles of Art bears resemblance to some of the views Proust’s Narrator expresses in 
the Recherche. 
his ability to take pride in his (more recent) works.20 The overwhelming aesthetic 
experience in front of Vermeer’s View of Delft, seeing the miraculous little patch of 
yellow wall, leads Bergotte to conclude: ‘C’est ainsi que j’aurais dû écrire. […] Mes 
derniers livres sont trop secs, il aurait fallu passer plusieurs couches de couleur, rendre 
ma phrase en elle-même précieuse, comme ce petit pan de mur jaune.’ (RTP III, 692) It 
is almost as if he acknowledges here that the communication with himself has become 
‘insincere’ in his more recent works; having gained popularity amongst wide audiences, 
he seems to have moved away from his true artistic ambitions and ended up writing 
works of fiction that seem to yield or reveal nothing to him. 
It is with this discrepancy in mind that I explore the writing process in the following – a 
discrepancy between the writing-self and the reading-self, which is present in Bergotte’s 
self-criticism as well as in the passage where the Narrator is reading his own article in 
Le Figaro (which I discuss in 2.3. below). Even if writing seems to, at least 
momentarily, allow the writer some kind of access to ‘truths’, the problem with the 
process of creation (as we saw in the previous chapter) is that like involuntary memory, 
these ecstatic moments are fleeting and fortuitous. Furthermore, they seem to become 
denied to the writer himself after the creation process is finished and not to be accessed 
again simply by reading the text. The way in which reading his own text fails to yield 
the writer the same kind of ‘illuminations’ as the process of writing did, or as reading a 
text written by someone else might, seems to further imply that the self-revelatory 
quality of literary texts resides in the process of making meanings rather than inherently 
in the text itself.
In Collingwood’s approach, one has to view the expression not as something which 
captures the emotion but as something which, in fact, releases it: coherence or the sense 
of the real can only arise through an internalised process. This is why, subsequently, the 
text may be regarded as an instrument (rather than a source) for the reader to understand 
their own ‘unmarked’ experiences and feelings. Proust’s Narrator suggests something 
very similar, noting how the creation of an artwork is a process in which knowledge or 
understanding (‘le savoir’) cannot help us in the process itself but is a reward which 
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20 This incident is another manifestation of the inner inconsistencies in the novel, as the Narrator here is, 
as occasionally with Swann, ‘inside’ Bergotte’s mind as it were, quoting his thoughts.
comes afterwards:
[L]’écrivain se rend compte que si son rêve d’être un peintre n’était pas réalisable 
d’une manière consciente et volontaire, il se trouve pourtant avoir été réalisé et 
que l’écrivain, lui aussi, a fait son carnet de croquis sans le savoir. 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 479
Even though the process of expressing an experience can be highly revelatory during 
the moment of creation, with ‘les clochers de Martinville’, the Narrator here reminds us 
of the inability to initiate this kind of process in a ‘manière consciente et volontaire’.
A moment similar to the Martinville experience, in which the Narrator feels a 
compelling urge to ‘make sense’ of an experience appears, in A l’ombre des jeunes filles 
en fleurs II. Now in Balbec, the Narrator travels with his grandmother in Mme de 
Villeparisis’s carriage and sees three quivering trees in Hudimesnil. The vision of the 
trees evokes a profound sense of ‘recognition’ within him, but this time he is not able to 
locate the ‘original’ experience:
Où les avais-je déjà regardés? Il n’y avait aucun lieu autour de Combray où une 
allée s’ouvrit ainsi. Le site qu’ils me rappelaient, il n’y avait pas de place pour lui 
davantage dans la campagne allemande où j’étais allé une année avec ma grand-
mère prendre les eaux. Fallait-il croire qu’ils venaient d’années déjà si lointaines 
de ma vie que le paysage qui les entourait avait été entièrement aboli dans ma 
mémoire et que comme ces pages qu’on est tout d’un coup ému de retrouver dans 
un ouvrage qu’on s’imaginait n’avoir jamais lu, ils surnageaient seuls du livre 
oublié de ma première enfance? [...] Je crus plutôt que c’étaient des fantômes du 
passé, de chers compagnons de mon enfance, des amis disparus qui invoquaient 
nos communs souvenirs. 
      
     A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 78 
 
This inexplicable sense of ‘realness’ and the way it flees from him leads the Narrator to 
compare the pleasure caused by the trees to the transitory moments of happiness in his 
life; the Narrator notes how the carriage, taking him further and further from the trees, 
‘m’entraînait loin de ce que je croyais seul vrai, de ce qui m’eût rendu vraiment 
heureux’ and, in this sense, the experience ‘ressemblait à ma vie.’ (RTP II, 79) 
The Narrator tries very hard to direct his thoughts ‘dans la direction des arbres, ou 
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plutôt dans cette direction intérieure au bout de laquelle je les voyais en moi-
même’ (RTP II, 77), but being addressed by Mme de Villeparisis brings his 
contemplation to a halt. Thus drawn out of his reverie, the Narrator is overtaken by an 
immense feeling of sadness, ‘comme si je venais de perdre un ami, de mourir moi-
même’ (RTP II, 79, my emphasis). The scenario of being denied the access to one’s own 
past is once again presented here, and unlike in the Martinville passage, this time the 
pleasure remains incomplete because of the inability to locate the original experience 
‘en [s]oi-même’. The absence of a point of reference here seems to prevent the Narrator 
from actually mediating the present moment in light of the past, and thus also from 
getting ‘au bout de [s]on impression’ (RTP I, 177).21
The more the Narrator tries to catch the fleeting past impression, the further away it 
seems to move, and instead of assisting him, the trees in fact seem to be saying to him: 
‘ce que tu n’apprends pas de nous aujourd’hui tu ne le sauras jamais’ (RTP II, 79). The 
risk of being left forever in doubt, not understanding what lies within oneself, to feel as 
if one was dead to oneself (‘comme si je venais ... de mourir à moi-même’ RTP II, 79), 
is a deeply disturbing prospect for the Narrator – it seems, in fact, to be much more 
disturbing than the inability to understand the other. Indeed, there are moments in which 
this inaccessibility of the other, even though it causes anxiety in the Narrator, also 
excites and exhilarates him,22 and still, it is the prospect of regaining access to one’s 
own past – the experiences that one should be able to call one’s own – that ultimately 
prompts the Narrator to write. 
This urge to relate to the world and to one’s experience through mediation is what 
Sartre considers as one of the driving forces behind aesthetic expression. The creation 
process, according to Sartre, begins with the desire to feel essential in relation to 
something:
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we have read a long time ago is particularly interesting and insinuates that the effects of reading on the 
reader’s mind can be as effective and perserved in the memory as vividly as life experiences. (I shall 
explore this quality of reading experience further in Part Three of the thesis.)
22 As Edward Hughes points out, for example, the bewilderment caused by encounters with the young 
girls in Balbec, as well as the lessons learnt through Elstir’s art, contribute essentially to the shift of 
emphasis in the Narrator’s aesthetic quest: the movement from philosophical and ‘intellectual’ subject 
matters onto the coding of veritable impressions in life. See Hughes, pp. 106-115 and 179-184.
Un des principaux motifs de la création artistique est certainement le besoin de 
nous sentir essentiels par rapport au monde. Cet aspect des champs ou de la mer, 
cet air de visage que j’ai dévoilés, si je les fixe sur une toile, dans un écrit, en 
resserrant les rapports, en introduisant de l’ordre là où il ne s’en trouvait pas, en 
imposant l’unité de l’esprit à la diversité de la chose, j’ai conscience de les 
produire, c’est-à-dire que je me sens essentiel par rapport à ma création.23
What is suggested here is that artistic expression provides the means (for the artist) to 
endure the ‘besoin de se sentir essentiel par rapport au monde’. Sartre makes it clear, 
however, that in spite of feeling essential in relation to something, i.e. our own creation, 
one is not ‘essentiel’ to the world through it. This does not mean that we are not really a 
part of the world – only that we are not in any way essential to it. We are, however, 
essential to the disclosure (‘dévoilement’) of the world and of our existence in it, as 
disclosure always requires consciousness. 
The Narrator’s urge to mediate the inexplicable pleasure and a sense of realness that 
overtakes him both in the Martinville passage and with the Hudimesnil trees (as well as 
in the context of other ‘moments bienheureux’ in Combray and Le Temps retrouvé) 
might be considered as a sign of the ‘besoin’ Sartre writes about. It is, however, exactly 
this ‘besoin’ which also problematises the artistic creation process as a means to arrive 
at the sense of ‘reality’ by making it a motivated process: the writer is aware of the 
origins of this process, of the ‘primary experience’ behind it (the experience which 
needs to be ‘recorded’ faithfully), and therefore the end result – the work – remains 
subject to constant evaluation and re-evaluation by the writer himself, as the example of 
Bergotte earlier also demonstrates.
The artistic quest on which the Narrator eventually embarks seems to originate in this 
precise desire to understand life – not by describing it but, indeed, by translating it: ‘je 
m’apercevais que, pour exprimer ces impressions, pour écrire ce livre essentiel, le seul 
livre vrai, un grand écrivain n’a pas, dans le sens courant, à l’inventer puisqu’il existe 
déjà en chacun de nous, mais à le traduire.’ (RTP IV, 469) This idea of translation also 
features in Collingwood, who, like Proust’s Narrator, suggests that the content, the 
meaning of an artwork cannot be simply ‘installed’ there by its creator, but only comes 
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to being in some kind of communication with his expression, through the process of 
reading:
We […] speak of a work as ‘self-expression’, persuading ourselves that what 
makes a poem great is the fact that it ‘expresses a great personality’, whereas, if 
self-expression is the order of the day, whatever value we set on such a poem is 
due to its expressing not the poet – what is Shakespeare to us, or we to 
Shakespeare? – but ourselves.24
    
In describing and rejecting such attitudes towards a work of art which often precede the 
experience of the work itself, Collingwood comes very close to what Proust in Contre 
Sainte-Beuve calls aesthetic ‘fetishism’ or ‘idolatry’25 – the evaluation and 
‘appreciation’ of a work of art according to its form and origin, rather than the actual 
impressions the work yields to us when we encounter it. In Roger Shattuck’s words, ‘les 
célibataires d’art’ cannot grasp the fact that ‘the domain of art does not exist exclusively 
or even primarily outside us in great masterpieces […] but rather in our responses to 
[art], and in our […] attempt to track that response to our inner life.’26
While the process of creation may enhance the artist’s self-understanding (for example, 
by making him aware of his emotions when expressing them, as Collingwood suggests), 
for a writer, accessing this kind of level of self-understanding through his own text later 
on is problematic because the writer-self is never able to read the text without the 
knowledge of how it came about. As Sartre points suggests, reading your own text is not 
really reading but always, in a way, re-writing.27 I now move on to consider the ways in 
which reading a text written by someone else might be considered as more ‘self-
revelatory’ than writing or reading one’s own text.
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2.3. ‘Une autre pensée qui se fabrique’: Who Reads Whom?
 
The Narrator plays a kind of double-role in the novel both as a writer and a reader, and 
through him, Proust also presents us with a situation – described in a passage in 
Albertine Disparue where the Narrator attempts to read his own article in Le Figaro – in 
which the writer faces the difficulty (impossibility even) of simultaneously trying to be 
both the writer and the reader of his own text. Adam Watt, in his book Reading in 
Proust’s ‘A la recherche’, illustrates the problematic nature of the phenomenology of 
reading through this very passage. Watt’s analysis of the task of reading one’s own text 
as a ‘lecteur quelconque’ illustrates the importance of the highly subjective dimension 
that is always required in the process of (genuine) interpretation: the Narrator is not able 
to read his text through the eyes of ‘just any reader’, not only because he has written it 
and thus has a special knowledge about how the text was produced (and thus lacks the 
essential ingredient of liberty that Sartre attaches to the process), but also because as a 
‘lecteur quelconque’ he now tries to approach the text without any reservoir of personal 
experiences and thoughts that inhabit every actual reader.28
Reading his article, the Narrator remarks that while ‘la pensée de l’auteur est 
directement perçue par le lecteur, [...] c’est une autre pensée qui se fabrique dans son 
esprit’ (RTP IV, 149). While the idea of ‘une autre pensée qui se fabrique’ (RTP IV, 149) 
seems to resonate with both the Sartrean demand for freedom and the Barthesian view 
of language forever in play,29 to approach the reading experience on such an abstract 
level – first and foremost as a textual encounter, a cosa mentale – contains a risk of 
overlooking the conditions which individualise the reader’s experience and through 
which the thoughts presented in the text develop into ‘une autre pensée’ in the first 
place. If we consider the self-revelatory potential of the reading experience, these 
conditions – the reader’s existence as a psycho-physical being in the world and subject 
to time – become absolutely crucial. 
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While the Figaro passage does suggests that a certain distance from the text is required 
for the reading process to be successful, it does not completely support the Sartrean 
demand for freedom (of not knowing how the text came about). Namely, the Narrator 
changes his approach and tries to read his article as himself but to approach the text as if 
it was written by someone else, which, as Watt notes, ‘seems to yield far more agreeable 
results’30. The fact that when the Narrator approaches his own text as if it was someone 
else’s creation the text suddenly ‘works’, suggests that in a successful reading 
experience, the personal ‘reservoir’ of experiences of the reader to which he can relate 
the text is even more important an element than freedom. The Narrator notes how 
reading as himself ‘toutes mes images, toutes mes réflexions, toutes mes épithètes prises 
en elles-mêmes et sans le souvenir de l’échec qu’elles représentaient pour mes visées, 
me charmaient par leur éclat, leur imprévu, leur profondeur’ (RTP IV, 151). 
This kind of approach to the text – not with the memory of how it came to being, but 
with memories and impressions that echo from a deeper, almost unconscious level – 
allows the words on the page to be faced as more ‘éclatés’, ‘profonds’ and most 
importantly ‘imprévus’. What seems to lie at the bottom of this method is the repelling 
of voluntary memory and yielding to whatever crops up involuntarily as we read. Watt 
in fact proposes that the process of reading (for literate people) is au fond involuntary in 
the sense that once we have learnt how to read, we cannot but read, and partly because 
of this kind of habituation, ‘reading somehow allows an uninterrupted access to the 
deeper reaches of the self in a similar fashion, we might say, to the experience of 
involuntary memory.’31 When we consider the reader as a being who always remains a 
part of the material world and exists in time, Watt’s comparison becomes particularly 
convincing:
Reading, in sum, like involuntary memory, is a powerful transformative process 
that yokes two entities which maintain the material and the spiritual in tension. On 
the material level are the book and the body of the reader; on a more ethereal level 
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are the interpretive capacity or ‘esprit’ housed in the reader’s body, and the 
conceptual, ideational potential, housed in the book.32
Once we have learned to read, reading certainly becomes a kind of reflex, and it seems 
we do indeed also unconsciously (and involuntarily) import some of our preconceptions 
into the act of reading and thus ‘thrust meaning onto words’.33 However, the act of 
reading is not involuntary in every respect, and Watt acknowledges this: we can choose 
what to (and what not to) read; we can (and to some extent have to) analyse and 
interpret what we are reading on a conscious, intellectual level; and we can, after having 
read something, retrospectively attach our life experiences and thoughts to what we 
have experienced through the given text. This is what gives the process its epistemic 
vigour. Furthermore, as the example of the Narrator as the reader of his own text shows, 
we can – to some extent at least – also choose (and develop) the mode in which we read. 
Facing all the different forms of reception and ‘uses’ of art in the Recherche, we may 
ask whether the Recherche suggests that there are ‘correct’ ways to experience an 
artwork, and if so, what defines this correctness.
In Le Temps retrouvé, the Narrator does talk about ‘une certaine façon pour bien 
lire’ (RTP IV, 490, my emphasis), but the germ of this ‘façon’ is not some kind of 
congruity between the writer’s ‘intention’ and the reader’s interpretation. Rather, the 
idea is that the reader may experience some kind of affinity between the mediated 
experience of the text and his or her own ‘direct’ experience in the world. It is this 
affinity, rather than any particular methodological approach, a set of reading methods, 
that allows the reader to experience the text as part of himself. However, what is so 
specific about the aesthetic reading – reading without a particular aim or objective – is 
that it can also reveal to us, through this ‘involuntary’ dimension of our imagination 
drawing endlessly from the reader’s own sphere of experience, the way in which 
mediation always comprises a part of the experience in the real. 
We only need to consider the Narrator’s deliberation in Le Temps retrouvé (448-490) 
where he marks how the writing process can never be ‘guaranteed’ to reveal truths for 
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the one who is writing because ‘les idées formées par l’intelligence pure n’ont qu’une 
vérité logique, une vérité possible, leur élection est arbitraire’ (RTP IV, 458). It is 
impression, the Narrator remarks, which provides the writer with the access to truths, 
but while ‘l’impression est pour l’écrivain ce qu’est l’expérimentation pour le savant’, 
the difference is that ‘chez le savant le travail de l’intelligence précède et chez l’écrivain 
vient après’ (RTP IV, 459). In aesthetic reading, then, the reader’s process of decoding 
the text is similarly filled with impressions drawn from his or her own life experiences, 
and it seems it is only by suspending the ‘travail de l’intelligence’ that the reader is able 
to find those truths which already exist ‘en soi-même’. As the Narrator points out, ‘non 
que ces idées que nous formons ne puissent être justes logiquement, mais nous ne 
savons pas si elles sont vraies’ (RTP IV, 459) unless we allow our own impressions to 
animate the text for us. 
This takes us back to the problem that the writer faces when reading his own text, and 
the way there is an ‘original’ experience attached to the process of mediation, which in a 
sense provides a point of comparison for a certain ‘validity’ of the text: for him, the text, 
even if fictional, does not really allow him to experience it ‘du dehors’. In the 
Hudimesnil passage, the Narrator comments on how the familiarity of the quivering 
trees (but the simultaneous inability to trace the origins of this familiarity) in fact makes 
the whole situation feel unreal, ‘fictional’ all round: 
Je me demandai si toute cette promenade n’était pas une fiction, Balbec un endroit  
où je n’étais jamais allé que par l’imagination, Mme de Villeparisis un personnage 
de roman et les trois vieux arbres la réalité qu’on retrouve en levant les yeux de 
dessus le livre qu’on était en train de lire et qui vous décrivait un milieu dans 
lequel on avait fini par se croire effectivement transporté.
      A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 77
Here Proust plays with the idea that ‘truth is stranger than fiction’ and emphasises, 
through the Narrator’s comment, the way in which fictional ‘description’ in the sense 
that Lamarque uses it as something which ‘normally implies that it is not true’ can 
produce or evoke in us the sense of realness in the reader.34 Clearly what the Narrator 
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experiences in this passage is a sense of the real, but the origins of this sensation remain 
a mystery which he, unlike in the Martinville passage, is now unable to grasp. 
What this passage elucidates is, on the one hand, the importance of imagination in 
thinking and ‘truth-making’ in general, and, on the other, the role of direct life 
experience in the workings of our imagination. In the previous chapter, I already 
discussed the difference between imagination and fantasy; what was argued was that 
imagination transcends fantasy, since instead of ‘somewhat mechanically generating 
narrowly banal false pictures’, as Murdoch puts it, imagination is a constitutive element 
in all our thinking, always moving us ‘toward the expression and elucidation [...] of 
what is true and deep’.35
It is this kind of evocative quality of the experience of art – the way it ‘moves’ our 
thoughts by setting our imagination at work – that is essential to experiencing the sense 
of realness in fiction and to the process of becoming ‘un propre lecteur de soi-
même’ (RTP IV, 610), rather than ‘arriving’ at some new truths outside the self.36 As 
Lamarque continues, ‘to enlarge the imagination is not to add new truths to it but 
“exercise” it through new applications.’37 The power of imagination thus resides in its 
ability to offer us choices which make us acknowledge the multifaceted, processual 
nature of truth in the first place and help us to ‘keep up with it’. This is why an 
experience of reading a fictional text which is able to evoke the sense of realness in the 
reader cannot be deemed inferior to the sense of realness arising from life experience 
simply on the basis that what it says, what it describes, is not contingently ‘true’. 
Gadamer, in his essay on ‘Semantics and Hermeneutics’, proposes something similar, 
viewing the process through which a hermeneutical mind can disclose truths as follows:
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37 Lamarque, Philosophy of Literature, p. 241.
The hermeneutically enlightened consciousness seems [...] to establish a higher 
truth in that it draws itself into its own reflection. Its truth, namely, is that of 
translation. It is higher because it allows the foreign to become one’s own, not by 
destroying it critically or reproducing it uncritically, but by explicating it within 
one’s own horizons with one’s own concepts and thus giving it new validity. 
Translation allows what is foreign and what is one’s own to merge in a new form 
by defending the point of the other even if it is opposed to one’s own view.38
Thus, similarly to the Narrator’s conviction that writing a literary work can at its best be 
a translation of life, then reading can be considered as translating the literary text back 
into life by ‘explicating it within one’s own horizons with one’s own concepts’. 
Part of this ‘activating’ potential of literature is based on the ways in which it is created, 
mediated and again re-created through the means of language – a system which needs to 
be, especially in fictive descriptions, ‘animated’ by the one who uses it. Thus the 
linguistic aspect of the literary experience – or, indeed, any experience – is by no means 
inconsequential, since human understanding is intrinsically ‘language-bound’, as 
Gadamer notes.39 However, he proceeds to remark that
this assertion does not lead us into any kind of linguistic relativism. It is indeed 
true that we live within a language, but language is not a system of signals that we 
send off with the aid of a telegraphic key when we enter the office or transmission 
station. ... [Living within a language] does not constitute linguistic relativism 
because there is absolutely no captivity in language.40
Gadamer’s statement that there is no captivity in language is based on the idea that, 
instead of being confined within one language through which we first conceptualise the 
world (that is, our mother-tongue), we can acquire new languages, new words, and new 
concepts, new systems, endlessly, to both match our lived experience and to satisfy our 
imagination. Thus, Gadamer manages simultaneously to emphasise the hermeneutical 
conditionality of our being – the significance of the lived experience, place, and time in 
the way we use language – as well as acknowledge the creative and endless possibilities 
of linguistic mediation in the process of disclosing the direct experience.
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The proposition that the reader can come to possess some knowledge or ‘truths’ that in 
fact are in no way proper to the narrative itself seems to represent a somewhat similar 
situation to the Narrator’s ‘shift of emphasis’ when, with the Hudimesnil trees, he 
remarks how he directs his thoughts ‘dans la direction des arbres, ou plutôt dans cette 
direction intérieure au bout de laquelle je les voyais en moi-même’ (RTP II, 77). The 
text for the reader can be something similar to the trees or the steeples for the Narrator, 
in holding a potential for disclosure of something outside the object itself. But is this 
‘something’, then, knowledge? Can it be considered as ‘truth’? 
This prompts us to consider the concept of truth itself and the question of what 
ultimately gives grounds for it – and indeed, to what extent truth is separable from the 
way it is experienced and expressed. For example for Heidegger, any ‘true knowledge’ 
of the world can only be obtained through personal experience; what this means, in 
Heidegger’s discourse, is that any true recognition of human existence can only be 
accessed through individuals and therefore cannot be manifested objectively. 
Heidegger’s theory avoids total subjectivism, however, in maintaining, unlike many 
relativist theories, that there are truths in the world – not only to be ‘known’ but to be 
experienced. As Dermot Moran explains it:
Human existence is not an entity which is simply there in the world, accessible 
from different points of view. Rather human existence is some specific person’s 
existence; it has the character of ‘specificity’ (Jeweiligkeit) or 
‘mineness’ (Jemeinigkeit). So too an interpretation of human existence cannot be 
neutral, dispassionate, theoretical contemplation, but must take into account the 
involvement of the enquirer him- or herself in the undertaking. […] Understanding 
what it is to be a questioner reveals the purely human mode of being-in-the-world 
(In-der-Welt-Sein) as a kind of projective caring and involvement in the world. 41 
To consider Proust’s Narrator in the view of this argument, although his involvement in 
the world cannot be always counted as ‘caring’, his mode of being in-the-world 
certainly is that of a questioner. 
The tendency of an experience to change dramatically according to how we interpret it 
at one point in time and another, in the light of new information, is manifested in Proust 
through several examples of the Narrator’s encounters with other people. One such 
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instance can be found in the opening scene of Sodome et Gomorrhe I, where the 
Narrator voyeuristically witnesses the encounter between Charlus and Jupien and finally  
becomes aware of the Baron’s homosexuality. The Narrator remarks: 
Les personnes qui n’aiment pas se reporter comme exemples de cette loi aux 
messieurs de Charlus de leur connaissance, que pendant bien longtemps elles 
n’avaient pas soupçonnés, jusqu’au jour où, sur la surface unie de l’individu pareil 
aux autres, sont venus apparaître, tracés en une encre jusque-là invisible, les 
caractères qui composent le mot cher aux anciens Grecs, n’ont, pour se persuader 
que le monde qui les entoure leur apparaît d’abord nu, dépouillé de mille 
ornements qu’il offre à de plus instruits, qu’à se souvenir combien de fois, dans la 
vie, il leur est arrivé d’être sur le point de commettre une gaffe. 
    A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 15 
The ‘invisible ink’ of the motives and the intentions of others recurs everywhere in the 
Narrator’s social encounters – although most of the time (as with Albertine for example) 
it remains hidden, unreadable. 
One of the aspects that make the Narrator’s aesthetic experiences different is that they 
allow him to be a questioner without striving to access some ‘immediate truth’ – a 
tendency that features heavily in the Narrator’s dealings with people, for example. This 
does not mean that the Narrator’s approach to art is simply ‘escapist’, nor that the 
soothing quality of these aesthetic experiences is based on somehow suppressing the 
questioning mode. While the ‘specificity’ (Jeweiligkeit) or ‘mineness’ (Jemeinigkeit) of 
the other in life seems to remain mostly inaccessible, an artwork may allow us to read 
the other, to interpret the other, and indeed, to translate the other, without the paralysing 
fixedness of vision or intention which so often characterises interactions with the other 
in everyday life. In this way, art may help us to take advantage of ‘the real power of 
hermeneutical consciousness [which] is our ability to see what is questionable’ rather 
than to access ‘immediate’ truths.42 
The knowledge we extract from literary fiction can thus be described as self-referential 
in a way – not only in referring to the constant processual nature of language itself but 
also to that of the reader’s ever-evolving subjectivity. The reading of a book as reading 
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‘en soi-même’ does not mean our subjectivity can be revealed to us as something 
conceptually clear or controllable through the reading experience, but nor does it mean 
we are creating it from scratch. Reading is never merely an ‘internal’ process happening 
in the mind. Rather, the reader is able to move backwards and forwards, with the text, 
between the imaginary world of the book and the empirically experienced world, his or 
her everyday life.
In the experience of reading, our imagination is not restricted by direct sensuous 
impressions drawn from the object of our attention itself (that is, from the text) but in 
fact sources from outside the object. For example Adam Watt discusses the eminent role 
of sensory stimuli, such as colours and sounds in the young Narrator’s reading 
experiences in Combray and how these sensuous impression bind the Narrator to the 
‘real’ physical world and to his bodily existence in it, even when his mind is wandering 
in the fictional world.43 In this sense the reader never completely ‘loses’ himself in the 
text but rather enters into a negotiation between imagination and reality – and never just 
abstract ‘reality’, what is apprehended by our intellect as ‘true’ or ‘actual’ but also the 
reality experienced through our physical existence in the world. It is through this 
movement between the two worlds – the phenomenologically experienced world and 
the fictional world of the text – that the reader’s subjectivity becomes engaged in the 
reading process.
One special aspect of this kind of ‘in-between’ experience is that it helps us to recognise 
the role of imagination in all knowledge and construction of meaning and that 
representation does not merely come after an experience but is always a part of the 
experience to begin with. Considering the Narrator’s remark that ‘la vraie vie, la vie 
enfin découverte et éclaircie, la seule vie par conséquent pleinement vécue … [qui] 
habite à chaque instant chez tous les hommes aussi bien que chez l’artiste’ (RTP IV, 
474), it seems that while fictional texts do not embody truths they may indeed release 
them. While fictive utterances determine how things are in the fictional world, they do 
not prevent the interpretation of the fictive world from drawing from ‘real’ experience 
or, vice versa, from being projected onto the ‘real’; in this way a fictive utterance may, 
when correlating with our experience of the real, reveal to us something essential about 
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how we perceive the world and ourselves in it. As Lamarque notes elsewhere, the point 
of reading fiction is ‘not that the readers come to grasp propositional truths or acquire 
new beliefs but that their way of seeing the world has been affected’.44 
Even though this kind of release of truths is not a process that can be completed simply 
by will and intellect, there is some kind of epistemic drive behind the process which 
activates the reader. In describing his experiences of reading in the Combray garden, the 
Narrator notes how 
Après cette croyance centrale [en la richesse philosophique, en la beauté du livre 
que je lisais] qui, pendant ma lecture, exécutait d’incessants mouvements du 
dedans au dehors, vers la découverte de la vérité, venaient les émotions que me 
donnait l’action à laquelle je prenais part [...] [I]l est vrai que les personnages 
qu’ils affectaient n’étaient pas ‘réels’, comme disait Françoise. Mais tous les 
sentiments que nous font éprouver la joie ou l’infortune d’un personnage réel ne 
se produisent en nous que par l’intermédiaire d’une image de cette joie ou de cette 
infortune [...]. Un être réel, si profondément que nous sympathisions avec lui, 
pour une grande part est perçu par nos sens, c’est-à-dire nous reste opaque, offre 
un poids mort que notre sensibilité ne peut soulever. […] La trouvaille du 
romancier a été d’avoir l’idée de remplacer [les] parties impénétrables à l’âme par 
une quantité égale de parties immatérielles, c’est-à-dire que notre âme peut 
s’assimiler.
   A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 83-84 (my emphasis)
This passage allows us to reflect on the processual nature of truth in Proust. The 
Narrator’s reading process is an epistemic quest, but not aimed at simply becoming 
aware of something by reading about it; rather, the discovery of truth means actively 
taking part. In reading, this means taking part in a process where meanings are not only 
created but actually experienced, through emotions, memory and imagination.
What is so essentially valuable about reading fiction, according to the Narrator’s 
comments above, is that it enables our soul to assimilate to the experience of the other 
precisely because in a text the other is not experienced ‘par nos sens’ (not directly, that 
is) but by ‘notre sensibilité’. The advantage of reading, then, is that it can offer us 
experiences abstracted from the restraints of the real but not of the reality itself; this is 
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how literature succeeds in describing things as ‘réels sans être actuels, idéaux sans être 
abstraits’ (RTP IV, 451). 
And yet, in order for the reader to assimilate to the ‘parties immatérielles’, with which 
the writer replaces ‘[les] parties impénétrables’ of ‘un être réel’ (RTP I, 83), the reader’s 
sympathy and assimilation must find their most rudimentary sources in what has been 
experienced, interpreted and appropriated before the act of reading, both in life and in 
other texts and forms of mediation. The actual emotional, sensuous and embodied in-
the-world experience (as well as being subject to time) is what enables the reader to 
‘prendre part’, through the ‘incessants mouvements du dedans au dehors’ (RTP I, 83). 
The Narrator’s failure to read as a ‘lecteur quelconque’ adroitly points to the 
significance of these dimensions, as the ‘lecteur quelconque’, as an abstraction lacking a 
web of experiences in the real, cannot fulfil the reader’s task in a satisfactory, profound 
way. 
As already suggested above, the process of reading is, in part, such an active and 
creative one exactly because it is created, mediated and again re-created through 
language, which is an abstract system and thus needs to be ‘animated’ by the one who 
uses it. In order to test the proposition that the self-revelatory potential of literary 
experience is related precisely to this process of ‘taking part’, in which the reader 
enlivens (even if unconsciously) the fictional text by drawing from his or her own 
experiences and emotions, we need to consider what a literary text can do differently 
from, for example, sound or image; with this question in mind, in the next part of the 
thesis I move on to discuss the experiences of paintings, music and performing arts in 
comparison with the experience of reading.
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PART II
OTHER AESTHETIC EXPERIENCES 
Music: breath of statues. Perhaps even
silence of pictures. You language where languages
end. You time,
set upright in the grain of hearts’ evanescence.
Feelings for whom? O you, transformation
of feelings to what? – to audible landscape.
You stranger: music. You heart-space
grown out beyond us. 
– Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘To Music’ 1
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3. ‘Cette toile si fixée donnait l’impression la plus fugitive’: Reading Paintings
Visual art, and paintings in particular, feature prominently in the Recherche, both on 
the level of its narrative and in recurrent imagery and metaphors throughout the 
novel. In the introduction to Paintings in Proust: a Visual Companion to ‘In Search 
of Lost Time’, Eric Karpeles remarks how enthusiasm for visual art – and 
Impressionist painting in particular – ‘seemed to trigger something in Proust’s 
nervous system,’ influencing his own work as a writer.1 Signs of Proust’s fervour for 
Impressionism can be recognised both on the meta-textual level – in Proust’s style 
and the structure of the Recherche itself2 – as well as on the level of the narrative, 
especially in the discussion evolving around the works of the fictional painter Elstir.
While Proustian ekphrasis [the description and commentary of a work of visual art in 
literature] has received much critical attention, the way in which the experience of 
visual art and that of literature relate to one another in the novel has not yet been 
exhaustively discussed. In this chapter, I analyse the ways in which visual aesthetic 
experience is presented in Proust’s novel and compare the process of ‘reading’ paintings 
to that of reading literature, considering different ways in which these experiences may 
enhance one’s grasp of ‘la réalité’ and contribute to one’s self-understanding. The 
descriptions of looking at Impressionist art in the novel are especially worthwhile in this 
respect: Elstir’s Impressionist paintings are celebrated for their ability to, on the one 
hand, represent instantaneity and, on the other, reveal the way in which mediation and 
imagination play a crucial role even in what tends to be regarded as ‘pure’ (direct) 
perception.
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One immediate difference between viewing paintings and reading would seem to 
relate to the way visual artwork engages our senses whereas a text appears in the first 
instance to trigger the mind. While this is undoubtedly true of the initial stages of the 
experience, such a perspective – distinguishing the visual and the literary primarily 
on the basis of one being more connected to our senses and the other to our mental 
faculties – would not allow the inherent qualities of each experience to be fully 
explored. Such a point of departure would, first of all, imply that a visual aesthetic 
experience could not convey meanings or reveal truths beyond its appearance 
(beyond the surface that is registered by our senses), which is clearly not the case in 
Proust. Secondly, this kind of approach would undermine the role of the senses in the 
reading process.3 While the material aspect of the visual art object does make it 
inherently different from a book, visuality is what also brings the experience of these 
different artworks together; visuality, as Proust’s novel recurrently reminds us, is not 
merely connected with our direct, sensory experience but also plays an essential role 
in the working of our imagination and memory (and vice versa).
 In ‘Sentiments filiaux d’un parricide,’ Proust writes that ‘nos yeux ont plus de part 
qu’on ne croit dans cette exploration active du passé qu’on nomme le souvenir […] 
les yeux de celui qui fait effort pour se souvenir [deviennent] des téléscopes de 
l’invisible’.4 This visual ‘genealogy’ of memory prompts us to consider the links 
between the experiences of involuntary memory and visual art – not so much in the 
sense than the latter would trigger the former but in the sense that the two 
experiences seem to bear resemblances. This interlinking of memory and visuality 
also raises the question of to what extent the visual is, in fact, personal, to which I 
return towards the end of this chapter.
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3 In its descriptions of the reading process, Proust’s novel repeatedly shows how the reader remains a part 
of the tangible world, sensing it and being affected by it. I shall look at some of these passages and 
explore the way in which the sensuous experiences feed into the aesthetic experience of a book in Part 
Three of the thesis.
4 Marcel Proust, ‘Sentiments filiaux d’un parricide’ in Contre Sainte-Beuve (précédé de Pastiches et 
mélanges et suivi de Essais et articles) ed. Pierre Clarac and Yves Sandre. (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque 
de la Pléiade, 1971), pp. 151-52.
The prominence of visual metaphors and visual experiences in the Recherche is 
striking: according to Victor E. Graham, sixty-two percent of the literary imagery in 
the novel is visual.5 In addition to paintings, references to photographs, statues, 
posters and postcards are frequent. Gabrielle Townsend, in her study on the primacy 
of the visual in Proust, offers a comprehensive examination of the role of visual 
reproduction and reproductions in Proust’s work, discussing the use of photographs 
as an important narrative device and a source of ‘visual instantaneity’ in the 
Recherche.6 In the following, I shall focus explicitly on paintings as the source of 
visual aesthetic experience. I have chosen to prioritise paintings mainly because they 
play such an essential role in the Narrator’s aesthetic apprenticeship and are therefore 
discussed in far more detail than other visual works in the novel, but also because 
there are certain characteristics in paintings which make the onlooker’s experience 
especially interesting from the viewpoint of self-understanding. These aspects 
include a certain sui generis quality of the artwork, an ‘auratic distance’, and the fact 
that the canvas as a surface creates a certain position for the onlooker and his or her 
gaze.
In comparison to three-dimensional visual art, such as sculpture, paintings situate the 
onlooker in relation to one surface, whereas with statues, for example the onlooker is 
able to perceive the artwork from a variety of angles. The experience of paintings, in 
comparison to ‘everyday’ forms of visual presentation (such as the aforementioned 
reproductions), becomes distinctly different due to a certain uniqueness or ‘aura’ that 
surrounds the original work and the artistic craft that has gone into its execution, 
which is absent from mechanically reproduced photographs, posters or postcards. For 
now, to acknowledge there are essential differences between the experience of 
reproductions and bona fide artworks is enough for our purposes, as my analysis of 
Proust’s text in the following will focus explicitly on the latter. The question of 
reproduction will, however, be revisited towards the end of this chapter, when I 
discuss the role of imagination in the appropriation of visual artworks and literature.
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5 Victor E. Graham, The Imagery of Proust. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), p. 8.
6 Gabrielle Townsend, Proust’s Imaginary Museum: Reproductions and Reproduction in A la Recherche 
du temps perdu (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008), pp. 15, 17.
We can distinguish at least three major perspectives through which the links between 
the experiences of visual art and self-understanding can be approached in the 
discussion evolving around paintings in the Recherche. The first type of usage is 
what initially appears a straightforward analogy between a painting and the 
‘everyday’ world – the world that is familiar to us through our direct experience and 
through our daily contact with it. The Narrator and Swann especially often comment 
on the similarity between people or objects they encounter in everyday life and in 
paintings, and in these passages Proust often refers to identifiable, existing paintings, 
or at least to a style of an existing painter; I shall call this first type of usage 
recognition. It is not merely the visual resemblance between the painting and a real-
life person, landscape or object that is recognised in these instances, however; 
particularly in the Narrator’s case, what seems to be extracted from the painting is a 
discovery of some psychological truth, an applicable meta-text, or a novel 
perspective on something familiar. 
The second prominent framework in which paintings are discussed in the Recherche 
evolves around the fictional painter Elstir. Visual art features prominently in the 
Narrator’s psychological and aesthetic apprenticeship, and it is Elstir’s works in 
particular that play an important role in revealing to the Narrator the significance of 
impressions in art. Through the character of Elstir, Proust is able to put his finger on 
some of the fundamental questions concerning the artist’s role, perspective, vision 
and method of representation. Furthermore, by discussing the Narrator’s most 
personal experiences through these imaginary works of art, Proust is also able to 
avoid any disaccord between the Narrator’s experience and the experience of the 
actual readers of the novel, which might arise if the Narrator were to discuss existing 
paintings that the readers would have access to. 
The third usage is that of painting as a metaphor – a metaphor which most often 
refers either to the unattainable beloved whom the Narrator longs to possess or to 
another place or time where he longs to be. These ‘paintings’ of the mind are, so to 
speak, doubly imaginary: they do not exist materially (even at the level of the 
narrative) but merely figuratively in the Narrator’s head. Here, instead of recognition, 
what the paintings seem to always refer to is otherness – a world that is inaccessible 
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to the onlooker. It would seem that the discussion of visual art in Proust most often 
relates to experiencing something external or other – be it a place, a person, or a 
psychological phenomenon recognised outside the self, whereas with literary 
aesthetic experiences, the emphasis often seems to fall on what lies hidden within 
ourselves. 
3.1. Recognition: Reading Life through Paintings
The very first volume of the Recherche includes several instances in which ‘real life’ 
is paralleled to paintings. I start with a passage in Combray in which the Narrator 
reflects upon Swann’s comment about the likeness of the pregnant kitchen maid to 
Giotto’s Charity (RTP I, 80). In the context of this comparison, the voice of the adult 
Narrator intervenes and analyses the childhood experience; the adult Narrator notes 
how as a child he was not able to appreciate the frescos, the illustrations of which 
used to hang on the walls of his schoolroom, precisely because of their resemblances 
to the people he encountered in his everyday life. 
The reason why the Narrator initially fails to take pleasure in these frescos is that the 
characters in them vividly remind him of the inhabitants of Combray rather than 
sublime symbols of virtues and vices. Later on, however, the Narrator is able to see 
that the true value of these works of arts is not to be judged according to their 
symbolic nature in an abstract sense:
Mais plus tard j’ai compris que l’étrangeté saisissante, la beauté spéciale de ces 
fresques tenait à la grande place que le symbole y occupait, et que le fait qu’il 
fût représenté non comme un symbole puisque la pensée symbolisée n’était pas 
exprimée, mais comme réel, comme effectivement subi ou matériellement 
manié, donnait à la signification de l’œuvre quelque chose de plus littéral et de 
plus précis, à son enseignement quelque chose de plus concret et de plus 
frappant.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 81 
In time, the Narrator learns to appreciate the way these symbols are incarnated, and 
instead of remaining abstract, they become something sublunary [sic], something 
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‘effectivement subi ou matériellement manié’. This passage illustrates the gradual 
progression of the Narrator’s experience of the frescos – from the sensuous visual 
trigger produced by the surface to a prolonged psychological process of perception – 
a process through which these symbols are rendered into something ‘real’. 
As a result, the Narrator is eventually able to recognise the likeness between what the 
frescos symbolise and the most commonplace scenes of his own life, which makes 
him acknowledge that there is ‘quelque chose de plus littéral et de plus précis’ in 
Giotto’s treatment of his subject matter. The Narrator’s use of the word ‘littéral’ is 
interesting here: while this expression may primarily be used here as indicating ‘[le] 
sens strict d’une phrase, d’un mot’ (as a synonym for ‘vraie’, ‘réel’ or ‘fidèle’), it is 
worth considering that Proust’s use of a word which also refers to textuality might 
not be accidental here.7 The same choice of word recurs in the context of Giotto’s 
frescos in Albertine disparue when the Narrator travels to Padua to see them: ‘[D]ans 
le vol des anges, je retrouvais la même impression d’action effective, littéralement 
réelle que m’avaient donnée les gestes de la Charité ou de l’Envie.’ (RTP IV, 227) 
This small detail, Proust’s choice of word here, seems to support the suggestion 
presented in Chapter Two that language in Proust – and particularly language in art – 
might have a privileged role in not only accessing but in releasing and appropriating 
truths.8
The Narrator’s experience of the frescos shows how marking the visual resemblance 
between a work of art and ‘le réel’ is only one stage of the process of ‘recognition’. 
As Gilles Deleuze remarks, when we face a work of art, ‘il y a d’autres choses qui 
nous forcent à penser: non plus des objets reconnaissables, mais des choses qui font 
violence, des signes rencontrés.’9 The ‘étrangeté saisissante’ (RTP I, 81) of the 
frescos – and the fact that they initially trigger contradictory feelings in the Narrator 
– can be regarded as a distinct proof of their true aesthetic value. The Narrator’s 
complex relation to Giotto’s frescos also exemplifies the overall struggle to reconcile 
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7 Larousse dictionnaires français <www.larousse.com/en/dictionnaires/francais/
littéral_littérale_littéraux> [Accessed 10 July 2012].
8 Further discussion of such qualities of literary language will follow in Part Three.
9 Deleuze, Proust et les signes, p. 123 (emphasis in the original).
the real and imaginary in the novel: these experiences become an essential part of his 
aesthetic apprenticeship, in revealing to him how escapism in art, or art as total 
abstraction of lived experience, as ‘pure imaginary’, is always a dead end.10
The fact that Swann’s opinion, despite his aesthetic expertise, is not enough to 
convince the young Narrator of the beauty of the frescos is also significant; the 
revelation of the true value of the frescos has to come to the Narrator in time, 
together with the lessons in human psychology that life offers him:
Quand, plus tard, j’ai eu l’occasion de rencontrer, au cours de ma vie, dans les 
couvents par exemple, des incarnations vraiment saintes de la charité active, 
elles avaient généralement un air allègre, positif, indifférent et brusque de 
chirurgien pressé, ce visage où ne se lit aucune commisération, aucun 
attendrissement devant la souffrance humaine, aucune crainte de la heurter, et 
qui est le visage sans douceur, le visage antipathique et sublime de la vraie 
bonté.
 
                                                               A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 81 
This is only one of the numerous examples in Proust of how we need to create a 
personal relationship to a given artwork before we are able to construct the world 
around us through it. When the Narrator later considers these frescos, he 
correspondingly finds in reality what he seems to have learned to see through art.
Other examples of ‘recognition’ include Swann spotting the resemblance of Bloch to 
Sultan Mahomet II in Bellini’s portrait (RTP I, 96) and the likeness of Odette to 
Zipporah in Botticelli’s fresco (RTP I, 219-22). The viewing of Odette as Zipporah 
bears intense meta-textual and biblical meanings; it has also been suggested that by 
defining Odette’s appearance as ‘botticellienne’ (RTP I, 607), and by keeping a 
picture of Botticelli’s Zipporah on his desk instead of Odette’s photograph, Swann 
satisfies his aesthetic snobbery and justifies his adoration for a woman who ‘n’était 
pas [son] genre’ (RTP I, 375).11 While Swann’s proclivity for choosing ‘art’ over 
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10 The whole concept of ‘pure imaginary’, in fact, seems somewhat contradictory in the light of Proust’s 
novel, which emphasises the role of our lived experience in the workings of imagination and vice versa. 
We can also consider here the distinction made in  Chapter One between imagination and fantasy (pp. 
40-41).
11 See e.g. Townsend, pp. 52-8.
‘real’ is not always unequivocally clear, it can be considered as a sign of a kind of 
escapist aestheticism; for example with Odette, Swann does refuse the ‘real’ Odette 
and replaces her with the imaginary (Botticelli’s Zipporah), which eventually leaves 
him unsatisfied both in the domain of art and in life. 
While Swann can be considered as one of the most influential aesthetic ‘mentors’ for 
the Narrator, and while the genuine passion that he has for art never seems to be 
questioned, his enjoyment of paintings seems to stop at the first level of recognition, 
after which he considers what he sees in everyday life as kinds of copies of what he 
has encountered in art or at least ‘sieves’ the life experience through the aesthetic. 
Swann thus represents a kind of ‘célibataire d’art’ (RTP IV, 470) in the sense that he 
seems to use artworks (and paintings in particular) as a framework according to 
which he rates a life experience as enjoyable or valuable. In Swann’s case, the 
problem is not an apparent, superficial enthusiasm towards art but rather that his 
enthusiasm is too compelling.12
In the course of the Recherche, we see how the Narrator, too, starts to formulate and 
arrange his world through art: art becomes familiar, whereas life becomes more and 
more perplexing and constantly provides him with strange, new and anxiety-
provoking circumstances. One of the Narrator’s moments of recognition is described 
in a passage in Le Côté de Guermantes II where Albertine comes to visit the Narrator 
in his Paris home while his parents are away. In the middle of their budding love 
scene, Françoise decides it is her duty to play the moral chaperone and abruptly steps 
into the room. Her excuse is bringing in the lamp, and she is viewed by the Narrator 
as ‘La Justice éclairant le Crime’ (RTP II, 655); the Narrator refers here to a painting 
by Pierre Prud’hon, La Justice et la Vengeance divine poursuivant le Crime (1808).13 
This passage provides a good example of the way the representational qualities of a 
painting reach beyond visual resemblances: the recognition here is more than 
recognition of sensuous signs. Indeed, here the dramatic entrance of Françoise 
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12 I shall discuss Swann’s aesthetic experiences further in the next chapter in the context of music and ‘les 
célibataires de l’art’ (RTP IV, 470) in more detail in Chapter Five.
13 The reason for which Proust misquotes the title of the painting is unclear. See the editorial section in 
RTP II, note 4, p. 1717.
probably reminds the Narrator of the psychological element that Prud’hon’s painting 
captures rather the actual visual resemblance between Françoise and Dike. According 
to Deleuze, while the sensuous impression is what in the first instance generates the 
movement of thought and make us strive for truth, the signs of art are 
‘immatérielles’ in the sense that they reach beyond the tangible sensuous dimension 
of the artwork, referring to ‘essences’: ‘Les signes sensibles nous forcent à chercher 
la vérité [et] enfin les signes d’art nous forcent à penser à […] l’essence’.14 The 
‘Prud’honian’ entrance of Françoise into the room qualifies as one such moment 
when the Narrator, in fact, recognises the signs of art in life, as the psychological 
reality of the situation reminds him of his appropriation of the given painting, the 
way he has come to ‘know’ it.
This example also shows how the effect that a picture has on us gradually becomes 
less attached to the actual object (painting) and more entangled with our emotions, 
thoughts, and ideas. However, the initial visual experience still remains as the 
steering force in the experience of the painting itself, and thus the viewer always 
remains, at least for that very instant of looking at the painting, guided by someone 
else’s perspective. Even if this perspective and the sensation that the painting 
represents are not literally those of the artist, it does preserve the presence of the 
other in the experience. I now move on to consider this presence through perspective, 
mainly through looking at Elstir’s role in the novel, and to discuss the relationship 
between the painter, his work and its viewers.
3.2. ‘Le laboratoire d’une [...] nouvelle création du monde’: Elstir’s Art
A significant part of the discussion of visual aesthetic experience in the Recherche 
centres around Proust’s fictive painter Elstir and his work. In the following, I 
examine two episodes in the Recherche which demonstrate how the Narrator’s 
relationship with Elstir develops in the course of the novel. The first one depicts the 
Narrator’s first encounter with Elstir in Balbec and the second one the Narrator’s 
experiences at the Guermantes’ dinner party where Elstir’s art is both physically 
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14 Deleuze, Proust et les Signes, pp. 51-3, 120.
present (in the Guermantes’ collection of Elstir’s paintings) and discussed at the 
dinner table. The relationship between the Narrator and Elstir is also significant 
because its progression parallels a vaster shift of emphasis in the narrative: the 
Narrator’s movement from the societal to the realm of art.
The friendship with Elstir begins during the Narrator’s first visit to Balbec where the 
painter has his studio. This first ‘social’ encounter with Elstir takes place in 
Rivebelle, where the Narrator is dining with Saint-Loup. At one of the tables, they 
notice ‘un dîneur obscur, isolé et retardataire’ (RTP II, 182) and learn from the 
‘patron’ of the restaurant that the man is, in fact, the famous artist Elstir of whom 
Swann has often talked. The Narrator and Saint-Loup, excited simply about having 
this man of repute sitting at a nearby table, write him a note of admiration, without 
ever having seen any of his paintings. The Narrator admits that their childlike 
admiration is initially directed to Elstir’s fame rather than the artist’s work: 
Notre sentiment pouvait avoir pour l’objet l’idée creuse de “un grand artiste”, 
non pas une œuvre qui nous était inconnue. C’était tout au plus l’admiration à 
vide, le cadre nerveux, l’armature sentimentale d’une admiration sans contenu 
[...] nous étions encore des enfants.
             A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 183
At first, Elstir ignores them, but when leaving the restaurant he suddenly walks to 
their table and, because Swann has mentioned the Narrator to him, invites the 
Narrator (but not Saint-Loup) to visit his studio. 
During his first visit to the studio, the Narrator learns that Elstir knows Albertine, 
which, for the Narrator, enhances the artist’s appeal a great deal: the acquaintance 
with Elstir becomes initially fuelled with another ulterior motive, to get to know ‘la 
petite bande’. At this point, the Narrator is still choosing society over art; however, 
the other dimension of the relationship with Elstir – the aesthetic dimension – starts 
to evolve the moment he first encounters the painter’s work: ‘[J]e me sentais 
parfaitement heureux […] par toutes les études qui étaient autour de moi, je sentais la 
possibilité de m’élever à une connaissance poétique, féconde en joies,’ he states 
(RTP II, 190). This ‘pure’ intense aesthetic enjoyment and the idea of being able to 
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develop ‘une connaissance poétique’ through Elstir’s work overtakes the Narrator; 
what follows is his enthusiastic account of some of the works and sketches in the 
studio, to which I shall return shortly. 
Later in Le Côté de Guermantes II, after the Narrator’s return from Balbec to Paris, 
the clash between aesthetic and societal life is already full-grown. In a passage 
describing a dinner party at the Guermantes’ house, Elstir’s art is centrally present – 
both literally, hanging on the walls of the Duc and Duchesse’s ‘cabinet d’Elstir,’ as 
well as a conversation topic at the dinner table. Before the dinner, the Narrator enjoys 
the paintings in solitude in the ‘cabinet’, and here the pleasure of aesthetic 
experience becomes clearly contrasted with the obliging norms of societal life: 
looking at the paintings, the Narrator completely loses the track of time and, due to 
his tardiness, the dinner is delayed.  
In the course of the evening, the Narrator’s illusions of ‘l’esprit’ of Oriane de 
Guermantes and the leading elite of the Faubourg Saint-Germain in general is 
shattered. He is shocked particularly by the utter shallowness of the discussion 
concerning the reception of art – so much so that, leaving the Guermantes house, the 
Narrator concludes:‘[Ma] vie intérieure pût se réveiller durant ces heures mondaines 
où j’habitais mon épiderme, mes cheveux bien coiffés, mon plastron de chemise, 
c’est-à-dire où je ne pouvais rien éprouver de ce qui était pour moi, dans la vie, le 
plaisir.’ (RTP II, 817) 
The dinner party episode thus illustrates the great thematic shift in the Recherche, 
contrasting ‘la nullité de la vie mondaine’ (RTP II, 762) and the ‘redemptive’ 
potential of art. The distinction (and incompatibility, in some sense) between art and 
societal life becomes particularly clear for the Narrator during the evening, as he 
experiences some aesthetically intense solitary moments admiring Elstir’s work and 
the vain and superficial discussion about aesthetic reception at the dinner table, 
directly one after another.15 By this point, the ‘aesthetic’ dimension of the Narrator’s 
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15 Some examples of the triteness of the Faubourg Saint-Germain elite and their superficial attitude 
towards art include Oriane’s idea of having a tramway passing all the paintings of Hals in Holland (RTP 
II, 813, 837) and the enthusiasm that Saint-Loup shows towards some books simply in order to impress 
Rachel (RTP III, 95). For further discussion of ‘faulty’ aesthetic reception, see discussion of ‘célibataires 
de l’art’ (RTP IV, 470) in Chapter Five (pp. 156-9).
friendship with Elstir has clearly out-shone the social one: the (internal) 
disappointments the Narrator experiences in society make him consider the process 
of creation as one (or indeed, perhaps the only) option to flee from the nullity of 
social life.
Once this incompatibility has been acknowledged, we can hear its echoes throughout 
the book, for example in the Narrator’s remark in Albertine disparue, where he notes 
that ‘c’est seulement par la pensée qu’on possède des choses et on ne possède pas un 
tableau parce qu’on l’a dans sa salle à manger si on ne sait pas le comprendre’ (RTP 
IV, 132). However, it must be stressed that the Narrator does not view art as a form of 
escape from the societal scene per se; in fact, art for him comes to represent the 
ultimate means, perhaps indeed the only means, to communicate with the world and 
genuinely understand its phenomena. Even though it will be through a book that he 
himself eventually sets out to do this, paintings play a crucial role in the Narrator’s 
revelations of this very potential of art to communicate, to prolong moments and to 
defy time.
Let us now look more closely at the Narrator’s experience of Elstir’s works in A 
l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs II and Le Côté de Guermantes II. On the one hand, 
the Narrator considers Elstir’s work as ‘d’une sorte de nouvelle création du 
monde’ (RTP II, 190), and yet, on the other, Elstir’s paintings are viewed as deft 
representations of the world which the Narrator inhabits – he remarks how it seems 
that ‘le peintre n’avait eu qu’à le découvrir, qu’à l’observer, matériellement realisé 
déjà dans la nature et à le reproduire’ (RTP II, 203, my emphasis). In these 
occasionally contradictory comments on Elstir’s works, Proust’s text echoes the 
fundamental question attached to the painter’s expression since Plato: that of whether 
a painting is a creation of another, entirely new world or a reproduction, a 
representation of what is already in the world.
This question of creation versus representation in visual art, which manifests itself in 
the passages describing Elstir’s work, parallels the vaster underlying tension in the 
Narrator’s apprenticeship between the ‘real’ and the imaginary, and the question of 
whether the aesthetic experience is primary or secondary to life itself. On the one 
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hand, looking at Elstir’s work in the artist’s studio, the Narrator suggests that it seems 
as if the artist has but reproduced what nature has already ‘materialised’ and offered 
to our senses:
[cette aquarelle] me causa cette sorte particulière d’enchantement que 
dispensent des œuvres non seulement d’une exécution délicieuse, mais aussi 
d’un sujet si singulier et si séduisant que c’est à lui que nous attribuons une 
partie de leur charme, comme si, ce charme, le peintre n’avait eu qu’à le 
découvrir, qu’à l’observer, matériellement réalisé déjà dans la nature et à le 
reproduire. 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 203
This comment seems to loudly echo the Platonic notion of Ideas or ‘essences’ which 
nature reproduces and art then copies. 
However, the Narrator’s remark about this ‘natural’ charm in Elstir’s work can also 
be considered as something more subjective. Indeed, we may ask if this appeal is not 
more based on the coinciding perspective of the onlooker and the artist than 
necessarily the artist presenting some universal essences. Some scholars, such as 
Joshua Landy, view Proust’s Narrator essentially as non-Platonist and consider 
perspective as the defining element of a work of art. Landy suggests that ‘since in the 
Proustian approach, an artwork conveys nothing more nor less than the perspective 
of its maker, what we perceive in it is not the gleam of Platonic ideas.’16 Such a 
proposition is supported by another remark by the Narrator, this time describing how 
Elstir’s treatment of a subject matter may help the viewer to ‘arrange’ visual stimuli 
the world throws at him or her:
L’atelier d’Elstir m’apparut comme le laboratoire d’une sorte de nouvelle 
création du monde, où, du chaos que sont toutes choses que nous voyons, il 
avait tiré, en les peignant sur divers rectangles de toile qui étaient posés dans 
tous les sens, ici une vague de la mer écrasant avec colère sur le sable son 
écume lilas, là un jeune homme en coutil blanc accoudé sur le pont d’un 
bateau.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 190
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Here, the painting is presented as something which is capable of rearranging the 
stimuli from the chaotic external world (‘le monde’) into a composition which allows 
us to experience them differently and in this sense capable of creating the world 
anew. Even though the instant visual perception is essential in the appropriation of a 
painting, the Narrator’s words here emphasise once again the idea of how mediation 
is always a part of any experience; in order to arrive at a meaning, no matter how 
rudimentary a meaning, the impressions need to ‘communicate’ with our previous 
experience to make sense of the ‘chaos que sont toutes choses que nous voyons’.
The Narrator, looking at the portrait of young Odette de Crécy in Elstir’s studio, 
proposes that ‘le génie artistique [d’Elstir]’ in fact originates in ‘le pouvoir de 
dissocier les combinaisons d’atomes et de grouper ceux-ci suivant un ordre 
absolument contraire, répondant à un autre type’ (RTP II, 216). Elstir’s artistic genius 
lies in his ability to first see the world ‘dispersed’, to allow it to be ‘open’ and then 
gather and rearrange the ‘atoms’ into a new order. This new order, then, may open the 
eyes of the onlooker, allowing them ‘les rares moments où l’on voit la nature telle 
qu’elle est, poétiquement’ (RTP II, 192, my emphasis). This idea that what enables 
one to truly see how things are in the world is seeing it ‘poétiquement’ becomes a 
crucial part of the Narrator’s aesthetic credo, based on the significance of 
impressions on the one hand and, on the other, the potential of art to reveal to us the 
inseparability of immediate and mediated experience.
While the debate about whether Proust is a Platonist or not is an ongoing one and 
while I allow it to remain so, I suggest that it is possible to at least partly dismantle 
this representation/creation controversy by returning once again to the notion of ‘la 
réalité’ in Proust, and by acknowledging how reality itself in the Recherche is 
considered as something which can never merely be discovered by searching but 
always needs to be created as well. In view of the following contemplation, which 
appears later on in Le Côté de Guermantes II, it seems that a painting, particularly an 
Impressionist painting, can be simultaneously regarded as the creation of something 
entirely new and a reproduction of something already present ‘in the world’, to 
which we can relate through our subjective experience:
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Parmi ces tableaux, quelques-uns de ceux qui semblaient le plus ridicules aux 
gens du monde m’intéressaient plus que les autres en ce qu’ils recréaient ces 
illusions d’optique qui nous prouvent que nous n’identifierions pas les objets si 
nous ne faisions pas intervenir le raisonnement. Que de fois en voiture ne 
découvrons-nous pas une longue rue claire qui commence à quelque mètres de 
nous, alors que seul devant nous un pan de mur violemment éclairé nous a 
donné le mirage de la profondeur! Dès lors n’est-il pas logique, non par artifice 
de symbolisme mais par retour sincère à la racine même de l’impression, de 
représenter une chose par cette autre que dans l’éclair d’une illusion première 
nous avons prise pour elle? Les surfaces et les volumes sont en réalité 
indépendants des noms d’objets que notre mémoire leur impose quand nous les 
avons reconnus. 
  A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 712-13 (my emphasis)
The experience of Impressionist painting is particularly appropriate to consider the 
way in which the meaning, the way a painting ‘says’ something to the onlooker, 
comes about not merely through looking at it but ‘par retour sincère à la racine même 
de l’impression’, the realisation of how sensuous perception is initially free from 
meaning and how ‘les surfaces et les volumes sont en réalité indépendants des noms 
d’objets que notre mémoire leur impose quand nous les avons reconnus’. 
After the initial impression perceived through our senses, we move on to connect the 
instantaneous sensory experience to a range of similar experiences we have had, and 
through the recognition of the links between the new unfamiliar (the art object) and 
the familiar that is our past experiences. These do not need to be predominantly 
visual experiences but can also be experiences which have had some psychological 
impact on us, as we saw earlier in the context of the Narrator’s and Swann’s 
‘recognitions’. In this sense the painting, once the process of interpretation begins, 
then becomes a reproduction of something which is familiar to our parameters of 
experience and to the ‘noms d’objets que notre mémoire leur impose quand nous les 
avons reconnus’, while at the same time, creating and changing these parameters, it 
also becomes a device through which we perceive and construct the world. Thus, this 
heightened role of impressions is another aspect which seems to, at least partly, 
absolve the contradictions in the Narrator’s statements about the representational and 
creative qualities of Elstir’s work.
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The idea that an artwork can affect our perception and ‘train’ our senses became 
particularly popular in late nineteenth-century aesthetics and features prominently for 
example in the writings of Walter Pater and Charles Baudelaire. In The Decay of 
Lying, Oscar Wilde famously remarked that ‘at present, people see fogs, not because 
there are fogs, but because poets and painters have taught them the mysterious 
loveliness of such effects’17. Echoes of this manifesto of ‘life imitating art’ can be 
heard in some of the Narrator’s observations, for example in his remark on how, 
returning to Balbec for the second time, Elstir’s paintings have taught him to see the 
sea differently: ‘[M]es yeux instruits par Elstir à retenir précisément les éléments que 
j’écartais volontairement jadis, contemplaient longuement ce que la première année 
ils ne savaient pas voir.’ (RTP III, 179) Thus, it seems that art does not only affect his 
conscious perception and formulation of the world but also, involuntarily and partly 
unconsciously, ‘trains’ his senses. This example also further manifests the 
intermingling of the immediate and mediated experience in Proust – the interrelation 
between the sensuous experience and construction of meaning through thought. 
Elstir’s ‘génie artistique’ is also related to ‘son effort [...] de dissoudre cet agrégat de 
raisonnements que nous appelons vision’ (RTP II, 713). This remark and the one on 
Elstir’s ability to present ‘la nature telle qu’elle est, poétiquement’ (RTP II, 192) take 
us back to the Proustian notion of ‘la réalité’ as something which is always created 
and cannot merely be discovered. Elstir, instead of imposing on the canvas a ‘fixed’ 
perspective, allows the painting to ‘breathe’ and ‘move’ in the processual perception 
of the onlooker:
Or celui-ci avait su immortellement arrêter le mouvement des heures à cet 
instant lumineux où la dame avait eu chaud et avait cessé de danser, où l’arbre 
était cerné d’un pourtour d’ombre, où les voiles semblaient glisser sur un 
vernis d’or. Mais justement parce que l’instant pesait sur nous avec tant de 
force, cette toile si fixée donnait l’impression la plus fugitive, on sentait que la 
dame allait bientôt s’en retourner, les bateaux disparaître, l’ombre changer de 
place, la nuit venir, que le plaisir finit, que la vie passe et que les instants, 
montrés à la fois par tant de lumières qui y voisinent ensemble, ne se 
retrouvent pas. Je reconnaissais encore un aspect, tout autre il est vrai, de ce 
qu’est l’instant.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 714
93
17 Oscar Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying’ in The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (London: Collins, 2003), p.
1086.
Here, what in Elstir’s Impressionist work is fixed on the canvas is not a ‘vision’ or a 
‘perspective’ but an impression, capturing the senses of the onlooker and stopping ‘le 
mouvement des heures à cet instant lumineux’. This ‘instant lumineux’, then, is the 
moment of seeing the world without interpreting it, freed from ‘des noms d’objets 
que notre mémoire leur impose quand nous les avons reconnus’ (RTP II, 713-4). 
Looking at the artwork frees us, for a moment, from ‘les combinations 
d’atomes’ (RTP II, 216), the conceptual arrangement imposed on objects and 
phenomena by ‘le raisonnement’. The counter force of ‘raisonnement’, then, is 
impression, the ‘aspect [...] de ce qu’est l’instant’ (RTP II, 714).
In discussing the experience of the onlooker, instead of merely focusing on the 
perspective, it seems more fruitful to consider the sensation that the artwork, on the 
one hand represents and, on the other, produces. In his book Francis Bacon: Logique 
de la sensation, Deleuze remarks that what the term ‘sensation’ (introduced in the 
sphere of aesthetics by Cézanne) stands for is something subjective and objective at 
the same time:
Cette voie de la Figure, Cézanne lui donne un nom simple: la sensation. La 
Figure, c’est la forme sensible rapportée à la sensation; elle agit 
immédiatement sur le système nerveux […] La sensation a une face tournée 
vers le sujet (le système nerveux, le mouvement vital, “l’instinct”, le 
“tempérament” […]) et une face tournée vers l’objet (“le fait”, le lieu, 
l’événement). Ou plutôt elle n’a pas de faces du tout, elle est les deux choses 
indissolublement […]: à la fois je deviens dans la sensation et quelque chose 
arrive par la sensation, l’un par l’autre, l’un dans l’autre. Et à la limite, c’est le 
même corps qui la donne et qui la reçoit, qui est à la fois objet et sujet. Moi 
spectateur, je n’éprouve la sensation qu’en entrant dans le tableau, en accédant 
à l’unité du sentant et du senti.18
   
‘La Figure’ in painting both represents a sensation and produces one, and a 
‘sensation’ therefore seems to be something more imaginative and more ‘open’ than 
perspective, but at the same time it also seems more subjective somehow. This 
quality of sensation, on the one hand, makes it more transitory and harder to grasp, 
and yet, on the other hand, it seems to empower the artist and the viewer alike. This 
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18 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, [1981] 2002), pp. 
39-40 (my emphasis).
idea of sensation as the guiding force of the experience, unifying the object and the 
subject, seems to support the idea that things exist largely in our experience of them, 
and mediation is always a part of this experience. 
There is, however, a difference between the Deleuzian, rather complete ‘fusion’ of 
subject and the object and the more hermeneutic approach to the ‘appropriation’ of 
an object through experience that is emphasised in the present study. Whereas in the 
Deleuzian view, the object and the subject become ‘indissolublement’ united through 
the sensation, I suggest that in Proust some kind of distinction between the object 
which is the artwork (and which embodies something of its creator) and the onlooker 
(in whom the art-object evokes the sensation) is still maintained, especially in visual 
art. 
This idea is presented directly in Contre Sainte-Beuve, where Proust suggests that 
paintings represent ‘une sorte d’apparition d’un coin d’un monde mystérieux’ that 
arises from the imagination of the artist, and the passages describing the experience 
of visual art in Proust’s novel seem to recurrently subscribe to similar views.19 There 
is always a certain sense of ‘otherness’, a sense of inaccessibility, connected to these 
experiences of looking at something – something ‘outside the self’ – and the visual 
impression, no matter how powerful and affective, seem to remain ‘la plus 
fugitive’ (RTP II, 714). These elements of unattainability and otherness in visual 
artworks become particularly pronounced in the painting-related metaphors that 
feature in Proust’s novel, which I shall discuss next. 
3.3. ‘Les tableaux de la mémoire’: Metaphorical Paintings and the Inaccessible
So far I have approached the representation of paintings in Proust mainly through 
examining the ways the onlooker relates to a painting (and appropriates the 
sensations the painting produces through his or her ‘reality’) and through asking 
whether a (non-abstract) painting is, in the first instance, a representation or a 
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19 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, p. 669. This idea is used later on in La Prisonnière when the Narrator 
discusses Vinteuil’s art and remarks that ‘chaque artiste semble ainsi comme le citoyen d’une patrie 
inconnue, oubliée de lui-même’ (RTP III, 761).
creation of something entirely new. As we have seen, paintings offer to the Narrator a 
means to delineate the world around him in various ways: visually (his eyes ‘learn’ to 
see with the help of Elstir’s work), metaphysically (he sees Elstir’s paintings 
formulating harmonious entities of the chaos of all that we see around us) and 
psychologically, or at least physiognomically (in the symbolic characters in Giotto’s 
frescos). While the experiences of visual art in Proust are viewed as highly personal 
and emotive,20 as well as a means for us to learn to see ‘ce que [nos yeux] ne savaient  
pas voir [autrement]’ (RTP III, 179), they simultaneously seem to be marked with a 
certain sense of otherness. This characteristic is illustrated most emphatically in the 
Proustian metaphors drawing from visual art which repeatedly allude to something 
inaccessible, something ideal yet simultaneously deceptive and fugitive.
The presence of the other in a visual artwork is explored by Proust also in ‘Notes sur 
le monde mystérieux de Gustave Moreau’. In this essay Proust suggests that a 
painting preserves some ‘fragments’ of its maker’s perspective and that therefore, 
when we are looking at a painting by a certain artist, what we see is ‘un monde 
mystérieux dont nous connaissons quelques autres fragments, qui sont les toiles du 
même artiste’.21 When we know other works by the artist, we are more likely to pay 
attention to his or her style and recognise those ‘quelques fragments’ in the painting 
we encounter, re-encountering in them the visual imagination of the other (the artist 
in question). However, Proust goes on to note that the artist himself is not in control 
of these fragments, but that the creative process for the artist is ‘sa patrie véritable, 
mais où il ne vit que de rares moments’ and that artists ‘sont des exilés intellectuels; 
dès qu’ils sont exilés, ils ont perdu du même coup le souvenir de leur patrie et savent 
seulement qu’ils en ont une, qu’il est plus doux d’y vivre, mais ne savent comment y 
revenir’.22
The idea of ‘intellectual exile’ here is particularly interesting and it also prompts us 
to ask what this ‘patrie véritable’ of the artists actually refers to. We might consider it 
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20 One of the most obvious examples of the affective powers of visual aesthetic experience is undoubtedly 
Bergotte’s death in front of Vermeer’s View of Delft (RTP III, 628-630) which I briefly discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
21 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, p. 669.
22 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, pp. 670-72.
as a moment of creation, the moment of experience and mediation blending together 
– the same kind of state of elevation that is experienced by the Narrator in the 
Martinville passage with ‘ce plaisir, dont l’objet n’était que pressenti, que j’avais à 
créer moi-même’ (RTP II, 77). Even though the pleasure is created by the artist 
himself, it is not accessible by will or intellect. As we saw in Chapter Two, this kind 
of failure to track the pleasure, not knowing ‘comment y [à la patrie véritable] 
revenir’, is depicted in the Hudimesnil passage, in which the Narrator, despite his 
serious attempts, remains unable to ‘locate’ the original experience of which the 
quivering trees remind him. In the light of the further contemplations on the artistic 
process of creation in the Recherche, the idea of artists as ‘exilés intellectuels’ gains a 
kind of double-meaning: they are not merely intellectual exiles but also, in a way, 
exiled by intellect. 
One visual metaphor in the Recherche which uses exactly this kind of sense of 
fortuity in artistic creation as a parallel to life – to our relationships with other 
people, in fact – appears in Le Côté de Guermantes II, where the Narrator describes 
the loves of his life – Gilberte, the Duchesse de Guermantes and Albertine – as a 
series of sketches: 
[Ces] trois femmes que j’avais aimées, je me dis que notre vie sociale est, 
comme un atelier d’artiste, remplie des ébauches délaissées où nous avions cru 
un moment pouvoir fixer notre besoin d’un grand amour, mais je ne songeai 
pas que quelquefois, si l’ébauche n’est pas trop ancienne, il peut arriver que 
nous la reprenions et que nous en fassions une œuvre toute différente, et peut-
être même plus importante que celle que nous avions projetée d’abord.
     
     A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 684 
The Narrator here seems to suggest that even if we in some ways are ‘artists’ of our 
life, we are not still entirely in control of the art we produce: we cannot decide or 
predetermine fully what our ‘sketches’ eventually turn out to represent.23 The 
‘sketches’ – ‘des ébauches délaissées’ – in his ‘atelier’ (RTP II, 684) have, as it were, 
a mind of their own: they end up representing something completely different than he 
intended. As we will see later on in the narrative, this is, of course, particularly true 
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23 This passage also resonates back to the issue of self-fashioning that was discussed in Chapter One: in 
view of this passage, we might consider how true self-understanding resembles a ‘genuine’ artistic 
creation process, in which the outcome cannot be predetermined, fixed or established ‘objectively’.
of Albertine, who at this point still seems potentially ‘accessible’ to the Narrator, but 
becomes eternally fugitive in due course.24 
Of course, the role of desire also needs to be acknowledged here. While these women 
are here compared to sketches and paintings, they are still fundamentally objects of 
the Narrator’s desire, contributing to the general pattern of desire, anticipation and 
disappointment that the Narrator follows throughout the novel, in various domains.25 
The very fact that the Narrator here uses the visual creation process as a metaphor in 
discussing love or desire towards other people – something which engages our senses 
and our soul but over which we cannot exercise complete power –– is telling in its 
own right. In the same way that we are not entirely in control of our relationships but 
still very much exist ‘in’ them (and ‘through’ them), a part of the ‘exiled’ painter still 
remains in his or her ‘patrie véritable’, through those ‘fragments’ in his or her work.
The onlooker’s desire for the other in visual representation is illustrated even more 
effectively in the Bois de Boulogne episode – a chronological interval in Du côté de 
chez Swann, describing the Narrator’s visit to the (presumably) pre-war Bois.26 The 
now middle-aged Narrator is looking at the landscape, with the half-bare trees and 
the remains of the last leaves of summer, and, observing the ‘belles promeneuses’, 
missing the elegance of Mme Swann he used to witness and enjoy in his youth. In 
this passage, the Narrator contemplates ‘le manque de la puissance que nous avons 
perdue de donner de la réalité à des choses nouvelles’ (RTP I, 417, my emphasis), 
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24 In La Prisonnière, one of the occurrences that lead the Narrator to suspect Albertine’s honesty is related 
to ‘les peintures d’Albertine, touchantes distractions de la captive’ which the Narrator admires enough to 
congratulate her. ‘Non, c’est très mauvais, mais je n’ai jamais pris une seule leçon de dessin,’ she replies. 
The Narrator then reminds her that once in Balbec she said that she had been late because of a drawing 
lesson. ‘C’est vrai’, Albertine confesses, ‘je ne prenais pas de leçons de dessin, je vous ai beaucoup menti 
au début, cela je reconnais. Mais je ne vous mens plus jamais.’ (RTP III, 685-6) Here, even though not 
used metaphorically, paintings become a kind of a symbol of Albertine’s lies, and what they reveal to the 
Narrator is just that: the deceptiveness and unattainability of Albertine. ‘[J]e savais d’avance que ses 
aveux seraient de nouveaux mensonges,’ he states (RTP III, 686).
25 For example in La Prisonnière, the Narrator contemplates this kind of desire towards the unknown and 
how the attempts of his imagination to conquer spaces and people are eventually annulled by the contact 
with ‘reality’: ‘[C]es similitudes mêmes du désir et du voyage firent que je me promis de serrer un jour 
d’un peu plus près la nature de cette force invisible mais aussi puissante que les croyances, ou dans le 
monde physique la pression atmosphérique, qui portait si haut les cités, les femmes, tant que je ne les 
connaissais pas, et qui se débordait sous elles dès que je les avais approchées, les faisait tomber aussitôt à 
plat sur le terre à terre de la plus triviale réalité.’ (RTP III, 677).
26 There are various calculations and presentations of the chronology of the Recherche. (See e.g. Landy, p. 
39).
and, at the same time, realises how also the ‘reality’ of his past seems to be lost 
forever. The desired other here is the Narrator’s own past.
Painting-related imagery plays a key role in the passage, and the Narrator begins by 
comparing the landscape to an unfinished painting:
[Ç]à et là, en face des sombres masses lointaines des arbres qui n’avaient pas 
de feuilles ou qui avaient encore leurs feuilles de l’été, un double rang de 
marronniers orangés semblait, comme dans un tableau à peine commencé, 
avoir seul encore été peint par le décorateur qui n’aurait pas mis de couleur sur 
le reste, et tendait son allée en pleine lumière pour la promenade épisodique de 
personnages qui ne seraient ajoutés que plus tard. […] On sentait que le Bois 
n’était pas qu’un bois, qu’il répondait à une destination étrangère à la vie de ses 
arbres, l’exaltation que j’éprouvais n’était pas causée que par l’admiration de 
l’automne, mais par un désir.  
  
    A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 414-16
The landscape here is described as a half-finished painting, ready to become a setting 
for a scene in the story of the promenaders in the Bois. The Narrator’s perspective, 
however, seems to suggest that he himself will not be taking part in whatever scene 
the painter decides to present, not because he would not want to, but because he 
cannot. Reading on, we see why:
Ainsi regardais-je les arbres avec une tendresse insatisfaite qui les dépassait et 
se portait à moi insu vers ce chef-d’œuvre des belles promeneuses qu’ils 
enferment chaque jour pendant quelques heures. […] Mais forcés depuis tant 
d’années par une sorte de greffe à vivre en commun avec la femme, ils 
m’évoquaient la dryade, la belle mondaine rapide et colorée qu’au passage ils 
couvrent de leurs branches et obligent à ressentir comme eux la puissance de la 
saison; ils me rappelaient le temps heureux de ma croyante jeunesse quand je 
venais avidement aux lieux où des chefs-d’œuvre d’élégance féminine se 
réaliseraient pour quelques instants entre les feuillages inconscients et 
complices.
      A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 416 
The figures in his imaginary painting represent something unattainable; they remind 
him of the past, of his youth, of lost time – although, as the reader of the Recherche 
is about to find out, even when he was young, hopeful and followed his desire, he felt  
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forever estranged from the objects of his desire, which in a way doubles the 
inaccessibility here. 
As the night falls and the promenaders leave the park, the Narrator’s imagery 
becomes more sombre and he concludes that ‘les tableaux de la mémoire’ cannot 
ever provide us with an access to our past:
[L]es grands chênes [...] sous leur couronne druidique et avec une majesté 
dodonéenne semblaient proclamer le vide inhumain de la forêt désaffectée, et 
m’aidaient à mieux comprendre la contradiction que c’est de chercher dans la 
réalité les tableaux de la mémoire, auxquels manquerait toujours le charme qui 
leur vient de la mémoire même et de n’être pas perçus par les sens. La réalité 
que j’avais connue n’existait plus.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 419 
The use of the visual imagery of here is not accidental: the inaccessibility and 
otherness of the ‘toile si fixée’ which, nevertheless, gives ‘[une] impression la plus 
fugitive’ (RTP II, 714) connected with paintings also elsewhere in the novel 
manifests the Narrator’s error of trying to, still at this point, reach for the past, ‘la 
réalité qu[‘il] avai[t] connue’ (RTP I, 419) outside himself. The inability to find ‘la 
réalité’ in ‘les tableaux de la mémoire’ here manifests clearly the Narrator’s suspicion 
of the capacity of mere perception or voluntary memory to yield us access to 
reality.27
However, as mentioned earlier, the Impressionist paintings discussed in the context 
of Elstir’s art in particular seem to offer a different, more optimistic view of the 
capacities of visual art to approach ‘la réalité’, attaching visuality and impressions to 
the workings of involuntary memory. These paintings function as the Narrator’s first 
real guide to the significance of impressions in art, which gradually supersede the 
demand for intellectual-philosophical focus in the Narrator’s aesthetic register.28 For 
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27 In Le Temps retrouvé the Narrator also remarks how reality is never accessible through ‘une simple 
vision cinématographique’ (RTP IV, 468) which suppresses the ‘certain rapport entre ces sensations et les 
souvenirs qui nous entourent simultanément’ and which we call reality. (I discuss this proposition in 
Chapter Six, p. 198).
28 However, rather than simply replacing the ‘intellectual’ deliberation with the primary, sensuous 
experience, the Narrator’s apprenticeship is based on resisting and eventually dethroning the Cartesian 
separation of the bodily and sensuous from the mind.
the remaining part of this chapter, let us focus on the role of impressions in the 
Narrator’s apprenticeship. 
3.4. ‘Cette infaillible proportion de relief et d’omission’: the Power of 
Impression
 In Le Temps retrouvé, the Narrator compares the process of discovering truths 
through involuntary memory to the way in which Impressionist paintings affect us:
Je n’avais pas été chercher les deux pavés inégaux de la cour où j’avais buté. 
Mais justement la façon fortuite, inévitable, dont la sensation avait été 
rencontrée, contrôlait la vérité du passé qu’elle ressuscitait, des images qu’elle 
déclenchait, puisque nous sentons son effort pour remonter vers la lumière, que 
nous sentons la joie du réel retrouvé. Elle est le contrôle aussi de la vérité de 
tout le tableau fait d’impressions contemporaines qu’elle ramène à sa suite, 
avec cette infaillible proportion de lumière et d’ombre, de relief et d’omission, 
de souvenir et d’oubli que la mémoire ou l’observation conscientes ignoreront 
toujours.
    A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 457-8
Here, the Impressionist painting is celebrated for its ability to enable us to see things 
which ‘la mémoire ou l’observation conscientes ignoreront toujours’. Objective and 
conceptualising observation and voluntary memory are once again here viewed as 
obstacles in experiencing ‘la réalité’ in its most intrinsic sense, and the passage 
demonstrates how, when looking at an Impressionist painting, this kind of wilful 
method in fact becomes insufficient. The Impressionist vision can yield to us ‘la joie 
du réel retrouvé’ outside the conscious, conceptualising practices with which we 
navigate in our everyday life.
In his work, Elstir, as the Narrator points out, does not present ‘les choses telles qu’il 
savait qu’elles étaient’ (RTP II, 194) but instead, captures in his representation a 
certain paradox of distance and closeness. The fracturing or the breaking up of the 
surface that characterises Impressionist art – the removal of the ‘glossy exterior’ – 
physically forces the viewer back and also prolongs the experience in time. In doing 
exactly this, Impressionist painting illuminates the relation between seeing and the 
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construction of meaning. ‘Cette infaillible proportion de lumière et d’ombre, de relief 
et d’omission’ in the Impressionist painting compels the onlooker to return, as it 
were, to the moment of seeing the world without interpreting it and, through this 
experience, appreciate the role of mediation and imagination as essential parts of 
making the experience our own.
The Narrator’s experiences of Impressionist works are also extraordinary because of 
their resemblance to the awakenings of involuntary memory. The similarity of these 
experiences is based on the way in which an impression is first initiated through the 
senses and at the same time it occupies the mind like a forceful symbol of something 
essential and precious to us – something ‘extratemporel’ which ‘avait su 
immortellement arrêter le mouvement des heures à cet instant lumineux’ (RTP II, 
714). The connection between the forceful sensuous experience – be it a visual 
aesthetic experience or a taste – that is triggered by a tangible object seems to 
simultaneously stop the movement of time and flee from us (RTP II, 714). As the 
Narrator remarks, these impressions cannot be reinstalled by thought or intellect 
alone, which leaves one feeling that ‘la vie passe et [...] les instants, montrés à la fois 
par tant de lumières qui y voisinent ensemble, ne se retrouvent pas’ (RTP II, 714).
Joshua Landy remarks that intellect, in Proust, succeeds ‘perfectly well in ordinary 
circumstances’ but is ‘easily corrupted by desire’.29 Landy lists ‘identifying an 
acquaintance after a gap of many years’ as an examples of the ‘ordinary 
circumstances’ in which the intellect may flourish, together with – rather peculiarly – 
‘mapping a complicated piece of music’ and ‘deciphering an [Impressionist] 
painting’.30 Landy suggests that these instances in the novel represent moments when 
the state of mind of the subject is not immediately affected by desires and thus 
capable of ‘intellectual’ thought. One is prompted to ask, however, how many such 
moments there really are in Proust. Especially in the context of Elstir’s work, the 
Narrator most certainly is affected by desire – his desire for the young girls in 
Balbec, but furthermore, throughout the novel, by the desire for artistic creation of 
his own. 
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30 Landy, p. 10.
The experience of Impressionist painting and the ‘mapping’ of Vinteuil’s Septet 
(which I shall discuss in the following chapter) seem not to present ‘ordinary’ 
circumstances but rather ‘extraordinary’ and they most certainly are not 
distinguishable from the Narrator’s desires.31 It is true that the Narrator manages to 
produce ‘intellectual’ philosophical remarks of Elstir’s work and even describe the 
mechanism by which they work, but the germ of his philosophical reflection seems 
to stem precisely from his highly subjective experience, not from somehow 
detaching himself from it.32 
In fact, the Narrator’s remarks on Elstir’s Impressionist paintings in particular (as 
well as on the psychological reality presented in Giotto’s frescos) seem to point to 
art’s capacity to make us see genuinely and resemble the way we truly perceive and 
come to appropriate things in life – through instant impressions which grow in 
meaning gradually. The experience of simultaneous closeness and distance (in both 
time and space) is an essential part of the process of looking at a painting whose 
surface is ‘fractured’, and it is precisely this dimension of an aesthetic experience 
that reveals the inseparability ‘de relief et d’omission, de souvenir et d’oubli que la 
mémoire ou l’observation conscientes ignoreront toujours’ (RTP IV, 458) and which 
therefore can never be reached through an intellectual, conceptual, objective 
approach alone.
This idea of ‘[la] vision première’ superseding the kind of approach in which one 
imposes the knowledge of ‘how things are’ on the experience is implied in the 
Narrator’s following remark on Elstir’s artistic credo:
L’effort d’Elstir de ne pas exposer les choses telles qu’il savait qu’elles étaient, 
mais selon ces illusions optiques dont notre vision première est faite, l’avait 
précisément amené à mettre en lumière certaines de ces lois de perspective, 
plus frappantes alors, car l’art était le premier à les dévoiler.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 194
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31 This is particularly true of the passage where the Narrator discusses Vinteuil’s Septet, in which the 
physically absent Albertine is vividly present in the Narrator’s experience. 
32 The passage to which Landy refers in the context of painting is the same one that I have discussed in 
this chapter: the Narrator’s contemplation on Elstir’s Impressionist paintings in A l’ombre des jeunes filles 
en fleurs II.
It is noteworthy here that although Elstir’s paintings refuse to impose a perspective 
on the viewer in the same way that a more visually ‘polished’ mode of representation 
might, there is still ‘[un] effort’, a driving force behind the presentation at work in 
the painting, and through this very ‘effort’, the artist, too, remains present in the 
artwork. ‘L’effort d’Elstir’ is, however, followed by negation (‘de ne pas exposer les 
choses telles qu’ils étaient’), which implies that the task of intellect in the creative 
process is, first and foremost, to make itself scarce. 
To return to the viewer’s experience, then, and to Landy’s claim that intellect 
succeeds in description of aesthetic experience, the Narrator does manage to describe 
what Elstir does and the effects his techniques have, but how exactly these ‘lois de 
perspective’ trigger ‘ces illusions optiques’ still remains a mystery (RTP II, 194). 
Furthermore, as we saw in the context of metaphorical paintings – ‘les tableaux de la 
mémoire’ (RTP I, 419) and ‘des ébauches délaissées’ of the objects of our desire 
(TRP II, 658) – visual presentation in Proust seems recurrently to evoke a certain 
sense of inaccessibility, transience and otherness in the viewer. One possible 
explanation for this is, paradoxically, that in Proust the visual in general tends to be 
something highly personal. To support this claim we only need to consider the 
emphasis that is placed on the role of the visual in the workings of memory and 
imagination (both in Contre Sainte-Beuve and recurrently in the Recherche) and how 
the Proustian subject is constantly in the process of recreating his or her very own 
internal visual accompaniment to concepts and phenomena.33 
My hypothesis is that in Proust, the visual artworks, always remaining to some extent 
as embodiments of someone else’s visual imagination or ‘vision’ (in the most 
intrinsic sense), seem to offer the onlooker a glimpse of the other rather than access 
to his/her own self in the way that for example the reading of literature might. In the 
experience of a text, the task of ‘visual recreation’ is issued to the reader, and the 
artwork requires active ‘input’ from the reader in order to work aesthetically. The 
reading process is in this sense, as discussed earlier, an integral part of the very 
ontology of the literary work, whereas a painting can be aesthetically pleasing simply 
104
33 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, ‘Sentiments filiaux d’un parricide’ in pp. 150-159 and ‘Notes sur le 
monde mystérieux de Gustave Moreau’, pp. 667-677. 
to our senses. While the experience of the visual does not stop at the surface, the 
surface still situates the onlooker outside the painting and thus seems to prevent us 
from ever entirely ‘knowing from within’ what the painting represents.34 
These questions related to the ontology, the ‘auratic distance’, and the appropriation 
of the artwork take us back to the difference between the experience of painting and 
reproductions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. According to Walter 
Benjamin, the process of reproduction can alter the sui generis ‘image’ of an artwork 
quite radically, and this is true regarding paintings in particular: ‘The reproduction 
[Reproduktion], as offered by illustrated magazines and newsreels, differs 
unmistakably from the image. Uniqueness and permanence are as closely entwined 
in the latter as are transitoriness and repeatability in the former.’35 In Proust, when 
discussing existing (that is, non-imaginary) paintings, the Narrator interestingly only 
describes colours in relation to those paintings that Proust himself had seen first 
hand, such as Vermeer’s View of Delft, ‘[le] petit pan de mur jaune’ of which plays 
rather an essential role in Bergotte’s death scene (RTP III, 692).36 
Reproductions do, however, play an important role also in the elaborate, multilayered 
structure of Proust’s work.37 There are moments in the novel where different kinds of 
layers of mediation are valued one over another; Johanna Malt remarks how the 
Narrator’s grandmother, for example, prefers many layers of production – a picture 
of a painting of a landscape – to a more ‘realistic’ photograph of the landscape, and 
considers the former more valuable than the latter.38 Whether this value is primarily 
aesthetic value is, however, unclear. With the Narrator’s grandmother and mother, 
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34 This sense of otherness is, of course, also present in the Narrator’s dealings with other people in life; as 
the Narrator states, we cannot know (or love) other people except in our thoughts in real life: ‘Les liens 
entre un être et nous n’existent que dans notre pensée […] L’homme est l’être qui ne peut sortir de soi, 
qui ne connaît les autre qu’en soi, et, en disant le contraire, ment.’ (RTP IV, 34).
35 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility ed. by Michael W. 
Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 23.
36 Townsend, p. 62 The lack of colour descriptions in context of those existing paintings Proust had not 
seen in real life implies a certain desire to remain faithful to the ‘authentic’ aesthetic experience of the 
paintings in space and time. When unable to travel to see a given artwork in a gallery, Proust himself did 
frequently use reproductions of paintings as his source, but most of these were only available in black and 
white in his time.
37 Townsend, p. 15.
38 Johanna Malt, Obscure Objects of Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 143.
there always seems to be a certain leaning towards evaluating art from an educational 
and moral perspective, especially when the young Narrator’s education is at issue. In 
any case, it seems that it is not merely the idea of reproduction per se that the 
grandmother values but ‘les épaisseurs d’art’ – the multiple layers of artistic 
processing or mediation which create this aesthetic ‘thickness’. 
Reproductions can also be considered as a means to remove some of the ‘auratic 
distance’ of the original work in question by lessening the role of its material 
singularity: in a reproduction of a painting, for example, the physical presence of the 
work (in spatial dimension) is diminished, which may allow the ‘ethereal’ quality of 
the artwork to become more emphasised. Gabrielle Townsend takes this more 
favourable stand on reproductions, suggesting that for Proust himself the 
reproductions he used as his secondary source did not merely serve a practical 
purpose ‘for the immobile invalid’ but that they, in fact, ‘represent a stage in the 
transformation of reality into art’ in which ‘three dimensions [spatial, mental and 
temporal] are reduced to two, the physical becomes mental and time is frozen.’39 In 
this sense, and contrary to Benjamin’s theory, a reproduction can also be considered 
as a kind of liberation of the true ‘image’ beyond the canvas. 
While on the level of Proust’s narrative, tangible objects are of course anything but 
marginal, the reader of Proust’s novel, as Thomas Baldwin remarks, ‘is prevented 
from taking hold fully of the objects of the Proustian world. While we may be 
tempted by the lure of reproductive closeness, the referential “complications” of 
Proust’s work ensure that a certain auratic distance is maintained.’40 The same 
applies to the imaginary artworks in the ekphrastic passages within which the text 
produces a range of ‘sensuous’ effects based on the authentic but imagined object, 
which does not have any real materiality. The lack of meticulous descriptions of 
paintings in the Recherche leaves more room for the reader’s imagination and 
creates, quite literally, a certain ‘je ne sais quoi’ for the reader. 
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40 Thomas Baldwin, The Picture as Spectre in Diderot, Proust and Deleuze (London: Legenda, Modern 
Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2011), pp. 82-3.
From whichever viewpoint we choose to consider reproductions, it seems that the 
experience of reproductions differs from that of original artworks partly because 
through them, as the auratic distance diminishes, the image becomes more 
‘adaptable’. In the Recherche, we see this kind of adaptation for example in the way 
Swann keeps a reproduction of the face of Botticelli’s Zipporah on his desk instead 
of Odette’s photograph, in this way both justifying to himself his infatuation with 
Odette as well as making this particular part of Botticelli’s fresco his ‘own’. 
This example of ‘appropriation’ of Zipporah as Odette leads us back to the relation 
between the visual and ‘la réalité’ and the question of to what extent the visual is 
personal. In Les Jeunes filles en fleur I, discussing proper names and how we tend to 
fill them with associations,41 the Narrator remarks how 
le monde visible [...] d’ailleurs n’est pas le monde vrai, nos sens ne possédant 
pas beaucoup plus le don de la ressemblance que l’imagination, si bien que les 
dessins enfin approximatifs qu’on peut obtenir de la réalité sont au moins aussi 
différents du monde vu que celui-ci l’était du monde imaginé.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 538 
The direct sensory experience, as crucial a role as it plays in Proust, never functions 
as a source of ‘knowledge’ but rather as a foundation from which both our 
imagination and our understanding draw in creating and interpreting reality. The 
Narrator’s use of the word ‘dessin’ is also interesting here and points back to the 
view the Narrator’s grandmother takes that mediation (‘les épaisseurs d’art’) may 
present reality to us in a more genuine way than mere ‘direct’ – that is, unmediated – 
observation.
The idea that the construction of reality can never happen through primary, direct 
perception alone but always requires also imagination and mediation is further 
emphasised in the following remark by the Narrator in Le Temps retrouvé:
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41 I return to this topic later in Chapter Five where I discuss the evocations of a specific author’s name by 
analysing the Narrator’s use of the word ‘Dostoïevskien’.
Tant de fois, au cours de ma vie, la réalité m’avait déçu parce que, au moment 
où je la percevais, mon imagination, qui était mon seul organe pour jouir de la 
beauté, ne pouvait s’appliquer à elle, en vertu de la loi inévitable qui veut 
qu’on ne puisse imaginer que ce qui est absent. 
       
    A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 450
While the role of the sensuous ‘direct’ experience is by no means irrelevant, it is 
suggested here that imagination is, ultimately, the only means to access reality. This 
paradox will be examined later in Chapter Six, in which I discuss in detail the 
Narrator’s suggestions that ‘la réalité’ always requires an element of creation while a 
book needs not to be ‘created’ but simply discovered, because it always already 
‘habite à chaque instant chez tous les hommes aussi bien que chez l’artiste’ (RTP IV, 
474).
What is crucial about the above quote in view of the relation between visual and 
literary experience is the Narrator’s remark that ‘on ne [peut] imaginer que ce qui est 
absent’ and the grave emphasis on the role of imagination as the ‘seul organe pour 
jouir de la beauté’ (RTP IV, 450). This suggestion that imagination supersedes direct 
sensuous experience in the process of creating reality may also further explain why 
visual presentation in Proust tends to entail a sense of otherness and inaccessibility, 
while reading (where also the visual is created through the reader’s imagination) 
seems to allow a somehow even more subjective appropriation of the work. 
In reading, imagining what is absent becomes an inseparable part of the experience. 
The task of imagination in reading is not however to replace the sensuous but indeed 
to collaborate with it and to draw from our lived experience (past and present).42 The 
reader too, of course, will be ‘led’ by the narrative and the writer’s perspective, but it 
is the necessity of interpretation – and not merely conscious or intellectual 
interpretation but interpretation through our own sphere of experience in the absence 
of direct experience – that makes the reading process so intrinsically personal and the 
aesthetic experience of a text so properly ours.
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42 As the Narrator remarks in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs I, talking about the opposing forces of 
memory and imagination in his attempts to forget Gilberte, our imagination, even if directed towards the 
future, infinitely draws from our past experience: ‘Il est vrai que cette force que l’imagination dirigeait 
vers l’avenir, elle la puisait malgré tout dans le passé.’ (RTP I, 615).
In a sense, the kind of immaterialisation that takes place in reproduction of a painting 
is what happens at all times with literature, in so far as the words on the page exist, 
as it were, in a spatio-temporally freer sphere in which each reader needs to 
‘effectuate’ the text themselves, which makes the material dimension quite marginal. 
However, whereas with visual art, a reproduction always is a copy of the bona fide 
artwork, a copy of a text is never a copy of the literary artwork per se: with literature, 
the aesthetic value or ‘essence’ of the book only becomes available through reading 
it, through the creative reconstruction of the text in the ‘eye’ of the reader’s mind. 
Sartre describes this necessity of effectuation by the reader, comparing a book to a 
spinning top which only exists in movement: ‘L’objet littéraire est une étrange toupie 
qui n’existe qu’en mouvement. Pour la faire surgir, il faut un acte concret qui 
s'appelle la lecture, et elle ne dure qu'autant que cette lecture peut durer. Hors de là, il 
n’y a que des tracés noirs sur le papier.’43 Without the process of reading, the 
aesthetic qualities of the book also remain closed. In this way, the bona fide literary 
work only exists to (and in) its readers.
The way the literary text is only brought into existence through the reading process 
prompts us to consider the links between reading and performance, and indeed to 
what extent reading can be considered as a performance. This is one of the questions 
I address in the next chapter, examining experiences of performing arts, music and 
drama in the Recherche, alongside one crucially distinguishing element of the literary  
experience which was barely touched upon in this chapter: the role of language in 
this process of mediation and effectuation. 
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4. ‘Je ne la possédai jamais tout entière’: Music and Performance in the Recherche
In La Prisonnière, playing the Vinteuil Sonata by himself on the piano, the Narrator 
notes how the music seems different from when he hears it in Albertine’s company and 
how, ‘comme le spectre extériorisé pour nous la composition de la lumière, l’harmonie 
d’un Wagner, la couleur d’un Elstir nous permettent de connaître cette essence 
qualitative des sensations d’un autre où l’amour pour un autre être ne nous fait pas 
pénétrer’ (RTP III, 665). This remark crystallises the Narrator’s attitude towards the 
communicative potential of art and his increasing faith in the potential of aesthetic 
experiences to allow us to approach the other in the way that mere love or desire for the 
other person never can.1 The Narrator does not claim that such experiences would allow 
us necessarily to know the other per se but to know ‘une essence qualitative des 
sensations d’un autre’. Noteworthy is also that this ‘communication’ in music does not 
actually happen through the listener trying to understanding the other but rather because 
music allows one a ‘retour à l’inanalysé’ (RTP III, 763).
In this chapter I discuss the experience of music and performance in the Recherche, 
with a special emphasis on the communicative potential of these experiences, to which 
the Narrator repeatedly refers. I explore this potential in comparison with that embodied 
in the experience of literature – both in the form of performance and as solitary reading. 
One aspect in which the experience of visual art and music differ from literary 
communication is that mediation happens (in the first instance) through media other 
than language. The Narrator’s comments on how these experiences nevertheless (or 
perhaps precisely because language in them is secondary) allow us to see ‘l’univers 
avec les yeux d’un autre’ and reveal to us ‘ces mondes que nous appelons les individus, 
et que sans l’art nous ne connaîtrions jamais’ (RTP III, 762). Vinteuil’s music for 
example, as Edward Hughes points out, ‘offers the prospect of real encounter with the 
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1 Indeed, most often in Proust love and desire seem to produce false ‘knowledge’ and distorting suspicion 
above anything else.
“Inconnue”’ in so far as ‘in music, the Narrator can touch the web of mystery and still 
preserve it.’2 This prompts us to ask whether genuine communication with the other in 
Proust in fact only becomes possible in the absence of linguistic formulation.3 However, 
it is also right to ask how exactly the non-verbal experience of music is able to 
communicate in the first place. Is musical communication, instead of being an exchange 
of messages or mediating meanings, in fact, something based on simply sharing 
sensations? Is it communication proper?
Furthermore, it is also worth noting how the experiences of ‘non-linguistic’ art – 
Vinteuil’s music like Elstir’s paintings – in fact steer the Narrator towards the 
reconfirmation of his own artistic vocation: writing. Already in A l’ombre des jeunes 
filles en fleurs I, listening to Mme Swann play the Vinteuil Sonata, the Narrator 
describes his experience as being carried ‘par le flot sonore vers les jours […] où [il 
avait soi-même] désiré d’être un artiste’ (RTP I, 521). So, while the Narrator repeatedly 
expresses his doubts about language’s ability to communicate, it is this ever-present 
desire for artistic creation of his own that distinguishes him from Swann for example. 
Since it is the experiences of art, together with the miracles of involuntary memory, that 
eventually lead the Narrator to communicate his own ‘essence qualitative des 
sensations’ (RTP III, 665) in the form a book, his habit of plunging into ‘le seul bain de 
Jouvence’ (RTP III, 762) through aesthetic experiences (while some of his relationships 
seem to go horribly wrong simply due to his inability to actually communicate with the 
other in everyday life) cannot be regarded as mere escapism from the mishaps of his 
social self.4
With visual art, as we saw in the previous chapter, the recipient is always ‘positioned’ in 
some way in relation to the canvas, which in turn enhances the prevalence of the auratic 
distance or inaccessiblility for the onlooker. There is at least one aspect in which music 
seems to overcome this kind of distancing effect and in this sense improve on visual art 
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3 Music as the redemptive artform and as a model for a literary work of art in (and for) Proust has been 
discussed by Peter Dayan and Roger Shattuck. See: Peter Dayan, Music, Writing, Literature: from Sand 
via Debussy to Derrida (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), esp. Chapter Six ‘How Music Enables Proust to 
Write Paradise Lost’ (pp. 79-96); and Shattuck, Proust's Way, esp. pp. 159-60 and 225-31.
4 Examples of this social miscommunication which will be discussed later in this chapter as well as in 
Chapter Five in the context of different modes of reading.
as a means to encounter the ‘Inconnu’, even if its ‘messages’ remain ambivalent: the 
fact that music always requires effectuation from the composer’s scores. When listening 
to (especially live) music, the listener is simultaneously sharing the ‘perspective’ or 
interpretation of not just one other (as with a painting) but indeed, of multiple ‘others’ – 
the composer, possibly a conductor, the musicians as well as (to some extent) also the 
other members of the audience. However, with a literary text, this kind of effectuation 
does not result in harmonious ‘communication des âmes’ (RTP III, 762) – quite the 
contrary, in fact, as we see in the passage describing the Narrator’s experience of La 
Berma’s performance, which I analyse at the end of this chapter. 
While drama is a genre (and indeed the first genre) of literature, I have chosen to 
discuss it together with music here, precisely because of the prominence of this 
performing dimension in both artforms. The differences between a listener’s and a 
spectator’s experience of the multiple layers of interpretation within a performance 
illustrate wonderfully the role of language – its presence or its absence – aesthetic 
mediation and communication and lead us subtly to the paradox on which I focus in Part  
Three of the thesis – that of how we can become ‘les propres lecteurs de [nous]-
mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610) through someone else’s text.
 Another sense in which music differs remarkably from visual art and a (prose) text is 
the highly time-bound quality of the experience and the heightened role of repetition 
within it. As the Narrator suggests, listening to Mme Swann play Vinteuil’s Sonata (in a 
passage I discuss shortly), the ‘comprehension’ of a piece of music is only available to 
us in time, though re-encountering the piece; as the Narrator remarks, ‘souvent on 
n’entend rien, si c’est une musique un peu compliquée qu’on écoute pour la première 
fois’ (RTP I, 520). This is partly because music is not referential in the same way as 
other artforms. In looking at a (representational) painting or reading a text the meaning 
is somewhat more immediately available.5 With non-abstract paintings, for example, 
referentiality is based on, in the first instance at least, visual resemblance, and thus the 
elements of familiarity are somewhat more readily available because they can be 
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resemblance to music in the sense that accessing the deeper levels of meaning in poetic form often 
requires rereading and ‘reading between the lines’. As the discussion of poetry is not predominant in 
Proust, I do not examine it in this study, but I hope to explore the qualities of poetic reading in a future 
project.
compared to our perception of the empirically experienced world (and other works of 
art). In music, it is repetition and memory that seem to enable the listener to discover 
the elements of familiarity and to find a point of reference for the musical concepts and 
structures in time. 
Thus, the experience of music is inherently linked to memory, which is undoubtedly one 
of the reasons why it inspired Proust so much and why it features so prominently in the 
Recherche. The links between the experience of music, memory and selfhood in Proust 
have attracted much critical attention to date and have recently been discussed by for 
example Mauro Carbone in his book Unprecedented Deformation: Marcel Proust and 
the Sensible Ideas and James Holden in his In Search of Vinteuil: Music, Literature and 
the Self Regained.6 My intention is not to recapitulate their findings here, but to 
approach the experience of music primarily from the listener’s viewpoint in order to 
compare it with the experience of a spectator and a reader of a literary text.
The ways in which Proust himself used the music, musicians and composers he knew as 
creative models for the musical works and characters within the novel – as well as in the 
composition of the Recherche itself – has also received much critical attention from 
early on. The real-life model for Vinteuil’s music, especially the violin sonata, has been 
identified with Beethoven, Schumann and Schubert, Claude Debussy, César Franck and 
Gabriel Fauré.7 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, William Carter and James Holden among others 
discuss the role of music in the composition of the book – both the Narrator’s book in 
the narrative and the Recherche itself.8 
In 1913, Proust used a ‘théâtrophone’, a precursor of the radio, in which performances 
from theatres, the Opéra, and some concert halls were broadcast periodically. He also 
113
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Keane (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010), esp. pp. 69-82; and James Holden, In Search 
of Vinteuil: Music, Literature and the Self Regained (Brighton, Portland, Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 
2010).
7 Discussion about the real life models for Vinteuil can be found for example in Jean-Jacques Nattiez, 
Proust musicien (Paris: Christian Bourgeois , 1984), pp.18-21; K. Yoshikawa, “Vinteuil ou la genèse du 
septuor”, Etudes proustiennes III, Cahiers Marcel Proust (Paris: Gallimard 1979), pp. 298 and 305; and 
George D. Painter, Marcel Proust (Paris: Mercure de France, 1966) Vol. 2, p. 307.
8 Nattiez, passim; William Carter, The Proustian Quest (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 1992), pp. 49, 137-43; Holden, pp. 69-111.
had an automatic piano player installed in the grand piano in his room, to enable him to 
listen to music when he was too ill to attend concerts regularly. However, the fact that 
during the last years of the war, Proust used to hire the Poulet string quartet to play for 
him in his apartment indicates the value Proust gave to live performances and the 
dissatisfaction of having to rely on mere piano transcriptions.9 Echoes of the preference 
for a live performance over a recording can be found in a brief comparison in the 
beginning of Noms de pays: le nom, where the Narrator considers the idea of hearing 
one’s mother’s voice played on a gramophone and remarks how it would become 
estranged and remain inadequate compared to the experience of her real voice and her 
presence: ‘Le beau son de sa voix, isolément reproduit par le phonographe, ne nous 
consolerait pas d’avoir perdu notre mère’(RTP I, 377).
The experiences of music in the novel still take place predominantly in the context of 
live performances, which makes the multiple layers of interpretation in a musical work 
more discernible – the layers that the musician(s), sometimes a conductor and also the 
presence of the other members of the audience add to the experience.10 Due to the 
performing context, the experience of music is also always shared in Proust’s novel, 
apart from one instance where the Narrator, waiting for Albertine, plays the Vinteuil 
sonata on the piano by himself (RTP III, 664-5). In this context the Narrator notes how 
the music becomes ‘bien différent en cela de la société d’Albertine’ and how it helps 
him to ‘descendre en [s]oi-même, à y découvrir du nouveau’ (RTP III, 665). Being both 
the performer and the listener here seems to make the experience more about him, 
which supports the idea that the presence of the other in the experience of music is 
partly intertwined into a piece through the multiple layers of the interpretation that we 
get in a (live) performance.
It is often in the context of a public (or semi-public) musical performance that the 
Narrator observes and comments on his fellow listeners and depicts the specimen of art-
lovers who are not, as Milton Hindus puts it, capable of ‘ris[ing] above the rudimentary 
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10 There are a few scenes in the Recherche in which music is heard from a distance and in which the 
performer and the listener do not share the same space. For example in the Balbec hotel, the Narrator 
hears someone playing Schumann on the piano in one of the rooms (RTP III, 185) and in Paris he hears 
one of the neighbours performing arias form Massenet’s opera Manon (RTP IV, 35-6).
stage of responding to what may be called the circus-element of art’11. And yet, some of 
what we might call the most intimate aesthetic experiences in the novel, both for the 
Narrator and Swann, are also described in the context of music. In many ways music 
seems to give more freedom to the recipient’s subjective interpretation than any other 
art form because it is not strictly representational in nature and seems to allow the 
absorbed listener a very private experience in the midst of the whole social ‘charade’, as 
we shall see shortly in the context of Swann.
In the passages where music is played at home, such as when Albertine plays the 
pianola (the semi-automatic piano) in the Narrator’s apartment, the performance 
becomes a more private but nevertheless shared experience. Albertine is responsible for 
choosing what is being played and her selection is done with skill and devotion, as the 
Narrator remarks: ‘Elle choisissait des morceaux ou tout nouveaux ou qu’elle ne 
m’avait encore joués qu’une fois ou deux, car, commençant à me connaître, elle savait 
que je n’aimais proposer à mon attention que ce qui m’était encore obscur [...]’ (RTP III, 
874). Here music, even though not selected by the Narrator himself, is selected 
especially for him, which makes this experience slightly different from the spatially and 
temporally restricted setting of a concert or a matinée and seems to allow the music to 
respond to and nurture even more effectively the Narrator’s desires towards art and 
Albertine alike.
Before I move on to analyse the passages describing the experience of music in the 
Recherche, it must be noted that musical notation can, of course be considered as a kind 
of language in its own right and the different variations, ‘colours’, and techniques in a 
musical performance can be identified, described and discussed in detail by using notes 
and musicological terms, which is exactly what musicians and conductors do when 
assembling a performance. The reading of musical ‘language’, the system of 
signification expressed in musical scores, is an expert skill and requires specialised 
terminology, although – as Daniel Barenboim point out – even ‘the most talented 
musician in the world will not be able to analyse [a score] at first sight’.12 This remark 
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11 Milton Hindus, A Reader’s Guide to Marcel Proust (Syracuse University Press, 2001), p. 253.
12 It is only after this initial contact that ‘[the musician] can proceed to an analysis of the piece, work on 
it, think about it, turn it upside down.’ Daniel Barenboim, Everything is Connected: the Power of Music 
(London: Phoenix, 2008), pp. 57-8.
further underlines the role of time and effectuation in the process of music becoming 
‘meaningful’ on which I focus in the following. The methods of musical annotation are 
thus not directly relevant to my discussion here, as I primarily explore the experience of 
the audience as described in Proust’s novel – the experience of listeners who, like 
myself, are educated but not professional musicians or musicologists themselves. 
4.1. ‘Comme un être surnaturel et pur qui passe en déroulant son message 
invisible’: Music and Meaning
The first description of a powerful experience of music in the Recherche appears in Un 
Amour de Swann, at the soirée Saint-Euverte. Swann is anxious in Odette’s absence and 
wishes to leave but is stopped by M. de Froberville whom Swann has promised to 
introduce to young Mme de Cambremer. Once this is done, the concert is about to start 
again, and Swann has to remain seated. In this scene music is at first described almost 
as a kind of spatio-temporal penitentiary for Swann who feels urged to return to his 
lover without delay:
Mais le concert recommença et Swann comprit qu’il ne pourrait pas s’en aller 
avant la fin de ce nouveau numéro du programme. Il souffrait de rester enfermé au 
milieu de ces gens dont la bêtise et les ridicules le frappaient d’autant plus 
douloureusement qu’ignorant son amour, incapables, s’ils l’avaient connu, de s’y 
intéresser et de faire autre chose que d’en sourire comme un enfantillage ou de le 
déplorer comme une folie, ils le lui faisaient apparaître sous l’aspect d’un état 
subjectif qui n’existait que pour lui, dont rien d’extérieur ne lui affirmait la réalité; 
il souffrait surtout, et au point que même le son des instruments lui donnait envie 
de crier, de prolonger son exil dans ce lieu où Odette ne viendrait jamais, où 
personne, où rien ne la connaissait, d’où elle était entièrement absente.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 339 
But all of a sudden, through music, Odette appears: when the musicians start to play 
Vinteuil’s Sonata for piano and violin, which Swann has not expected to hear in this 
context, his mind becomes fully occupied with her. It is ‘la petite phrase de la sonate de 
Vinteuil’ – the ‘love motif’ of their relationship –  which makes Odette more 
prominently ‘present’ in the room than any of the people surrounding Swann and 
116
renders him a vivid evocation of ‘les refrains oubliés du bonheur’ – an offering which 
causes severe pain for the current self:
Mais tout à coup ce fut comme si elle était entrée, et cette apparition lui fut une si 
déchirante souffrance qu’il dut porter la main à son cœur. […] Et avant que 
Swann eût eu le temps de comprendre, et de se dire: ‘C’est la petite phrase de la 
sonate de Vinteuil, n’écoutons pas!’ tous ses souvenirs du temps où Odette était 
éprise de lui […] s’étaient réveillés, et, à tire-d’aile, étaient remontés lui chanter 
éperdument, sans pitié pour son infortune présente, les refrains oubliés du 
bonheur. 
Au lieu des expressions abstraites ‘temps où j’étais heureux’,‘temps où j’étais 
aimé’, qu’il avait souvent prononcées jusque-là et sans trop souffrir, car son 
intelligence n’y avait enfermé du passé que de prétendus extraits qui n’en 
conservaient rien, il retrouva tout ce qui de ce bonheur perdu avait fixé à jamais la 
spécifique et volatile essence; il revit tout [...].   
     A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 339-40 
This passage illustrates the time-bound nature of the listener’s experience: Swann does 
not have time to recognise the piece and warn himself of its effects, because the 
overwhelming memory of Odette grows in intensity synchronically with the movement 
of the piece: ‘l’exaltation où il était d’apercevoir déjà l’objet de son attente qui 
s’approchait, et avec un effort désespéré pour tâcher de durer jusqu’à son arrivée, de 
l’accueillir avant d’expirer’ (RTP I, 339, my emphasis). Thus, music here is initially 
‘recognised’ by Swann’s senses and (involuntary) memory, before it is recognised by his 
mind, through intellect, as a work of art with a name and a history of its own – that is, as 
a work of art existing ‘outside’ himself. What seems to be suggested here is that when 
re-encountering a piece of music we first seem to recognise ‘[une] spécifique et volatile 
essence’ to which our previous experience of the piece is attached and which is the same 
for our past and present selves. Only after this is our comprehension able to explain this 
phenomenon by saying: ‘I have heard this before.’
In certain respects, this ‘volatile’ impact that the Sonata has on Swann resembles the 
awakenings of involuntary memory. Music seems to render to him a piece of the past as 
something actual, precise and real – offering Swann the means not only to remember 
but to ‘revi[vre] tout’ (RTP I, 340) – while the abstract linguistic expressions referring 
to his past seem to be able to transmit mere empty shells of memories, ‘prétendus 
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extraits qui n’en conservaient rien’(RTP I, 340). This remark resounds loudly with the 
passage in Combray in which the Narrator, before eating the madeleine, notes that what 
he remembers of Combray is ‘mort pour [lui]’ because it is ‘fourni seulement par la 
mémoire volontaire, la mémoire de l’intelligence, et comme les renseignements qu’elle 
donne sur le passé ne conservent rien de lui, je n’aurais jamais eu envie de songer à ce 
reste de Combray [autre que ‘le décor strictement nécessaire’]’ (RTP I, 43). For the 
Narrator, the linguistically constructed ‘reality’ of Combray (‘this is how things were 
when I was young’), evoked by deliberate reminiscing, seems not to yield him anything 
more than Swann gains through ‘des expressions abstraites “temps où j’étais 
heureux” [ou] “le temps où j’étais aimé’ (RTP I, 339). 
However, there might also be psychological reasons behind these reservations about 
linguistic expression, especially in Swann’s case. Swann’s suspicion about language’s 
potential to yield to him anything ‘real’ from the past might also arise from the fact that 
expressions like ‘temps où j’étais heureux [et] aimé’ (RTP I, 339) would in fact require, 
in order to become something else than ‘vide’, some evidence and explanation of what 
his happiness consisted in. In other words, the linguistic expression, always issuing him 
the task of interpretation, threatens to wreck Swann’s illusion of his past – for, in view 
of Un Amour de Swann, we may ask if Swann was in fact, even at the time, happy or 
‘loved’ to begin with. Without interpretation and some kind of subjective precision, the 
representation of the past through words thus also contains a risk of error and fallibility. 
As it is possible to conjure up completely imaginary (but simultaneously plausible) 
things with language, language in Proust functions as a kind of double-bladed sword in 
relation to memory: as the reality is not conserved in the linguistic representation itself 
– the use of language as a means to record our memories leaves plenty of room for 
delusion and also for deliberate obliteration or alteration of certain ‘truths’ of the past. 
And yet, language collaborates with memory in an inseparable way, for example in 
enabling us to express, analyse and represent our past (even though not always 
accurately) – including things we do not actually remember but which we know have 
existed.13
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13 This is an aspect in which language differs remarkably from the other forms of expression, such as 
painting or music: linguistic representation always seems to have a some kind of epistemic dimension and 
be related (either explicitly or implicitly) to what is considered to be ‘true’, as we saw in Chapter Two.
In La Prisonnière, the experience of music is presented as free from such processes and 
presented by the Narrator as ‘[un] retour à l’inanalysé [...] si enivrant, qu’au sortir de ce 
paradis, le contact des êtres plus ou moins intelligents me semblait d’une insignifiance 
extraordinaire’ (RTP III, 762-3, my emphasis). Swann, on the other hand, does not 
really seem to be able to completely return to ‘l’inanalysé’, as his experience is 
dominated by an excruciating desire for the beloved. This tendency of Swann, already 
discussed in the context of paintings, to use art to ‘justify’ some of his life choices 
resurfaces here: the theme of the Sonata seems to function as some kind of rationale for 
his pain. However, in some sense the experience of music does pull the analytical rug 
from under Swann’s feet, taking him closer to ‘a genuine aesthetic response’ and, as 
Barbara Bucknall suggests, leaving him ‘feeling that [the Sonata] has expanded his 
soul’.14
Indeed, it seems that Swann here is very much at the mercy of music. This element of 
voluptuousness in Swann’s experience comes through for example in how the sound of 
the violin is described as a bird which you can never really catch, ‘un être surnaturel et 
pur qui passe en déroulant son message invisible’ (RTP I, 342). The ‘messages’ and 
meanings in music seem only to be released synchronically with listening to the piece 
and therefore cannot be fully accessed or predicted, or indeed ‘explained’, outside the 
experience. This suggests that while the music is able to bring up very specific 
memories and emotions in the listener, it is clearly not referential in the same way as 
other art forms. ‘[Musical] concepts are not expressive of semantic or representational 
properties’, as Kivy notes, and the meanings it carries seem not to be proper to the 
music itself.15 While Proust’s text points to the extraordinary ability of music to trigger 
memories and create the sense of familiarity – even recreate scenes from our past and 
reawaken our past emotions – these are in fact effects of music, something which has 
been associatively attached to it by the listener over time – they are not the ‘contents’ 
proper to music.
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14 Bucknall, p. 79.
15 Kivy, Music, Language, and Cognition, p. 225.
It is not just Swann who relives his past through music; in La Prisonnière, the Narrator 
himself notes how ‘rien ne ressemblait plus qu’une belle phrase de Vinteuil à ce plaisir 
particulier que j’avais quelquefois éprouvé dans ma vie, par exemple […] en buvant une 
certaine tasse de thé’ (RTP III, 877). Considering how music functions as a powerfully 
effective mnemonic trigger in this way, there are two questions we are prompted to ask: 
how does an experience of music differ from and improve on just eating another 
madeleine dipped in another ‘tasse de thé’? And secondly, if there is nothing in the 
structure or formal properties of a piece of music which ensures what kind of associated 
content and meaning we attach to it, what is the universality and the communicative 
potential to which the Narrator keeps referring based on? Before we move on to discuss 
the communicative dimensions of music, let us consider the first question by exploring 
the links between music and memory and the role of repetition and time in the listener’s 
appropriation of the piece.
4.2. ‘N’a-t-on pas tort de dire “entendre la première fois”’: Repetition, Memory, 
Comprehension 
To explore the Narrator’s comparison between ‘une belle phrase de Vinteuil’ and ‘ce 
plaisir particulier que j’avais quelquefois éprouvé […] en buvant une certaine tasse de 
thé’ (RTP III, 877), we must start by asking on what is this ability of music to carry 
associations and vivid impressions based? Is it the structure of the work, the ‘syntax’ of 
sounds, that allows us to re-access our emotions and impressions with which we have, 
during the previous times of listening, filled the musical concepts? And how do these 
concepts differ from the ‘substance’ of a purely ‘sensuous’ trigger – like a madeleine 
dipped in tea? 
In other words, we need to ask how music becomes ‘meaningful’, how it is appropriated 
by the listener. In a passage in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs I, where the Narrator 
is listening to Mme Swann play the Vinteuil Sonata, he contemplates the aesthetic 
pleasure of music and notes how recognising themes and motifs makes a major 
difference between the first and subsequent times of listening:
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Mais souvent on n’entend rien, si c’est une musique un peu compliquée qu’on 
écoute pour la première fois. Et pourtant quand plus tard on m’eut joué deux ou 
trois fois cette Sonate [de Vinteuil], je me trouvai la connaître parfaitement. Aussi 
n’a-t-on pas tort de dire ‘entendre la première fois’. Si l’on n’avait vraiment, 
comme on l’a cru, rien distingué à la première audition, la deuxième, la troisième 
seraient autant de premières, et il n’y aurait pas de raison pour qu’on comprît 
quelque chose de plus à la dixième. Probablement ce qui fait défaut, la première 
fois, ce n’est pas la compréhension, mais la mémoire.
   A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 520 (my emphasis)
The Narrator seems to suggest here that the first hearing may leave a vivid sense-
impression on us which then enables us to ‘comprendre’ the piece on the subsequent 
hearings, which then, in turn, may enable us to experience a piece of past and present 
simultaneously – a possibility to glimpse the ‘extra-temporal’ self. The ‘extratemporal’ 
is what is shared between the self who first heard but did not yet ‘comprendre’ and the 
layers of meaning that have been added since and stored in our memory. 
The Narrator proceeds to remark how the Vinteuil Sonata, like life, is composed of 
successive moments which we experience sequentially but are never able to grasp as a 
whole or to remember as an entirety: ‘Pour n’avoir pu aimer qu’en des temps successifs 
tout ce que m’apportait cette Sonate, je ne la possédai jamais tout entière: elle 
ressemblait à la vie’ (RTP I, 521). The way in which music itself is always subject to 
time thus seems to restrict the experience in some sense: even if the listener has a 
repeated access to a piece of music – which, in Proust’s time, was very rare unless one 
could play oneself – the effects (the resurfacing of the past self or ‘le temps perdu’) 
occur synchronically with the music and are thus only fully accessible through listening 
– an experience which itself takes time – and not through mere remembrance.16
While the impossibility of ‘possessing’ a piece of music in its entirety connects the 
experience of music to the general anticipation-disappointment pattern of the Narrator, 
the Narrator goes on to note how the experience of music improves on the life 
experience in one essential aspect: ‘[M]oins décevants que la vie, ces grands chefs-
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16 It is also worth considering whether this remark about not being able to possess the experience has 
something to do with the experience not being mediated through language. I come back to this question in 
4.3 when I explore the communicative potential of music.
d’œuvre ne commencent pas par nous donner ce qu’ils ont de meilleur’ (RTP I, 521). 
This remark also links to the idea of how a piece of music, even though the actual 
experience of it is always ‘immediate’ and direct, only becomes meaningful to us 
gradually, in time.17 This process of unraveling a piece of complicated music, as Roger 
Shattuck puts it, is ‘cumulative, subject to time, never exhaustive’ and nevertheless
differs from life in that its greatest rewards come late and not early. The 
[Recherche] itself, we realise, observes this rhythm of delayed revelation. The 
time needed for gradual initiation to a work of art belongs to and forms part of its 
experience. An instant does not contain it, though art may contain exalted 
instants.18
Thus, the initial stages of the experience of music – the nebulous and fragmentary 
impressions which the Narrator celebrates in La Prisonnière – play an essential role in 
the gradual unfolding of the work: these impressions, registered first through our senses, 
lay a foundation, as it were, of a musical platform for memory. 
It is perhaps precisely because the experience of music has both these qualities of 
happening synchronically, ‘in the moment’ (and us therefore being unable to ‘la 
posséd[er] jamais tout entière’ outside the listening experience) and being cumulative 
and deepening with subsequent hearings, that it seems to be deemed above any other 
artform in Proust in its capacity to evoke involuntary memory. The experience of music 
in Proust is described as one which is closely linked to the personal psychological 
reality of the listener and a certain sense of mystery – something which presents itself 
not in the form or the content of the artwork but in the impressions it evokes. 
Thus, ‘comprehension’ of certain pieces of music in Proust is thus primarily discussed 
in terms of how the experience allows the listener to reflect his or her own experiences 
and relationships. And yet, the way these associations are evoked is not completely 
unrelated to the structure of the piece; as we saw in the example of Swann above, the 
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17 In Proust, the interrelatedness of music and life is implied through several other metaphors as well; if 
music resembles life in a kind of metaphysical scope, there are also examples of the sounds and 
experiences of the everyday life identified as music. In La Prisonnière for instance, the Narrator marks 
the resemblances of the cries of a fruit-and-vegetable-seller in the street beneath his window to medieval 
plainsongs (RTP III, 625) and in Le Temps retrouvé he notes how the sound of the sirens marking the 
arrival of the German aeroplanes in the night sky over wartime Paris is ‘assez wagnérien’ and resembles 
the screams of the Valkyries (RTP IV, 338).
18 Shattuck, Proust's Way, p. 211.
musical ‘syntax’ does somehow seem to frame the experience so that when he re-
encounters the piece, that volatile ‘essence qualitative des sensations’ – the 
‘inanalysé’ (RTP III, 665, 762) which is the same for the present and the past self – may 
become available to him. While music itself is described as ‘un être surnaturel et pur 
qui passe en déroulant son message invisible’ (RTP I, 342), ‘[un] paradis’ (RTP III, 763) 
as well as ‘[un] appel vers une joie superterrestre’ (RTP III, 765), the actual experience 
of music in Proust is never entirely ‘abstracted’ from the life of the listener.
In the Narrator’s experience of the Vinteuil Septet, as we shall see shortly, the ability to 
enjoy the piece more fully already during the first hearing arises from encountering in it 
the familiar phrase from the Sonata. The ability of the listener to perform this kind of 
aesthetic ‘mapping’ seems to suggest that music is not a mere stimulus but, as Kivy puts 
it, ‘an object of perception and cognition, which understanding opens up for [...] 
appreciation.’19 Although in some senses music does seem to function similarly to a 
sensuous trigger, both to Swann and the Narrator, it seems that it is its internal structure, 
its ‘syntax’, that differentiates a musical experience as a mnemonic trigger from a 
singular punctual ‘inexplicable’ experience, such as a taste. Music represents to us an 
eloborative organisation of something – a structure within which consecutive and 
repeated elements (such as leitmotifs) allow us to map, explore and deepen the 
experience in our re-encounters with the work. As Margaret Topping remarks, it is ‘this 
model of diversity within unity [...] achieved through the recurrent motifs, the 
metaphorical networks, which create and extend the artist’s aesthetic vision’ that will 
later on become the germ of the Narrator’s own artistic work.20
The resemblance, then, between the ‘belle phrase de Vinteuil’ and drinking ‘une certaine 
tasse de thé’ is explained by the Narrator in the following terms:
Par instants je pensais que cela tenait à ce que ce qui est senti par nous dans la vie 
ne l’étant pas sous forme d’idées, sa traduction, littéraire, c’est-à-dire 
intellectuelle, en rend compte, l’explique, l’analyse, mais ne le recompose pas 
comme la musique où les sons semblent prendre l’inflexion de l’être, reproduire 
cette pointe intérieure et extrême des sensations qui est la partie qui nous donne 
cette ivresse spécifique que nous retrouvons de temps en temps et que, quand nous 
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19 Peter Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 41.
20 Topping, p. 5. 
disons: ‘Quel beau temps ! quel beau soleil!’ nous ne faisons nullement connaître 
au prochain, en qui le même soleil et le même temps éveillent des vibrations 
toutes différentes.
   
   A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 876 (my emphasis)
The musical pleasure resembles the ‘bonheur’ caused by the madeleine dipped in tea, in 
the sense that it offers the subject access to ‘cette pointe intérieure et extrême des 
sensations’ which is shared between the subject in two different points in time and 
which can only ever be accessed in ‘cette ivresse spécifique’, in the absence of 
deliberate attempts.21 
A literary work, here still unambiguously paired with intellect (‘littéraire, c’est-à-dire 
intellectuelle’), is deemed less capable of recomposing ‘cette pointe intérieure et 
extrême des sensations’, and intelligence is considered as a mainly disruptive force in 
the aesthetic process – something which cannot coexist with ‘cette ivresse spécifique 
que nous retrouvons de temps en temps’ (RTP III, 876).22 This leads us to ask what 
these ‘vibrations toutes différentes’ the listener can access in fact are, and if music 
indeed is ‘la communication des âmes’ (RTP III, 763), what exactly is being 
communicated through it? Music may well be able to recompose ‘ce qui est senti par 
nous dans la vie’, but how can the experience of it be appreciated and, furthermore, 
appropriated if it remains in the realm of ‘l’inanalysé’? Next, let us turn to examine the 
Narrator’s experience of the Vinteuil Septet, where he implies that music may rise 
above spoken and written language, and subsequently explore this suggested 
communicative potential of music in view of the relationship between the Narrator and 
Albertine.
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21 However, music does seem to trigger memory in a more ‘organised’ way than a mere sensuous 
impression; for example, the Narrator does not experience Venice with every uneven paving stone he 
stumbles on, even if he is able to recognise the similarity between the two experiences. With music, the 
familiar motifs and themes follow each other within a structure –  a structure which remains the same 
between the current and the previous times of listening. In this sense, music offers a much more infallible 
link between one’s past and present self than a ‘moment bienheureux’.
22 However, once again it is worth noting that these remarks precede the Narrator’s ultimate revelations 
about embodied time, memory and the nature of ‘la réalité’ in Le Temps retrouvé, which restore his belief 
in ‘translating’ life through writing.
4.3. Listening to Vinteuil, ‘hearing’ Albertine: Music and Communication
So far in this chapter I have considered the essential role that repetition and memory 
play in making musical meanings ‘available’ to the listener. In listening to the Vinteuil 
Sonata played by Mme Swann, the Narrator suggests that understanding a musical work 
requires the ability to contextualise the piece of music through memory – to say to 
oneself ‘I have heard this before’, ‘this reminds me of X’. A good example of such a 
moment of recognition is presented in a passage where the Narrator hears, for the first 
time, Vinteuil’s Septet in a concert; even though this is the first hearing, he is able to 
‘situate’ it due to his familiarity with the composer’s earlier work. This passage 
approaches the musical experience from several different angles. It does not only 
describe the Narrator’s sentiments and reflections on the piece itself but also his 
observations about the musicians and other members of the audience, recollections of 
the composer’s persona, as well as his anxieties attached to Mlle Vinteuil’s friend and 
her connections to Albertine (RTP III, 753-767).
At the beginning of the concert, the Narrator realises he does not recognise the piece 
that is being performed. He first compares his feelings to those of someone who has just 
arrived in an unknown land: ‘Le concert commença, je ne connaissais pas ce qu’on 
jouait; je me trouvais en pays inconnu. Où le situer?‘ (RTP III, 753) Then, suddenly, as 
if he met someone who spoke ‘his language’, he recognises ‘au milieu de cette musique 
nouvelle [...] en pleine sonate de Vinteuil la petite phrase’ (ibid.). This revelation gives 
the Narrator the ability to ‘navigate’ and underscores once again the idea that the 
‘accent’ of a great artist is unmistakably present in all his works: ‘Ma joie de l’avoir 
retrouvée s’accroissait de l’accent si amicalement connu qu’elle [la petite phrase] 
prenait pour s’addresser à moi […]. Sa signification, d’ailleurs, n’était cette fois que de 
me montrer le chemin.’ (RTP III, 754) This deictic function of ‘la petite phrase’ seems 
to further support the view that musical elements do not have a proper meaning as such, 
but that rather their function is to signal and signpost the listener inside a musical 
structure.
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Here, the Narrator hears Vinteuil’s music in what Peter Kivy calls hearing in an 
‘epistemic’ sense: ‘when one hears something [...] as something [and] takes it to be 
something. In other words [when] one hears it under some description’ and the piece of 
music becomes ‘the intentional object of one’s conscious state’.23 The description here 
is ‘I am listening to Vinteuil’, and the Narrator arrives at it through recognising ‘l’accent 
si amicalement connu qu’elle [la musique] prenait pour s’adresser à [lui]’ (RTP III, 
753). Because this is the first time the Narrator hears the piece, it seems the familiarity 
of this ‘accent amicalement connu’ must here arise from something other than purely 
personal associations which add ‘meanings’ to music in time. 
As notes are not referential in the same way as words (even though of course the 
meanings and connotations that words carry are always multiple as well and require 
interpretation and creative association), meanings in music do not seem to be embedded 
into the notes in the same semantic way that words carry meanings. However, the sound 
may take on a specific ‘meaning’ within a structure (when notes are joined together in a 
particular order), in a somewhat similar way that the meaning of a word depends on 
what precedes it and what comes after. In this sense music is ‘language-like’, as Kivy 
proposes, in so far that it has a ‘“syntax” without semantics’.24 It is this ‘syntax’, the 
musical structure in the artwork, that allows our memory to navigate through it on the 
subsequent times of playing and listening. Kivy suggests that the way we arrive at 
enjoyment and appreciation of a piece of music is inherently connected to musical 
structure:
The enjoyment and appreciation of classical music is concept-laden and content-
less [...] in that the entertainment of concepts, both consciously and self-
consciously [being aware of the self as being conscious about something], on the 
part of a qualified, attentive listener, is essential to its full enjoyment and 
appreciation, but the concepts entertained are purely musical concepts ... In other 




23 Kivy, Music, Language, and Cognition, p. 226.
24 Kivy, Music, Language, and Cognition, pp. 216, 222.
25 Kivy, Music, Language, and Cognition, p. 225 (emphasis in the original).
In Proust, this concept-laden and content-less structure of music seems to provide a 
powerfully effective framework for the listener to experience both something 
‘universally’ heightening and something highly personal at the same time. 
We may ask, however, does this kind of ‘epistemic’ hearing in the context of the Septet 
mean that the piece is ‘appropriated’? The Narrator seems to be able to enjoy the music 
in a different way because he is able to contextualise it, but does this yet make the 
Septet itself ‘meaningful’ to him? The Narrator may be able to analyse the piece during 
the first hearing here, but only because he is ‘hearing it under some description’ – that 
is, his knowledge of the composer’s earlier work. Thus, it would seem that the 
‘description’ under which the Septet is heard is, in fact, the Narrator’s appropriation of 
the Sonata, the concepts of which he has filled with ‘content’ during his re-encounter 
with the work. But if music is concept-laden and content-less to begin with and the 
musicians playing the piece and the listeners listening to it all ‘fill’ the concepts with 
their own subjective associations, it is right to ask what exactly is shared or 
communicated in a musical experience?26 The role of music in the relationship between 
the Narrator and Albertine offers a fertile ground to explore this question. 
Although the Narrator is capable of playing the piano himself, he seems to prefer taking 
the role of a listener. The Narrator often asks Albertine to play for him when they are 
alone – partly, as Carter suggests, ‘as a distraction from his jealous obsession’ and partly 
in order to ‘study and better comprehend musical works of which he has only a 
rudimentary or imperfect knowledge’27. With Albertine seated in front of the pianola, 
the Narrator is able to immerse himself in the piece Albertine is playing and, at the same 
time, feel the security of Albertine’s presence. Although the somewhat mechanical act 
of playing the pianola does not allow Albertine’s interpretation of the music in the same 
way as playing an actual piano would, what is emphasised in these passages is her 
capacity to choose the right pieces to suit the Narrator’s existing mood, to interpret and 
musically satisfy the Narrator. Such a selection process represents yet another factor that  
may contribute to the aesthetic experience of music and adds, in its own way, to the 
communicative dimension of the experience.
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26 See Kivy, Music, Language, and Cognition, pp. 216, 222.
27 Carter, p. 138.
As a provider of these experiences, Albertine also plays an important role in the 
Narrator’s aesthetic apprenticeship; as Carter points out, ‘Albertine’s understanding of 
[the Narrator’s] aesthetic needs proves her superiority over Odette, who is never able to 
assist Swann in his artistic development’.28 Whereas Odette’s ‘transformation’ in the 
course of the novel happens largely through her societal position, Albertine seems to 
undergo an aesthetic and intellectual apprenticeship of her own. The Narrator notes how 
during her ‘imprisonment’, Albertine ‘n’était pas frivole, du reste, lisait beaucoup quand 
elle était seule et me faisait la lecture quand elle était avec moi. Elle était devenue 
extrêmement intelligente’ (RTP III, 573). Albertine’s increased interest in literature, 
painting and music and her enhanced aesthetic and intellectual capacities make her, on 
the one hand, more independent of the Narrator and, on the other hand, seem to enable 
at least some kind of communication and proximity between her and her jealous lover. 
She even expresses her gratitude to the Narrator for this influence, simultaneously 
emphasising the transformation that has taken place in her character: ‘Je suis 
épouvantée en pensant que sans vous je serais restée stupide. Ne le niez pas, vous 
m’avez ouvert un monde d’idées que je ne soupçonnais pas, et le peu que je suis 
devenue, je ne le dois qu’à vous’ (RTP III, 573).
This ‘aesthetic’ communicative dimension is not altogether free from the obsessive 
jealousy that marks their ‘everyday’ communication, however. For example in La 
Prisonnière, Vinteuil’s Septet, much in the same way that the sonata affects Swann, 
reminds the Narrator of Albertine’s assumed connections to Mlle Vinteuil and her 
friend: ‘[J]e cessai de suivre la musique pour me redemander si Albertine avait vu ou 
non Mlle Vinteuil ces jours-ci, comme on interroge de nouveau une souffrance interne 
que la distraction vous a fait un moment oublier,’ (RTP III, 757) he says. Unlike Swann 
however, even though the suspicions around Albertine’s behaviour are never really put 
to rest, the Narrator’s ‘plus vaste amour [...], l’amour pour Albertine’ is occasionally 
overcome by his love of art. For example, when Albertine is playing Vinteuil for him, 
he notes how although ‘une seule fois, cette musique de Vinteuil avait été une cause 
indirecte de jalousie pour moi’, he is now able, at least for a moment, to get past his 
jealousy into the enjoyment of the music itself (RTP III, 875).
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Whereas it seems that Swann seeks the ‘other’ in artworks in order to dominate and 
possess them through his aesthetic expertise, the Narrator draws – with paintings as well 
as music – metaphorical links between the artworks and his beloved. Whereas for 
Swann, la petite phrase is about Odette and him, for the Narrator, Vinteuil’s music is 
like the Narrator’s past loves, all leading towards Albertine: 
J’avais pensé aux autres mondes qu’avait pu créer Vinteuil comme à des univers 
clos, comme avait été chacun de mes amours; mais, en réalité […] si je 
considérais maintenant non plus mon amour pour Albertine, mais toute ma vie, 
mes autres amours n’y avaient été que de minces et timides essais qui préparaient, 
des appels qui réclamaient ce plus vaste amour… l’amour pour Albertine.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 756-7
It seems that the Narrator is capable of intertwining his own experiences, memories and 
feelings into the aesthetic experience without harnessing an artwork to serve a certain 
means like Swann does; Swann’s method attempts to embed, capture even, the other 
(Odette) in his experience, but precisely due to this intentionality it does not seem to 
allow any true communication or be particularly redeeming either. With Albertine, even 
if Albertine’s ‘performance’ on the pianola does not include her interpretation per se, 
her presence is a part of the Narrator’s experience. These moments seem to enable 
‘communication of souls’ on some level, because when playing, Albertine steps, as it 
were, outside her usual role as an object of desire and takes the Narrator into the space 
of music, into the ‘essence qualitative des sensations d’un autre où l’amour pour un 
autre être ne nous fait pas pénétrer’ (RTP III, 665) through music. 
In the Septet passage we see how the Narrator is becoming increasingly convinced that 
obtaining knowledge of the other seems to be possible through art only (here music), as 
it allows us a ‘retour à l’inanalysé’ (RTP III, 762) through ‘cette ivresse spécifique que 
nous retrouvons de temps en temps’ (RTP III, 876). However, it is right to ask whether 
we can talk about communication per se in the case of Albertine and the Narrator. While 
they do share the musical universe during Albertine’s performance, this does not enable 
communication proper because the Narrator, instead of listening to Albertine, seems 
only ever to be hearing her. What he actually listens to and accesses through the music, 
is once again his own associations and reflections on their relationship. 
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The question arises whether the Narrator’s preferences to ‘communicate’ with Albertine 
through music have something to do with his inability to actually communicate with her 
in everyday life, through language, and furthermore, whether this inability is connected, 
as was suggested with Swann earlier, to some unwillingness to tackle the 
‘interpretative’ and truth-related dimensions so inherent in linguistic expression. Earlier 
in La Prisonnière, the Narrator laments over Albertine’s changed, now cautious and 
evasive speech, which leaves him no other alternative than to interpret her by what she 
does not say:
J’en étais arrivé à ne plus attacher […] d’importance qu’aux témoignages qui ne 
sont pas une expression rationnelle et analytique de la vérité; les paroles elles-
mêmes ne me renseignaient qu’à la condition d’être interprétées à la façon d’un 
afflux de sang à la figure d’une personne qui se trouble, à la façon encore d’un 
silence subit. […] Parfois l’écriture où je déchiffrais les mensonges d’Albertine, 
sans être idéographique, avait simplement besoin d’être lue à rebours.  
   
   A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 596-8 (my emphasis)
The Narrator starts to decode Albertine’s utterances, even when they are not ‘idiomatic’, 
as if they were symbolic language which requires to be read ‘à rebours’. What links this 
passage to the communication through music is the way the Narrator then compares the 
sound of Albertine breathing in her sleep to music, which creates another kind of scene 
of not-speaking, very different from her silence in the conversations they have. The 
sound of her breath allows the sense of genuine presence, unlike a chosen silence or a 
chosen expression when she is awake. The sound of her breathing, which ‘n’a 
l’épaisseur ni de la parole ni du silence’ (RTP III, 621), is described as music which 
becomes ‘non pas seulement matériellement mais moralement […] le pur chant des 
Anges’ (RTP III, 621). What seems to be implied here, through the Narrator’s metaphor, 
is that music (in the sense of not having ‘semantics’) is not capable of lying, not at least 
in the same sense as linguistic expression. 
This quality might be partly explained by the way in which ambiguities and even 
contradictions can co-exist in harmony in music. One of the aspects from which the 
difference between musical and linguistic expressions can be approached, is exactly the 
degree to which they tolerate ambiguity. The way in which musical concepts are free 
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from referentiality that would aim at representation, and in this sense also remain 
without any kind of epistemic point of reference, may partly explain why music, as the 
Narrator later implies, can be considered as ‘la communication des âmes’ (RTP III, 672) 
– allowing multiple highly subjective interpretations to coexist simultaneously. As 
Daniel Barenboim notes, in music, unlike often in language, ambiguity does not lead to 
confusion:
In life outside music, ambiguity is not necessarily a positive attribute – it is often 
a sign of indecision [...] – but in the world of sound, ambiguity becomes a virtue 
by offering many different possibilities from which to proceed. Sound has the 
ability to make a link between all elements, so that no element is exclusively 
negative or positive. Through music, in fact, even suffering can be pleasurable. 
[...] In music [....] joy and sorrow exist simultaneously and therefore allow us to 
feel a sense of harmony.29
Literary language is of course different from everyday communication, but even a 
fictional or poetic text cannot escape the fact that ‘a book is full of the same words that 
are used every day, day after day, to explain, describe, demand, argue, beg, enthuse, tell 
the truth and lie.’30
The soothing sound of Albertine sleeping is occasionally disrupted when she talks in her 
sleep. The Narrator’s comment elucidates even further his suspicion towards the 
possibility of communicating with her through words: ‘Parfois même à cette musique, 
la voix humaine s’ajoutait. Albertine prononçait quelque mots. Comme j’aurais voulu en 
saisir le sens!’ (RTP III, 621, my emphasis) The sound shifts from ‘le pur chant des 
Anges’ to ‘la voix humaine’, and words interrupt the ‘communication of souls’ between 
the Narrator and his beloved by issuing him with the incessant task of interpretation. 
This example also points to the ‘double-edged sword’ quality of language and to the 
way it is, for the human mind, the ultimate means to construct and understand things 
from one’s own perspective – exactly because it issues one with the task of 
interpretation. What seems to be implied here once again is that language is never 
merely a means to mediate an experience or ‘make sense’ of it, but an integral part of 
the experience. 
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29 Barenboim, pp. 19-20 (my emphasis).
30 Barenboim, p. 3. I shall return to the specificity of literary expression later on in this chapter and further 
explore how it differs from ‘everyday language’ in Chapter Five.
There are several references in Proust, as we saw above, to a certain ambiguity and 
supernatural quality in musical ‘messages’, which allow us to share something in the 
space of ‘l’inanalysé’ (RTP III, 763). This takes us back to the question of what is being 
appropriated in the experience of (instrumental) music and is this appropriation in fact 
even possible without some kind of linguistic mediation? As mentioned earlier, music 
can of course also be considered as a ‘language’ in its own right, a system of signifiers, 
and a score can be approached as a ‘text’ written in notes, which then needs to be 
‘translated’ by someone who knows how to read them and performed by an artist for a 
non-musician to grasp. The fact that a piece always needs to be effectuated from its 
original form (the composer’s scores), makes music, in this sense, always a mediated 
experience to begin with, and thus also a shared one: what we hear when we listen to a 
piece is always already someone else’s interpretation of the composer’s work. This 
process in which (each) musician appropriates the piece when rehearsing and playing, 
and each listener does the same when listening, results in the co-existence of multiple 
layers of interpretation within the experience. 
The Septet passage emphasises the role of the performers who partake in the vital 
process of ‘translating’ the piece from scores into music and make it available for the 
audience. Having so far considered the Sonata for piano and violin as the only known 
piece of Vinteuil, the Narrator now learns that the new piece that is being played (the 
Septet) has been discovered and rendered into an intelligible form from the composer’s 
‘indéchiffrables’ scores by ‘la seule personne qui avait assez vécu auprès de Vinteuil 
pour bien connaître sa manière de travailler, pour deviner ses indications d’orchestre: 
l’amie de Mlle Vinteuil’ (RTP III, 765). Until now, Mlle Vinteuil’s friend has, in the 
Narrator’s mind, been solely attached to the traumatising Montjouvain scene and to the 
anxiety over her (possible) friendship with Albertine. Now, however, she is granted the 
role of a translator – and moreover, of a saviour – of the late Vinteuil’s scores.31 
This skill of Mlle Vinteuil’s friend allows the Narrator to think of her, for the first time, 
as not entirely corrupted, and, in this sense, art here functions as a form of redemption. 
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31 The Narrator’s reflections on Mlle Vinteuil in this new context are beautifully analysed by Adam Watt. 
See Watt, pp. 83-7.
The same applies to the Narrator’s comments on Morel, whose role is acclaimed in 
making his enjoyment of the Septet so intense, with a certain ‘qualité morale et 
supériorité intellectuelle’ which never seems to characterise his behaviour in life but 
which is present in the music when he plays:
Morel avait beau jouer merveilleusement, les sons que rendait son violon me 
parurent singulièrement perçants, presque criards. Cette âcreté plaisait et, comme 
dans certaines voix, on y sentait une sorte de qualité morale et de supériorité 
intellectuelle. Mais cela pouvait choquer. Quand la vision de l’univers se modifie, 
s’épure, devient plus adéquate au souvenir de la patrie intérieure, il est bien 
naturel que cela se traduise par une altération générale des sonorités chez le 
musicien comme de la couleur chez le peintre.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 761
Acknowledging the layers of interpretation that the musicians bring to the piece they are 
playing as an essential quality of the artwork and paralleling the musicians to painters, 
this passage presents performance as an act of creation rather than just mere mediation. 
As Charlus states at one point, ‘instructing’ Morel with the Fifteenth Quartet (assumedly  
by Beethoven): “Il faut jouer ça comme si vous le composiez” (RTP III, 398). 
These comments emphasise the idea that there are multiple layers not merely of 
interpretation but creation even that co-exist in music already when it first reaches the 
listener. Each of these different efforts that have gone into making the piece available 
for the audience add a layer of interpretation to it, and in this sense the piece does 
indeed become ‘la communication des âmes’ (RTP III, 763). The live music situation of 
course makes the layers of interpretation within the piece even more discernible. 
Listening to Vinteuil’s Septet, the Narrator seems to experience a sense of calm and 
some kind of mutual understanding in the presence of the other listeners, as if he was 
suddenly allowed to glimpse the ‘essence qualitative de sensations d’une autre’ – 
something he feels he could never obtain in conversation:
Des personnes plus agréables causèrent un moment avec moi. Mais qu’étaient 
leurs paroles, qui, comme toute parole humaine extérieure, me laissaient si 
indifférent, à côté de la céleste phrase musicale avec laquelle je venais de 
m’entretenir? [...] [J]e me demandais si la musique n’était pas l’exemple unique 
de ce qu’aurait pu être – s’il n’y avait pas eu l’invention du langage, la formation 
des mots, l’analyse des idées – la communication des âmes.
133
   A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 762-3 (my emphasis)
This remark manifests the Narrator’s growing suspicion of the chances for human 
language to succeed in interpersonal communication, he having encountered, as the 
readers of the Recherche know, countless failures of ‘la parole humaine extérieure’ by 
this point in the novel. However, we must note that the communication referred to here 
and contrasted with music is indeed ‘la parole humaine extérieure’ – language used in 
social communication. Acknowledging this allows us to remain hopeful regarding the 
potential of what might be described as ‘la parole intérieure’ in communicating 
meanings in as profound a way as music.32
Furthermore, considering the terms in which the Narrator expresses himself here, using 
the conditional (what music ‘aurait pu être’ ‘s’il n’y avait pas eu l’invention du 
langage’), we cannot deem the Narrator’s comment as altogether sceptical as to 
language’s communicative potential – particularly if we keep in mid the broader context 
of this experience within Proust’s novel, which describes these other aesthetic 
experiences (of music as well as visual art) in such an effectual way precisely through 
words, metaphors, and, indeed, through analysing ideas. Language does, in a way, seem 
to ‘colonise’ non-linguistic experiences, but also allows us to appropriate and reflect on 
these experiences in a different and a possibly more all-encompassing way.33 
Let us consider this difference further through an example from Albertine disparue in 
which language joins in with the experience of music. This happens when the Narrator 
hears a neighbour performing arias from Jules Massenet’s Manon after Albertine’s 
departure. Here the performer is not in the same physical space as the Narrator, which 
lessens the ‘performed’ dimension of the experience, making it more solitary and in this 
respect it also more like reading. Hearing the arias from afar, the Narrator seems to 
instantly focus on the linguistic dimension of the experience – that is, on the words and 
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32 In fact, in view of Proust’s novel, it often seems that language, as it constructs such a major part of our 
subjectivity, can never be genuinely universal (and thus never free from misinterpretation regarding 
communication with others). This proposition will be further explored in the last two chapters of this 
study.
33 It is also worth remembering that of course in Proust’s novel we only ever get to witness the mediation 
of musical experience through words, never the experience itself – and yet, it seems that it is precisely 
mediation that ultimately makes the Narrator’s experience his experience. 
the narrative: ‘J’appliquais leurs paroles que je connaissais à Albertine et à moi, et je fus 
rempli d’un sentiment si profond que je me mis à pleurer’ (RTP IV, 35).
The words from the libretto, especially the lines ‘Hélas, l’oiseau qui fuit ce qu’il croit 
l’esclavage/ le plus souvent, la nuit d’un vol désespéré revient battre au vitrage’ (RTP 
IV, 35), are immediately applied by the Narrator to Albertine and himself and to his 
current despair caused by her parting; it is obvious that these words affect the Narrator 
very differently from the ‘[la] parole humaine extérieure’ in social context which leaves 
the Narrator ‘si indifférent’ (RTP III, 762). The Narrator’s application of the lyrics here 
is not based on merely listening to the words but, in fact, also on remembering them (he 
refers to ‘leurs paroles que je connaissais’). Since he knows the lyrics already, this 
process of applying the words becomes a kind of reconstruction – a rereading – of the 
text, and thus also a kind of rereading of his own self (and his relationship to Albertine) 
in a new context. This example demonstrates the way in which literary language – 
poetic or narrative – may turn into communication with one’s own self and thus become 
a kind of ‘parole intérieure’.
The proposition that language is performative in itself, in the sense that its users are 
never merely recipients but always also interpreters and (re)creators, may shed some 
light on this process of appropriating linguistic expressions more wholly and 
immediately ‘taking the ownership’ of these expressions. The Manon passage illustrates 
this idea well, as the Narrator immediately applies the words and the narrative of the 
arias. Furthermore, it seems that the physical absence of the actual performer, the 
neighbour singing the arias, enhances the Narrator’s ability so promptly to ‘take the 
possession’ of the piece and apply it to his own relationship with Albertine. 
If we follow this line of thought, reading seems to become a kind of solitary equivalent 
of a performance. Kivy suggests this, describing reading as ‘the experience of “seeing” 
and “hearing” in the imagination [as] a theatrical production in the mind’.34 To explore 
this suggestion further, we may ask how does this experience differ from witnessing a 
text being performed on the stage, by actual actors. Proust’s novel offers us an account 
of such experience as well, in the context of the Narrator witnessing a much anticipated 
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performance of La Berma as Phèdre. For the rest of this chapter, let us consider how this 
experience differs, primarily due to the presence of language, from that of a musical 
performance on the one hand and of a solitary reading experience on the other.
4.4. ‘C’était de ces choses fameuses que mon imagination avait tant désirées’: The 
Narrator and La Berma
In the passages depicting the Narrator’s anticipation of La Berma’s performance and 
subsequently witnessing of the performance itself, the multiple layers of interpretation 
in the experience are viewed in a far less positive light than in the context of music. The 
Narrator’s familiarity with the play, Racine’s Phèdre, leads the Narrator here to compare 
it with his previous experience of solitary reading – a process during which he has 
produced a rival interpretation of the play in his mind.
The clash between the Narrator’s expectations and the ‘reality’ of the performance 
originates not only in his knowledge of the text but also in the way his imagination has 
embellished the adored Berma (whom he has only seen in photographs and posters):
La Berma dans Andromaque, dans Les Caprices de Marianne, dans Phèdre, 
c’était de ces choses fameuses que mon imagination avait tant désirées. [...] [M]on 
cœur battait quand je pensais, comme à la réalisation d’un voyage, que je les 
verrais enfin baigner effectivement dans l’atmosphère et l’ensoleillement de la 
voix dorée. Un Carpaccio à Venise, la Berma dans Phèdre, chefs-d’œuvre d’art 
pictural ou dramatique que le prestige qui s’attachait à eux rendait en moi si 
vivants, c’est-à-dire si indivisibles, que si j’avais été voir des Carpaccio dans une 
salle du Louvre ou la Berma dans quelque pièce dont je n’aurais jamais entendu 
parler, je n’aurais plus éprouvé le même étonnement délicieux d’avoir enfin les 
yeux ouverts devant l’objet inconcevable et unique de tant de milliers de mes 
rêves.
    A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 432-33
Interestingly, the theatrical performance is here discussed side by side with painting, 
and the knowledge of the piece that will be played is compared to a particular place and 
context to which a painting ‘belongs’. La Berma, for the Narrator, ‘belongs’ to Phèdre, 
in the same way that a painting by Carpaccio belongs to Venice. What is ironic here, of 
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course, is that when the Narrator finally sees La Berma in Phèdre, she does not quite 
seem to ‘belong’: the reality does not live up to his own ‘production’ of Racine’s 
Phèdre, created through reading, nor to the ideal Berma of his imagination.
The experience of La Berma’s performance appears to fit to the Narrator’s all-around 
pattern of expectation and disappointment that reoccurs throughout the novel with his 
experiences of love, society and places.35 In somewhat striking contrast to the other 
aesthetic experiences described in the Recherche, it leaves him with a serious sense of 
lack. As Hughes remarks, the Narrator’s attempt to evaluate La Berma’s performance is 
a good example of how ‘the self-doubt that is at the heart of his over-evaluation of 
established artists also comes to pervade his own artistic judgement.’36 The 
disappointment that the Narrator feels is, indeed, somehow doubly horrifying because 
he, at the time, believes it must originate in his own lack of intelligence or aesthetic 
taste.
In the experiences of visual art and (instrumental) music in the Recherche, perception 
through the senses comes first and the recreation through language follows. The 
experience of a play on stage provides the spectator with an interpretation of both the 
sensuous (aural and visual) and the linguistic dimensions of the artwork, which makes 
the presence of the other rather dominant in the experience and, consequently, seems to 
make it somewhat impenetrable for the Narrator. During the actual performance, he tries 
very hard to discern La Berma’s talent through his senses, considering ‘cet instant, salle, 
public, acteurs, pièce, et mon propre corps [...] comme un milieu acoustique n’ayant 
d’importance que dans la mesure où il était favorable aux inflexions de cette voix’ (JF, 
440). However, this does not seem to produce the desired effects and he remarks how
en même temps tout mon plaisir avait cessé; j’avais beau tendre vers la Berma 
mes yeux, mes oreilles, mon esprit, pour ne pas laisser échapper une miette des 
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35 For example in La Prisonnière (pp. 648-9 and 676-7) the Narrator makes similar remarks in discussing 
his dreams of Venice: ‘[C]es similitudes mêmes du désir et du voyage firent que je me promis de serrer un 
jour d’un peu plus près la nature de cette force invisible mais aussi puissante que les croyances, ou dans le 
monde physique la pression atmosphérique, qui portait si haut les cités, les femmes, tant que je ne les 
connaissais pas, et qui se dérobait plus triviale réalité.’ (RTP III, 677) Also, the moment of finally seeing 
the Balbec church in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs II lacks the anticipated tantalising effect on the 
senses; the Narrator, standing in front of the church, notes how ‘l’église [...] faisait un avec tout le reste, 
semblait un accident, un produit de cette fin d’après-midi’ (RTP II, 19, my emphasis).
36 Hughes, p. 66.
raisons qu’elle me donnerait de l’admirer, je ne parvenais pas à en recueillir une 
seule. [...] Je l’écoutais comme j’aurais lu Phèdre, ou comme si Phèdre, elle-
même avait dit en ce moment les choses que j’entendais, sans que le talent de la 
Berma semblât leur avoir rien ajouté. J’aurais voulu – pour pouvoir l’approfondir, 
pour tâcher d’y découvrir ce qu’elle avait de beau – arrêter, immobiliser 
longtemps devant moi chaque intonation de l’artiste, chaque expression de sa 
physionomie [...].
    A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 441 
The Narrator’s eyes and ears are not able to ‘immobilise’ the words, as the play on the 
stage keeps progressing and, indeed, seems to flee from him, availing him only a taste 
of all the pleasures that the gestures and tones of the adored artist might (assumedly) 
convey to him, if only he had more time to savour them. Especially interesting here is 
the comment ‘je l’écoutais comme j’aurais lu Phèdre,’ which manifests clearly the 
Narrator’s attempt, in his search for a true aesthetic gratification, to access the same 
kind of pleasure that the text has given to him in the solitary moments of reading. In 
these moments, he is able to stop, go back, digress and return to the text. Listening 
‘comme j’aurais lu Phèdre’ is impossible, however, as the performance on the stage 
proceeds, leaving the Narrator with a feeling that he cannot ‘keep up’ with the 
experience: ‘Mais que cette durée était brève! A peine un son était-il reçu dans mon 
oreille qu’il était remplacé par un autre.’ (RTP I, 441)
La Berma the actress becomes in a way invisible and inaudible on stage, and while such 
acting – where the thespian becomes indistinguishable from the role she is playing – 
would normally be considered as good acting, it leaves the Narrator deeply unsatisfied. 
It is not thus due to some incapability of his senses or his intellect to ‘take it all in’ that 
causes the Narrator’s disappointment, but rather his expectations of witnessing La 
Berma act – actually seeing and hearing the ‘acting’. The other, possibly even more 
compelling reason is that he is familiar with the play, and the ‘real’ Phèdre therefore 
(‘Phèdre elle-même’) for the Narrator is the Phèdre that he has created through his 
imagination whilst reading and which La Berma’s acting, no matter how brilliant, can 
never match. This example seems to further support Kivy’s proposition that reading is a 
kind of performance in its own right – not merely an interpretation in thought but one in 
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which the imagination vividly engages our senses as well, resulting in a kind of 
complete ‘production in the mind.’37 
 
This kind of clash between different interpretations seems to be absent from the 
performance of (instrumental) music, as we saw above in the context of the Narrator’s 
reflections on the Septet. Unlike within a performance of a text, music may allow us a 
perfect sense of harmony, with the music as well as the other members of the audience, 
because this kind of music is free in a way from intrinsic ‘content’ or meaning. What 
seems to connect the performances of drama and music in the Recherche however is 
that both these experiences, as performances, are to some extent restricted by temporal 
(as well as spatial) conditions. Music is described as ‘un être surnaturel et pur qui passe 
en déroulant son message invisible’ (RTP I, 342) and something which one can only 
love in ‘temps successifs’ and can never possess ‘toute entière’ (RTP I, 521), and with 
La Berma’s performance everything that happens on the stage, including the words that 
are articulated, seems to pass too fast.
This temporal element seems to be one aspect in which the experience that is 
effectuated by the other (that is, by a performer) falls short of the solitary reading 
experience: in a performance, there is no time to reflect, to drift away and then come 
back with the same kind of freedom as with a text. If we compare these examples of 
Manon and La Berma to reading, it is indirectly suggested that reading stimulates the 
powers of imagination more fully and completely somehow than any other experience 
and, because of this maximised role of imagination, becomes an experience which is 
truly and properly ours. 
This idea of a more thorough appropriation of an experience through language takes us 
back to the remarks on the ontology of a literary work of art that were made at the end 
of the previous chapter in the context of paintings – how a literary work really only 
exists through the reading process, which leaves less room for the presence of the other 
in the experience. The Narrator states that ‘la trouvaille du romancier a été d’avoir 
l’idée de remplacer ces parties impénétrables à l’âme par une quantité égale de parties 
immatérielles, c’est-à-dire que notre âme peut s’assimiler’ (RTP I, 84). These 
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immaterial elements in a text require the reader to recreate the text and allow the reader 
to fill them with his or her personal associations, thus also in a way, taking the 
ownership of what is being expressed with words. (It is this kind of appropriation that 
we also saw above in the Narrator’s experience of the lines from Manon.) As the 
Narrator puts it, ‘les émotions de ces êtres d’un nouveau genre [dans le texte] nous 
apparaissent comme vraies, puisque nous les avons faites nôtres, puisque c’est en nous 
qu’elles se produisent’ (RTP I, 84). 
While the process of reading seems to be slower in some ways and perhaps less 
immediately pleasing to our senses than the experience of visual art or music, the 
experience of reading does, for these very reasons, seem to hold a specific potential to 
reveal to us something about the way we become ourselves. Reading ‘en soi-
même’ (RTP IV, 610) and the kind of gradual layering of meaning is a process which 
parallels to the way the multiple layers of time, experience and reality become 
embodied in us. In the last part of this study, I focus on the suggestion that the reading 
process may provide the readers with a more profound understanding of the nature of 
‘la réalité’ and enable, in a unique way, communication with one’s own self. 
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PART III
‘LES PROPRES LECTEURS D’EUX-MEMES’ 
All night I sat reading a book,
Sat reading as if in a book
Of sombre pages.
It was autumn and falling stars
Covered the shrivelled forms
Crouched in the moonlight. [...]
The sombre pages bore no print
Except the trace of burning stars
In the frosty heaven.
– Wallace Stevens, ‘The Reader’1
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5. ‘Lire d'une certaine façon pour bien lire’: Literary Communication and 
Different Modes of Reading 
At the beginning of this study I raised the question of what is ‘other’ to literature. I have 
considered the relationship between philosophy and literature in Part One and the 
experience of other art forms in Part Two. In this final part, I discuss literature’s 
communicative possibilities by examining different modes of reading in the Recherche 
and the heightened role of impressions in enabling one to ‘bien lire en soi-même’ (RTP 
IV, 610). In Chapter Six I revisit the relation between immediate and mediated 
experience and discuss in more detail literature’s potential to enhance our self-
understanding, through the Narrator’s seemingly paradoxical proposition that the 
readers can become ‘les propres lecteurs d’eux-mêmes’ through someone else’s text.
The concept of ‘literary communication’, first of all, brings us back to the question that 
was posed in Chapter Two of what is meant by ‘literary’. I suggested that instead of 
defining a literary experience simply on the basis of what types of texts are being read, 
it seems more worthwhile to approach literary experiences and their possible 
implications in life by considering the modes of reading instead. Indeed, as we will see 
shortly, ‘literariness’ in view of Proust’s novel seems to have more to do with the nature 
of the reader’s experience than with specific textual genres, or the style, 
form,‘operational’ or historical context of the texts. We may in fact ask whether genre, 
instead of being something which fundamentally shapes the way we read, is a mere 
precursory construction which is bound to be dismantled and recreated within the 
reading experience. 
The different reading modes in Proust’s novel seem to fall into two main categories: 
‘instrumental’ reading and aesthetic reading. By instrumental mode I refer to the kind of 
reading which serves a purpose and is carried out in search of something other than 
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mere aesthetic pleasure. I approach this mode by analysing three examples from 
Proust’s novel, each of which represents a different subcategory of instrumental reading 
(some of which still have aesthetic elements as well). First, I consider an ethical mode 
of reading through the reading of Mme de Sévigné by the Narrator’s grandmother and 
mother. The second type is a kind of intermediary mode between ethical, social and 
aesthetic, in which literary references function as a code and offer a mutual plane for 
communication without pre-established ties; an example of this kind of use of literature 
appears in somewhat surprising conversation between the Narrator and Jupien in Le 
Temps retrouvé. Thirdly, I consider the type of instrumental reading that involves the 
use of art and literature as ‘social currency’.
The aesthetic mode of reading, in contrast to these instrumental modes, can be regarded 
as a more or less disinterested, recreational activity, which has no particular objectives 
and which does not search for any particular justification outside itself. In this mode, the 
readers are not asked to consider (judge or praise) the text as a work of art outside 
themselves but simply ‘dire si c’est bien cela, si les mots qu’ils lisent en eux-mêmes 
sont bien ceux que [l’écrivain a] écrits’ (RTP IV, 610). It is through this kind of 
approach that texts seem to be able to become ‘[l]es verres grossissants’, furnishing the 
reader with ‘le moyen de lire en eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610). Such a mode of reading can 
of course also be regarded as motivated in the sense that it can, as Proust’s novel 
implies, help us to understand ourselves better. Yet it cannot be considered as strictly 
‘instrumental’, as these desired effects are not attainable deliberately but rather through 
impressions the text yields to us and which may disclose to us unmarked aspects of our 
experiences in-the-world.
Before moving on to the examples of different modes of reading in Proust, it is worth 
briefly considering the concept of ‘literary communication’ in comparison to ‘everyday 
communication’ (such as conversation and letters). One of the most obvious and most 
crucial characteristics of literary communication is that it starts in solitude, in the act of 
reading. In her book The Syllables of Time, Teresa Whitington discusses Proust’s take 
on John Ruskin’s ideas of reading as conversation and suggests that while Proust does 
not reject Ruskin’s idea of reading as exchange of ideas, he finds the term 
‘conversation’ unacceptable, since ‘reading is a phenomenon which cannot be conveyed 
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in terms of orality’1. Instead, in ‘Journeés de lecture’, Proust proposes that reading is an 
act of communication which takes place in solitude: 
[C]e qui diffère essentiellement entre un livre et un ami, ce n’est pas leur plus ou 
moins grande sagesse, mais la manière dont on communique avec eux, la lecture, 
au rebours de la conversation, consistant pour chacun de nous à recevoir 
communication d’une autre pensée, mais tout en restant seul, c’est-à dire en 
continuant à jouir de la puissance intellectuelle qu’on a dans la solitude et que la 
conversation dissipe immédiatement, en continuant à pouvoir être inspiré, à rester 
en plein travail fécond de l’esprit sur lui-même.2
The suggestion that we can communicate with ‘une autre pensée’ better ‘tout en restant 
seul’ seems peculiar at first. This proposition, however, arises from the idea that the 
communication with ‘une autre pensée’ in reading is freer from the restrictions of time 
and place and the social codes of practice which characterise conversation. These 
restrictions, Proust believes, affect our ‘puissance intellectuelle’, which does not only to 
suffer from the physical presence of the other but occasionally seems, in fact, to get 
discharged altogether.3 Noteworthy here is that the Narrator does not claim reading to 
be communication with the other per se, but, in fact, with ‘une autre pensée’.
The distinction that gets underlined in the Recherche is not just that between oral and 
written communication, however, but between communication in everyday life and 
communication through art. In everyday contexts, various kinds of texts, especially 
letters, get misread, often due to the reader’s lack of knowledge of the other, or even 
indeed, of their own self. For example, Swann does not see Odette’s first letter as a 
calculated attempt at seduction because he is already in love with her, and the Narrator 
is incapable of reading Charlus’s presents (one of which comes with a card with forget-
144
1 Whitington, p. 5. Whitington’s attention to reading as a psychological phenomenon and its function as a 
source of communication for the Narrator is engaging; however, this communicative potential of reading 
is in her book primarily regarded as a window to communication with other people, as something which 
facilitates one’s understanding of the social and spatial-temporal surroundings in which the reading takes 
place.
2 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, p. 174.
3 Michael R. Finn has explored the connections between Proust’s neuraesthenia – ‘that fin de-siecle 
chronic fatigue syndrome’– and the writer’s work. Finn suggests that Proust’s suspicion towards orality 
and the invasiveness of speech is greatly due to the way that ‘the physical presence of others seems to 
have had a particularly jangling effect on the Proustian psyche’ and that ‘a kind of nervous absenteeism 
[...] came over [Proust] when he was in presence of someone he admired.’ Michael R. Finn, Proust, the 
Body and Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 66.
me-nots pictured on it – a coded messages in itself that the Narrator fails to grasp) as a 
sign of seduction until after his discovery of the Baron’s homosexuality. Similarly, the 
Narrator fails to recognise the true origin of the telegram through which Albertine is 
‘raised from the dead’ because he finds it so hard to believe she is really gone.
Some critics, such as Paul de Man and Philip Bailey, have emphasised the limits of all 
communication in Proust, including the communication through art, and I will engage 
with such criticism, particularly Bailey’s criticism of the communicative potential of 
literature, at the end of this chapter. It is true that according to Proust’s Narrator, it is 
possible to read in a ‘wrong’ way and to ‘misread’ in art as well, and it is not clear 
whether art’s rewards remain momentary, fragile and fugitive.4 However, as we saw in 
the context of paintings, music and performance in Part Two of this study, aesthetic 
experiences in Proust still allow one to approach the other in a somewhat more genuine 
and fruitful way than everyday communication does (even though aesthetic 
communication does not, of course, still count as a relationship per se with that other). 
In this chapter I analyse some reading-related passages in the Recherche and propose 
that while the aesthetic experience is not portrayed as an incontrovertibly ‘redeeming’ 
activity in Proust, it nevertheless plays a crucial role in the Proustian process of self-
understanding – the process which seems to become available to us only by entering 
into communication with ‘une autre pensée, mais tout en restant seul’.5
Considering this suggested ‘redemptive’ potential of a literary work, the question of 
why and how we read becomes essential. For the Narrator, the reading of literature is 
primarily an aesthetic, solitary, ‘self-revelatory’ process, which is recreational in two 
senses of the word.6 As it is not something he does in search of a particular aim or 
result, the act of reading seems to avail to him ‘essences’, the kinds of truths which, 
were one to attempt to explain logically, descriptively and exhaustively, would remain 
unintelligible. The Narrator’s experience demonstrates how truths that can be disclosed 
in the reading process are not truths of ‘intelligence’ or logic planted there consciously 
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4 I shall discuss some examples of ‘faulty’ modes of reading in section 5.3. below.
5 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, p. 174.
6 In Chapter Six, I explore the question of what this kind of mode of reading eventually brings the 
Narrator in life, examining the relation between the ‘aesthetic’ reading of literature and ‘being oneself’.
by an authorial figure or voice. Rather, as the Narrator concludes in Le Temps retrouvé, 
the ultimate work of art, ‘notre seul livre’ (RTP IV, 458) is something which already 
exists within us and through which we read. Before examining the Narrator’s theory in 
more detail, I analyse different practices and outcomes of ‘instrumental’ reading – the 
reading of literary texts with a motivation or an aim beyond aesthetic pleasure – through 
examples of the Narrator’s mother and grandmother, Jupien, and a young valet in the 
Narrator’s apartment in Paris.
5.1. ‘Pas [la] Sévigné de tout le monde’: Mme de Sévigné as a Vade Mecum for the 
Narrator’s Grandmother and Mother
The committed way in which the Narrator’s grandmother and mother read the Mme de 
Sévigné correspondence, interweaving the text into their interpersonal real-life 
communication, plays a significant role in what is one of the few successful 
relationships presented in Proust’s novel. The function of Mme de Sévigné’s letters is 
one dimension of ‘literary communication’ in Proust which has not yet been 
exhaustively studied; Roland Barthes mentions the function of Mme de Sévigné 
references in the Recherche, and Elisabeth Ladenson examines the idea of ‘mother-
worship’ in view of these references in her article ‘The law of the mother: Proust and 
Madame de Sévigné’.7 More remains to be said, however, about the Sévigné letters as a 
prime example of a text which affords different readings within the narrative and 
illustrates the versatility of the literary experience. 
The way these letters are read outside their original context (a correspondence between 
two historical personae) also shows how non-fictional texts can be read aesthetically 
and ‘used’ creatively.8 Mme de Sévigné (1626–1696) was a French aristocrat and lady 
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7 See Barthes, Le Plaisir du texte, p. 107; Elisabeth Ladenson, ‘The law of the mother: Proust and 
Madame de Sévigné’, The Romanic Review, Vol. 85 (1994), pp. 91-112 . 
8 In any discussion concerning the ‘authenticity’ of these texts, one should keep in mind that the 
collection of the letters the grandmother and the mother so devotedly study is in fact an outcome of a 
careful selection and editing process by Mme de Sévigné’s granddaughter. Also, parts of Mme de 
Sévigné’s correspondence were published already during her lifetime, so in her later years she was aware 
of this semi-public nature of the letters which must have had an impact on her writing; therefore, the 
attempt to track down the ‘true’ Sévigné from these letters would be rather precarious in the first place. 
See e.g. Michèle Longino Farrell, Performing Motherhood: the Sévigné correspondence (Hanover; 
London: University Press of New England, c1991), pp. 146-50.
of letters, whose correspondence with her daughter and friends was edited and 
published by her granddaughter in the eighteenth century. These letters are renowned 
for their textual and stylistic merits, as well as their socio-historic value, as they give a 
vivid account of the life of the French aristocracy in the seventeenth century, while also 
portraying the close relationship between Mme de Sévigné and her daughter.
In Proust, the Sévigné letters are devotedly read and quoted by the Narrator’s 
grandmother and mother both in their speech and in letters they write.9 Their fascination 
with these letters stems from their communicative finesse and their portrayal of an ideal 
mother-daughter relationship. Their devotion to the Sévigné correspondence is so 
comprehensive, in fact, that at times it seems almost as if they are ‘acting out’ the 
relationship of their literary models in their own relationship. Ladenson, discussing the 
way the Narrator’s mother and grandmother use Mme de Sévigné, proposes that the 
function of these letters in Proust as a kind of model for mother-worship in the 
Recherche: ‘Sévigné is read and quoted by the grandmother and mother with every 
appearance of scriptural fidelity and evangelical zeal; her letters to her daughter form a 
peculiarly maternal Bible in the novel, maternal by virtue of both content and context.’10 
For the two women, the Sévigné text thus functions as a kind of vade mecum – a source 
of ethical values and a model for good communication – and in this sense their reading 
is always motivated. 
This ethically driven mode is at work also with other texts they read, and on several 
occasions, the mother and the grandmother try to inculcate in the Narrator their own 
mode of reading. One example of such (at least attempted) communication – or, rather, 
inculcation – through literature takes place at the end of the ‘drame du coucher,’ when 
the Narrator’s mother eventually stays the night in his room and reads to him George 
Sand’s François le Champi, which the Narrator has received as a gift from the 
grandmother. The mother, reading to her young son, moulds the text into more 
‘suitable’ form: ‘quand c’était maman qui me lisait à haute voix [...] elle passait toutes 
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9 For example when the Narrator is about to embark on his first journey to Balbec with his grandmother 
and is saying goodbye to his mother at the station, the mother tries to alleviate his anxiety by alluding to 
Sévigné, not only by quoting her directly, but through the grandmother: ‘Citons Madame de Sévigné, 
comme ta grand-mère: “Je vais être obligée de me servir de tout le courage que tu n’as pas.”’ (RTP II, 11, 
my emphasis).
10 Ladenson, p. 96.
les scènes d’amour’ (RTP I, 41). She reads beautifully and expressively, and yet her act 
of reading is guided by her own reading mode, prone to and aimed at ethical elucidation 
rather than mere aesthetic pleasure. 
However, already in these instances, what literature seems to evoke in the Narrator is 
primarily his imagination and his aesthetic consciousness rather than his moral 
conscience – the tendency which is only to be reinforced once he starts reading more 
(and especially when he starts reading prose fiction) on his own. The Narrator notices 
whenever the mother skips passages in the book but still enjoys the experience and finds 
it, above all, aesthetically pleasing: ‘Si ma mère était une lectrice infidèle c’était aussi, 
pour les ouvrages où elle trouvait l’accent d’un sentiment vrai, une lectrice admirable 
par le respect et la simplicité de l’interprétation, par la beauté et la douceur du 
son’ (RTP I, 41). While reading here is a kind of performance, the Narrator’s closeness 
to the ‘performer’ – the private nature and the emotional intensity of the situation – 
makes this experience very different from both reading by oneself and the Narrator’s 
experience of other more public ‘performances’ (in the theatre and in soirées) later on in 
the novel. 
One of the grandmother’s attempts to ‘develop’ her grandson’s character through 
literature takes place in the beginning of A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs II, when 
they travel to Balbec for the first time. Before the departure of the train, in order to calm 
his nerves and alleviate the anxiety caused by change of circumstances and saying 
goodbye to his beloved mother, the Narrator has, according to his doctor’s orders, 
gulped down a beer. The grandmother is not too pleased about this, and when her 
slightly inebriated grandson gets very verbose, she suggests he should try to sleep for a 
while. When he protests, she says ‘Si tu ne peux pas dormir, lis quelque chose’ (RTP II, 
13) and hands him the Lettres de Mme de Sévigné. 
The grandmother’s ‘read something’ here of course means ‘read Mme de Sévigné’ and 
serves as an example of the grandmother’s subtle attempts to shape her grandson’s 
character through the kind of literature that resonates with her own ethical attitudes and 
awareness. In the passage that follows, we see how the Narrator welcomes the text but 
not the mode: his reading of Mme de Sévigné differs remarkably from that of the 
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grandmother and the mother: ‘[D]éjà cet après-midi là, dans ce wagon, en relisant la 
lettre où apparaît le clair de lune […], je fus ravi par ce que j’eusse appelé un peu plus 
tard (ne peint-elle pas les paysages de la même façon que lui les caractères?) le côté 
Dostoïevski des Lettres de Madame de Sévigné’ (RTP II, 14). The Narrator’s focus is 
clearly on the aesthetic dimension of the text, on the sensuous and visual aspects that 
the text evokes.11 
Here we see how the Narrator’s aesthetic fascination with literature, in which 
impression and sensation gradually override philosophical and intellectual contents, 
produces a relationship to these texts which is very different from the more ethical 
mode of the mother and the grandmother. Thus, the Sévigné letters in Proust function as 
a kind of peculiar intermediary between ‘purely’ artistic texts and those which are 
(originally) aimed at interpersonal communication. It is through these different modes 
of reading that the multiple after-lives of the Sévigné text become possible, when the 
text, through its readers, gains distance from its original context. From this aspect, the 
mother’s ‘material’ attachment to the dead grandmother’s copy of Sévigné is intriguing 
and takes us back to the discussion about the ontology of a textual work. 
The difference between a literary work as an object and the way it is perceived has been 
explored for example by Barthes in his essay ‘De l’œuvre au texte’, who views ‘Le 
Texte’ as ‘un champ méthodologique,’ while ‘l’œuvre [est] un fragment de substance 
[qui] occupe une portion de l’espace des livres (par exemple dans une bibliothèque)’.12 
Such a distinction seems to be partly challenged by the way the mother and 
grandmother ‘employ’ the Sévigné letters, however, in the sense that while the Sévigné 
texts become ‘un champ méthodologique’ for the mother and the grandmother, it still 
retains some meaning as a material object as well. After the grandmother’s death, these 
two dimensions of the work seem to become rather inseparable for the Narrator’s 
mother who regards her mother’s copy of the Sévigné letters not only as a sacred 
memento but almost as a kind of emblem of their loving relationship. 
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12 Roland Barthes, ‘De l’œuvre au texte’ in Œuvres complètes, Tome II, 1966-1973 (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 
1212.
The mother’s attachment to the particular copy of the text does not of course originate 
in the object per se but rather follows a kind of logic of a holy relic: the book becomes 
so valuable because it has belonged to the beloved mother and because of the way the 
text has been interwoven into their relationship. For the devoted daughter, this copy 
becomes the authentic book which she ‘n’eût pas changé contre le manuscrit même des 
Lettres’ (RTP III, 166). It is equivocal whether the book is in fact discussed primarily as 
‘un champ méthodologique’ or as an object here. However, this example seems to imply  
that the separation between ‘le Texte’ and ‘l’œuvre’ is not by any means a 
straightforward one: the portrayal of the reading experience in Proust in general, and in 
the context of the Sévigné text in particular, shows how a merging of the text into the 
life of the reader does not merely happen in the domain which our mind operates, but 
how the appropriation of a text is always also attached to the sensuous, bodily, material 
and ‘tangible’ world as well. 
In its multiple manifestations, this Sévigné dimension of the grandmother and the 
mother’s relationship implies that in Proust there definitely is ‘hors-texte’ – that texts 
can and do exist ‘outside themselves’ in the sense of being interwoven into the life of 
their readers in various ways. In view of the grandmother and mother’s ‘adaptations’ of 
Sévigné, it seems that what they extract from their experience of reading is much more 
than the semantic contents of the text or a model for communication; the two women do 
not simply copy their literary models – Mme de Sévigné and her daughter – but, in fact, 
seem to be using their appropriation of the text as a form of self-creation. Approaching 
the uses of the Sévigné text in Proust from a strictly textually-oriented viewpoint would 
allow neither the interpersonal aspects nor these self-revelatory ones to be fully 
explored, nor would such an approach be able to explain why the Sévigné text is read in 
such a different way by these two women and the Narrator. The Sévigné dimension is 
one of the features in Proust’s novel which calls for a hermeneutic and 
phenomenological practice – an approach which refuses the strict distinction between 
the textual universe and that of the reader-subject.
The way the text takes prominence in the relationship between the two women is not, 
however, presented in an indubitably positive light – even if theirs is one of the few 
relationships in the novel which seems genuinely ‘successful’ and harmonious. The 
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following passage, in which the Narrator observes his mother’s behaviour after the 
grandmother’s death, exemplifies the more sinister effects of the Sévigné legacy:
Non seulement ma mère ne pouvait se séparer du sac de ma grand-mère, devenu 
plus précieux que s'il eût été de saphirs et de diamants, de son manchon, de tous 
ces vêtements qui accentuaient encore la ressemblance d'aspect entre elles deux, 
mais même des volumes de Mme de Sévigné que ma grand-mère avait toujours 
avec elle, exemplaires que ma mère n'eût pas changés contre le manuscrit même 
des Lettres.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 166-7
The Narrator’s mother starts imitating her dead mother after her passing, reading her 
books on the beach and even wearing her clothes, as well as constantly quoting both the 
grandmother and Mme de Sévigné in her letters and speech. As Elisabeth Ladenson 
points out, ‘the hero’s mother in the Recherche deals with the grandmother’s death by 
assuming her identity, and it is no accident that that identity is centrally articulated 
through citations of Sévigné’s letters to her daughter.’13 Even though the mother’s 
behaviour originates in her ceaseless appreciation, love and respect for her mother and 
in the deep pain of having lost her, it does not seem exactly healthy or rewarding.
One of her ways of paying homage to her mother is to quote Mme de Sévigné in the 
way she would have done, while despising the ‘Sévigné de tout le monde’ (RTP III, 
236) – the more widely spread and clichéd quotations from the Lettres. This example 
underscores the element of personalised reading, which makes the usage of the text a 
kind of exclusive code between the two women. This aspect of the grandmother’s 
Sévigné legacy is further illustrated in the way the mother’s quotations produce feelings 
of exclusion in the Narrator. When he reads his mother’s letters, they, while addressed 
to him, markedly follow the pattern of communication established between the two 
women: he remarks how ‘dans chacune des trois lettres que je reçus de maman avant 
son arrivée à Balbec, elle me cita Mme de Sévigné, comme si ces trois lettres eussent 
été non pas adressées par elle à moi, mais par ma grand-mère adressées à elle’ (RTP III, 
167).
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It must also be noted, however, that the Narrator himself refuses the mode that the two 
women employ (and subtly try to inculcate in him), and it is partly because of his 
refusal or incapacity to read in this way that the sphere of experience shared by the two 
women remains inaccessible to him. This does not mean, however, that he would fail to 
take pleasure in the Sévigné letters altogether; he simply approaches them differently, 
through a more aesthetically focalised way of reading, which I shall discuss shortly – 
possibly partly as a reaction to the feelings of exclusion from his mother and 
grandmother’s code.
While the case of the mother and the grandmother represents an interweaving of literary 
texts into a close personal relationship, Proust’s novel also shows examples of different 
kinds of literary code-sharing, where the references to a mutually known text 
unexpectedly offer a platform for communication in a far less established relationship. 
One of these instances is a conversation that takes place in Le Temps retrouvé between 
the Narrator and Jupien. Whereas the grandmother and mother’s code embodies a strong 
ethical element and the sharing of mutual values, in the following example, it seems 
almost as if in the conversation between the Narrator and Jupien the literary code frees 
the discussion of any moral dimension, which might obstruct the communication if the 
matter at hand – Jupien’s sadomasochistic brothel – was addressed in a more 
straightforward way. 
5.2. Code-sharing: ‘C’est mon Sésame à moi’
After witnessing the self-inflicted abuse of Charlus in Jupien’s brothel, the Narrator 
feels inclined to make Jupien aware of what he has seen. This short passage describing 
the Narrator’s relationship to Jupien offers a peculiar example of the communicative 
potential of literary references: while the references to literature here do not necessarily 
function as a means of communication per se, they do provide a profitable platform for 
communication, facilitating a discussion of a somewhat difficult topic. The Narrator 
first implies what he has witnessed by referring to Les Mille et Une nuits:
‘En attendant, dis-je à Jupien, cette maison est tout autre chose, plus qu’une 
maison de fous, puisque la folie des aliénés qui y habitent est mise en scène, 
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reconstituée, visible. C’est un vrai pandemonium. J’avais cru, comme le calife des 
Mille et une Nuits, arriver à point au secours d’un homme qu’on frappait, et c’est 
un autre conte des Mille et une Nuits que j’ai vu réaliser devant moi, celui où une 
femme, transformée en chienne, se fait frapper volontairement pour retrouver sa 
forme première.’ 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 411
The Narrator’s euphemisms immediately reveal to Jupien that the Narrator must have 
seen the Baron being beaten: ‘Jupien paraissait fort troublé par mes paroles, car il 
comprenait que j’avais vu frapper le baron.’ (RTP IV, 411) Despite seeming troubled by 
this revelation at first, Jupien swiftly picks up the code and continues the conversation, 
now himself referring to Les Mille et Une nuits, as well as to the title of Ruskin’s 
Sésame et les lys which he has undoubtedly come across at Charlus’s house: 
‘Vous parlez de bien des contes des Mille et Une Nuits, me dit-il. Mais j’en 
connais un qui n’est pas sans rapport avec le titre d’un livre que je crois avoir 
aperçu chez le baron (il faisait allusion à une traduction de Sésame et les lys, de 
Ruskin, que j’avais envoyée à M. de Charlus). Si jamais vous étiez curieux, un 
soir, de voir, je ne dis pas quarante, mais une dizaine de voleurs, vous n’avez qu’à 
venir ici; pour savoir si je suis là vous n’avez qu’à regarder là-haut, je laisse ma 
petite fenêtre ouverte et éclairée, cela veut dire que je suis venu, qu’on peut entrer; 
c’est mon Sésame à moi. Je dis seulement Sésame. Car pour les Lys, si c’est eux 
que vous voulez, je vous conseille d’aller les chercher ailleurs.’
         
       A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 411-2
At first, Jupien’s references seem like a slightly comical extension of the Narrator’s 
euphemism, and while his response manifests blazing ability to swiftly and cunningly 
adapt to the Narrator’s code, it seems unlikely that he has actually read Ruskin or even 
necessarily Les Mille et Une nuits. The role of reading literary texts must not be 
overemphasised here, since the references in the actual code Jupien uses are in fact quite 
generic, and with Ruskin’s Sésame et les lys, it is only really the title of the book which 
feeds into Jupien’s ‘code’.14
However, what follows is the Narrator’s somewhat surprising commentary on Jupien’s 
character, in which he deems Jupien one of the most intelligent and sensitive men he 
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14 However, we have to keep in mind this conversation is mediated through the Narrator, and these 
remarks by the Narrator might also be just another example of his patronising behaviour, assuming that 
Jupien could not have read the actual text.
knows, and suggests this intelligence does not originate in education or social class but 
simply Jupien’s ‘natural’ sensitivity to what is beautiful in language: 
C’était son simple sens inné, son goût naturel, qui de rares lectures faites au 
hasard, sans guide, à des moments perdus, lui avaient fait composer ce parler si 
juste où toutes les symétries du langage se laissaient découvrir et montraient leur 
beauté.
    
   A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 416-17 (my emphasis)
The Narrator believes that it is due to these qualities that Jupien has managed to extract 
a lot from the texts he has come across and read ‘au hasard [et] sans guide’ during his 
life. The emphasis that the Narrator here places on the form of Jupien’s speech is 
another indication of how Jupien’s use of literary references above cannot be taken 
simply as a humorous ciphering or euphemism used to embellish his dubious business 
attempts. Jupien’s literary codes are not merely based on the contents of what he has 
read, but the reading of literature, according to the Narrator, has affected Jupien’s entire 
way of speaking, in which ‘toutes les symétries du langage se laissaient découvrir et 
montraient leur beauté’ and, in this particular case, equipped him with appropriate 
metaphors. 
The code which the Narrator and Jupien share is not exactly an established one, as the 
literary texts referred to are not in any way diffused into their interpersonal relationship. 
Rather, these references provide an unbiased and (possibly morally) freer space for 
exchanging messages – a space where a certain dialogue between fiction and reality can 
take place. This passage may also be read as further evidence of how a fictional text can 
hold truths precisely because of the unique position in which it situates its reader – or 
rather, refuses to situate him or her. Although in a much less determined way than in the 
relationship between the mother and the grandmother, this exchange between Jupien 
and the Narrator seems to point to literature’s communicative value in life.
From the viewpoint of different reading modes, then, the Narrator’s remarks about 
Jupien’s ‘sens inné’ suggests that Jupien’s receptiveness is not (only) a result of reading 
literature but in fact something much more innate. This passage implies that there is 
such a thing as a ‘goût naturel’ which is independent from the reader’s educational and 
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social background and that the mere reading of literature does not magically transform 
us into something we were not before, but rather that the reading process can enhance 
some aspects of our character that might otherwise remain hidden or dormant. In this 
respect, reading seems to become a kind of intersection of the inner qualities of a person 
and the way he or she is in the world, which prompts us to ask whether it is this ‘sens 
inné’ that actually determines one’s reading mode.15 
The emphasis that the Narrator here places on ‘sens inné’ and ‘goût naturel’ in the 
reading process also indirectly suggests that the lack of such qualities may result in 
what might be regarded as less valuable or less profound ways of reading. This is 
another topic in relation to which we must keep in mind the inner inconsistencies of 
Proust’s novel and draw a distinction between the writer-Narrator in Le Temps retrouvé 
and the younger Narrator-protagonist who is keen to observe and describe what he 
considers as ‘misuse’ of art, such as the public display of one’s aesthetic preferences as 
a purported manifestation of one’s aesthetic sophistication, taste and sensitivity, done (at 
least in part) in order to obtain some social recognition. Next, I examine some such 
manifestations in the novel, before moving on to examine the Narrator’s own mode of 
reading and the writer-Narrator’s suggested ‘moyen de bien lire’ at the end of the 
Recherche.
5.3. ‘Les célibataires de l’art’ and ‘les lecteurs naïfs’
Examples of over-enthusiastic but ‘unfertilised’ approaches to art surface in many of the 
societal scenes in the Recherche. The Narrator, discussing these numerous showy lovers 
of art, remarks how they ‘n’extraient rien de leur impression [et] vieillissent inutiles et 
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15 It must be noted here that ‘innate’ in Proust is never a simple term: most often it refers to something 
concealed, something which surfaces only occasionally and often surprisingly in the ways in which 
people look, speak or behave. A good example is the ‘innate nobility’ and gracefulness of Saint-Loup. 
Saint-Loup’s nobility only truly manifests itself to the Narrator in the instances such as Robert’s dance 
across tables under the electric wires in a restaurant – an act which he performs just in order to fetch his 
sickly friend’s overcoat because the room is chilly – or the way he throws his own overcoat on the 
Narrator’s shoulders when they are out driving in Balbec. As the Narrator puts it: ‘A retrouver toujours en 
lui [Saint-Loup] cet être antérieur, séculaire, cet aristocrate que Robert aspirait justement à ne pas être, 
j’éprouvais une vive joie, mais d’intelligence, non d’amitié. Dans l’agilité morale et physique qui donnait 
tant de grâce à son amabilité, dans l’aisance avec laquelle il offrait sa voiture à ma grand-mère et l’y 
faisait monter, dans son adresse à sauter du siège quand il avait peur que j’eusse froid, pour jeter son 
propre manteau sur mes épaules...’ (RTP II, 96).
insatisfaits, comme des célibataires de l’art’ (RTP IV, 470). The failure of these 
enthusiasts, according to the Narrator, is their inability to seize the aesthetic impression 
and unveil some of its mystery by connecting it to their own life experiences. It is due to 
this failure that they remain ‘barren’, never truly consummating their relationship with 
art. 
Another failure of these ‘célibataires’ is their proneness to use their alleged knowledge 
of artworks as social currency. Mme Verdurin is a prime example of a character who 
throughout the novel parades her aesthetic preferences and ‘sensitivity’ in social 
situations. While Mme Verdurin does seem to possess some kind of true sense for talent 
(recognising, for example, Rachel’s innovative way of performing and supporting her 
artistic career at the end of the novel), the reader of Proust’s novel cannot be sure, any 
more than the Narrator can, whether her theatrical displays of emotions during concerts 
for example are genuine or not.16 The way she uses her ‘sensitivity’ and her self-
advocated aesthetic superiority as a means to promote her societal position and look 
down on others – such as the poor Saniette who trembles ‘comme une recrue devant un 
sergent tourmenteur’ (RTP III, 324) when questioned by the Verdurins about his 
experiences of plays – does, however, imply a somewhat gross misuse of art. 
It is not just in the world of the Guermantes or the Verdurins, however, that people use 
art as an ‘embellishment’ of their social character. In Le Côté de Guermantes II, the 
Narrator discusses the reading habits of the young valet in his apartment in Paris, who is 
keen on borrowing books from their library. The young valet attempts to impress his 
peers in the countryside and distinguish himself as an urban sophisticate by inserting 
quotes from famous poems into his letters to his friends back home. For his letters, the 
valet chooses ‘[les] chose[s] connue[s] de tout le monde’ from the poems and, as the 
Narrator somewhat cruelly remarks, ‘bien qu’écrivant à ces paysans dont il escomptait 
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16 In La Prisonnière, for example, the Narrator observes how it is impossible to tell whether she is crying 
or asleep as she hides her head in her hands. When Mme Verdurin states ‘Je n’ai rien contre Vinteuil; à 
mon sens, c’est le plus grand musicien du siècle, seulement je ne peux pas écouter ces machines-là sans 
cesser de pleurer un instant,’ the Narrator notes how ‘elle ne disait nullement “pleurer” d’un air 
pathétique, elle aurait dit d’un air aussi naturel “dormir”; certaines méchantes langues prétendaient même 
que ce dernier verbe eût été plus vrai, personne ne pouvant, du reste, décider, car elle écoutait cette 
musique-là la tête dans ses mains, et certains bruits ronfleurs pouvaient, après tout, être des 
sanglots.’ (RTP III, 745-6).
la stupéfaction, il entremêlait ses propres réflexions de vers de Lamartine, comme il eût 
dit: qui vivra verra, ou même: bonjour.’ (RTP II, 617-18) 
The question that arises here is how the young valet comes to pick these particular 
passages. If he chose them simply because those are the things he has heard repeated in 
societal situations, his use of the texts would seem primarily to function as social 
embellishment, originating from the desire to seem aesthetically and intellectually more 
‘cultivated’ than his peers in the countryside. However, the fact that the valet actually 
takes the books from the library and reads them instead of just using ‘second hand’ 
knowledge (repeating things as he has heard them), does imply some genuine literary 
appetite. According to this interpretation, it seems that he lands on these popular 
quotations indeed due to some kind of inner sensitivity, similar to the ‘sens inné [et] 
goût naturel’ that Jupien is said to possess (RTP IV, 416). 
The case of the young valet is just one of the many occasions in the novel where the 
Narrator casts his judgement on the way others experience art. The relatively 
uneducated valet could be considered a prime example of an ‘innocent’ reader, and the 
Narrator’s condemnation of the valet choosing the most ‘obvious’ bits (the generally 
most quoted extracts) from the poems, for example, seems therefore somewhat harsh. 
Even if the valet clearly uses quotations as social currency, it is possible, and even 
likely, that there is also a genuine love of reading which motivates his enthusiasm, in 
which case the Narrator’s comments are not just snobbish and degrading but also unjust 
in a way. 
Furthermore, we must keep in mind that the Narrator, as we can witness by following 
his aesthetic apprenticeship throughout the novel, is very much ‘a work in progress’ 
himself. As a boy, he exercises exactly the kind of escapism in art of which he later 
accuses others; as Roger Shattuck notes, ‘when Marcel’s Sunday afternoon reading in 
Combray tempted him to turn away form his existence in dissatisfaction and desire, he 
was misusing art as an escape and not discerning himself through its lens’.17 For a long 
time, his aesthetic activities are also overshadowed by the urge to (try to) over-
intellectualise his experiences. As for the Narrator’s use of art in social interaction, the 
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17 Roger Shattuck, Proust's Way, p. 159.
way he judges the young valet seems particularly unfair because the Narrator himself 
uses art to enhance his position in the eyes of the others – not as publicly as the valet, 
Mme Verdurin or Oriane, but within a more private sphere, especially in his relationship 
with Albertine. 
There is, thus, a notable difference between the younger Narrator-protagonist and the 
writer-Narrator who in Le Temps retrouvé rather emphatically promotes the 
interpretative freedom of the reader. The younger Narrator is much more judgemental 
(for instance in his comments about the valet’s reading habits) and more patronising 
(especially regarding Albertine as a reader) than the man who in Le Temps retrouvé 
states that ‘la reconnaissance en soi-même, par le lecteur, de ce que dit le livre, est la 
preuve de la vérité de celui-ci et vice-versa’ (RTP IV, 490). He also remarks how
d’autres particularités (comme l’inversion) peuvent faire que le lecteur ait besoin 
de lire d’une certaine façon pour bien lire; l’auteur n’a pas à s’en offenser mais au 
contraire à laisser la plus grande liberté au lecteur en lui disant: ‘Regardez vous-
même si vous voyez mieux avec ce verre-ci, avec celui-là, avec cet autre’. 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 490 
While this passage advocates a maximal freedom of interpretation, it nevertheless also 
contains the conception of ‘bien lire’. Thus, a certain sense of hierarchy is still at work 
here, and the Narrator further remarks how ‘le livre peut être trop savant, trop obscur 
pour le lecteur naïf et ne lui présenter ainsi qu’un verre trouble avec lequel il ne pourra 
pas lire’ (RTP IV, 490). The way to ‘bien lire’ does not seem to relate so much to the 
reader’s ability to appreciate specific aesthetic or intellectual formal properties of the 
text itself; rather, the ultimate test of a successful reading experience seems to be 
whether or not it releases and brings to light something personal and variable within the 
reader. 
This theory of reading that the Narrator eventually voices at the end of the Recherche is 
sketched out by Proust already in ‘Journées de lecture’. In this essay, Proust discusses 
falsely motivated reading experiences and emphasises the importance of reading as 
‘l’incitatrice dont les clefs magiques nous ouvrent au fond de nous-même la porte des 
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demeures où nous n’aurions pas su pénétrer’.18 While the idea of reading as a form of 
escape is presented as a very tempting option (‘Quel bonheur, quel repos pour un esprit 
fatigué de chercher la vérité en lui-même de se dire qu’elle est située hors de lui, aux 
feuillets d’un in-folio’), Proust notes that, for someone who reads like this, ‘le livre 
n’est pas l’ange qui s’envole aussitôt qu’il a ouvert les portes du jardin céleste, mais une 
idole immobile, qu’il adore pour elle-même, qui, au lieu de recevoir une dignité vraie 
des pensées qu’elle éveille, communique une dignité factice à tout ce qui l’entoure.’19 
This idea that a book can be regarded as a key to discovering truths rather than as a 
source in which they would exist objectively, independent of the reading process, is yet 
another point in Proust’s novel which resonates with hermeneutic theories. For example 
Hans-George Gadamer’s treatment of truth as something which can only be revealed to 
us through an ongoing ‘play’ (Spiel) between unconcealment and concealment, true and 
false resonates with the Narrator’s comments. In line with Proust’s ideas, instead of 
considering a work of art as ‘une idole immobile’, adored ‘pour elle-même’20 and 
embodying truths for our consciousness to grasp, Gadamer remarks that the basic sense 
of truths that are available through an aesthetic experience is that of ‘unconcealment’ 
rather than ‘correctness’. These truths always necessitate ‘opening up’ by the one who 
experiences, disclosure through a creative interpretative process. 
While our experience of the work of art is always attached to the form of the artwork 
and the perspective it represents, philosophical hermeneutics emphasises that the 
disclosure of truths in art cannot happen merely through analysis of the formal and 
aesthetic properties of the work. According to Gadamer, ‘the consciousness of art, the 
aesthetic consciousness’ is a contradiction in terms, in the sense that ‘when we judge a 
work of art on the basis of its aesthetic quality [i.e. its formal properties] something that 
is really much more intimately familiar to us is alienated.’21 What is ‘much more 
intimately familiar’ in the aesthetic experience, then, arises from our lived experience 
and the (sometimes unmarked) associations and parallels we draw between the 
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18 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, pp. 180-1.
19 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, p. 181-183.
20 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, p. 183.
21 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 5.
imagined and the real.22 Gadamer proposes that this ongoing ‘play’ between the 
unfamiliar and the familiar, between the impressions that the form of the artwork evokes 
in us and our similar experiences outside those forms, is fundamental to the ontological 
structure of the work of art, giving form and order to the aesthetic experience, as well as 
ensuring that an aesthetic experience does not become a disengaged exercise of the 
recipient’s subjectivity.
An aesthetic experience can enhance our self-understanding, but only when we 
approach the artwork through something that is ‘intimately familiar to us’.23 The 
‘essences’ or ‘truths’ artworks can reveal to us are not simply there for us to take, but 
rather we arrive at them through a process which is not merely intellectual but also 
unconscious and sensuous. It is this personalised process in which the ‘recognition’ of 
an essence or a truth can happen, as we ‘play’ with the idea. One of the flaws of the 
‘célibataires de l’art’ seems to be that they seek ‘aesthetic consciousness’ by 
concentrating primarily on the artwork’s formal properties, failing to truly examine their 
own impressions, sensations and emotions that the artwork evokes. This kind of 
experience remains on the surface of the artwork and cannot therefore enable true 
communication with ‘une autre pensée’ or with one’s own self.24
What makes an artwork a valid medium of self-understanding, as Paul Crowther puts it, 
is precisely the way that art ‘reflects our mode of embodied inherence in the world, and 
by clarifying this inherence it brings about a harmony between subject and object of the 
experience – a full realisation of the self. In the creation and reception of art, we are 
able to enjoy a free-belonging to the world’.25 So, to fully appreciate the idea of self-
revelatory potential in reading literature, we need to emphasise the freedom that reading 
in this kind of highly subjective way allows us –how the sensuous and ‘non-cogent’ 
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22 In the context of paintings in Chapter Two we saw how already the initial experience of a painting may 
give us a sense of the ‘familiar’ due to a mere visual resemblance. In a literary or musical experience, 
these associations can often go unmarked during the first time we experience an artwork but become 
available in time, through repetition. In the next chapter, I discuss a passage in Le Temps retrouvé which 
describes the attachment of memories to the books one has read; this passage in Proust demonstrates 
germanely the kind of dimension of the process of reading which reaches beyond conscious formal 
analysis and through which lived experience gets intertwined in the experience of a text.
23 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 5.
24 Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, p. 174.
25 Crowther, pp. 5-7.
dimension of ‘reading for pleasure’ liberates the reader, if only momentarily, from the 
search for objective knowledge or function outside itself. In the last section of this 
chapter, I discuss the Narrator’s reading mode in more detail – this kind of reading 
without a particular pre-fixed aim.
5.4. The Narrator’s Sévigné, the Narrator’s Dostoyevsky: Literary Impressions 
and Aesthetic Reading
The Narrator seems to engage with the books he reads in a very different way than the 
mother and the grandmother; his mode of reading is an aesthetic mode, in the sense that 
it does not search for justification outside being an aesthetic experience. Whereas the 
mother and the grandmother use the Sévigné text to improve and enrich their 
relationship and their interpersonal communication, the Narrator’s reading experiences 
seem to induce primarily subjective, solitary and internal responses, and have less direct 
impact (or none at all) on the ways he interacts with other people.26 For the young 
Narrator, the Sévigné texts for example do not offer ethical or communicative models 
but very specific (and highly subjective, as we shall see shortly) literary impressions. 
The Narrator’s first contact with literary fiction happens through a selection of novels 
he receives as a birthday present; the purpose of this present, carefully selected by his 
family members, is to pass on some ‘virtues of tact and savoir-vivre’ to the Narrator.27 
One of the books is George Sand’s François le Champi which receives much attention 
throughout the Recherche. It is a text that is both read to him by his mother and read by 
him, and Proust’s descriptions of these experiences point both to the difference between 
the experience of a text through listening and reading and to the difference between the 
Narrator’s reading mode and that of his mother. When his mother reads to him, the 
Narrator becomes absolutely captivated by the story, whereas reading by himself seems 
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26 This may partly be because the ‘workings’ of literature happen slowly and it is only in his mature years 
that these effects begin to be revealed to him, but as the Narrator points out in Le Temps retrouvé, the 
revelations in art succeed the experience, not the other way around: ‘L’impression est pour l’écrivain ce 
qu’est l’expérimentation pour le savant, avec cette différence que chez le savant le travail de l’intelligence 
précède et chez l’écrivain vient après.’ (RTP IV, 459).
27 Bucknall, p. 129.
a much more self-reflective experience: he tends to get distracted and notes how ‘quand 
je lisais, je rêvassais souvent, pendant des pages entières, à tout autre chose’ (RTP I, 41). 
This is an interesting phenomenon with which every reader undoubtedly is familiar: we 
read and suddenly realise that we have stopped paying attention to the text some 
sentences or even pages earlier. This kind of loss of concentration is a much overlooked 
aspect of the reading experience, and when it does receive attention, it is usually 
considered as a failure in the reading process. However, those moments when the 
reader’s attention moves from the text to something else ‘outside’ the narrative are a 
crucial part of the aesthetic reading experience and particularly noteworthy in the sense 
that they show how involved both our senses and our mind can still be with the 
surrounding ‘actual’ world when we read. In the Recherche, the loss of concentration 
when reading, and especially when reading fiction, seems not to be merely passive 
‘drifting away’ from the subject of the book but rather a sign of the way in which the 
reader’s mind is activated by the text. In the process of reading literature, which is free 
from a particular aim or purpose, reading becomes an act that, as Watt puts it, 
‘revitalises our perceptual capacities, injects energy into our often flagging powers of 
observation, our sense of participation in the world’.28
Watt discusses this dimension of the reading experience, by analysing the eminent role 
that sensory stimuli, such as colours and sounds, play in the young Narrator’s reading 
experiences in Combray, as well as in the light of his later comment in Le Temps 
retrouvé that ‘une heure n’est pas qu’une heure; c’est un vase rempli de parfums, de 
sons, de projets et de climats’ (RTP IV, 467-68).29 The sensuous dimension both 
animates the text and offers the reader a chance to negotiate between the experience in 
the real and in the imagined world of the book. As Watt beautifully puts it: ‘An hour 
spent reading, according to the vase metaphor, is never just that: it is an amalgam of all 
that is evoked, and set in motion during the interaction between the reader and the 
text.’30
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29 See Watt, pp. 31-8 and pp. 138-42.
30 Watt, p.138 (emphasis in the original).
Another aspect in which this ‘aesthetic’ mode seems to improve on the other, more 
instrumentalised modes of reading is that it allows us a disinterested relationship with 
the text, which no other person can take away from the reader. The benefit of 
communication with one’s own self as opposed to using literary texts in enhancement of 
one’s relationships to others is that the relationship to a text cannot be destroyed or 
swept away by the discrepancies and disappointments in life (such as death, deception 
or break-ups). We already saw such alteration in the Narrator’s mother’s relationship to 
the Sévigné letters after the grandmother’s death: she seems to lose the dynamic and 
communicative aspect of the text, which then gets reduced to a kind of shrine or holy 
relic, a way of commemorating the dead mother rather than communicating with the 
living (such as her own son who finds the Sévigné quotes in her letters alienating rather 
than communicative). 
The way the two women read Sévigné, interweaving the text into their relationship, 
makes the interpretation and experience of the text more vulnerable in the sense that it is 
easily shattered (at least partly) by the death of the other person. The Narrator, on the 
other hand, does not experience this kind of dissociation in his relationship to the text 
after his grandmother’s death, as he reads Sévigné differently to begin with; neither 
does he experience a loss of identity with the death of the grandmother (or later with the 
death of Albertine), although he does note how the death of the beloved results in part 
of himself dying along with them. 
The Narrator seems to read Mme de Sévigné as one would a fictional text, without 
paying much attention to the socio-historic background of the letters or to the people 
who wrote them. But reading literature is not mere escapism for him either, even if he 
refuses to connect the texts to life in the same kind of social, moral and ‘practical’ 
manner as the mother and the grandmother. Indeed, to propose that the Narrator 
approaches texts aesthetically is not to say he simply appreciates the form over the 
content. His love of literature is not aestheticism, merely appreciating the formal 
properties of the text, but rather savouring and reflecting on the powerful impressions 
these forms produce within him. Even though these impressions are not sought for any 
particular purpose, they become, as we shall see shortly, a means for the Narrator to 
embrace life experiences and also his experiences of other texts he reads, thus 
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improving on the enthusiastic but unfruitful attitude of ‘les célibataires de l’art’. A 
prime example of such a literary impression, which seems to be both the cornerstone 
and the outcome of reading ‘aesthetically’, is the Narrator’s repeated comment about ‘le 
côté Dostoïevski de Mme de Sévigné’ (RTP II, 14; RTP III, 880).
This remark is a good example of the way in which reading in this way is, however, still 
an intrinsically isolating experience. This isolating effect is revealed in a conversation 
between the Narrator and Albertine where this literary impression is discussed: when 
Albertine asks the Narrator what he means by ‘le côté Dostoïevski de Mme de Sévigné’ 
– this pairing of two seemingly so unconnected writers – the Narrator seems incapable 
of providing her with a straightforward answer. This inability implies that such 
impressions can never really fully be shared. These literary impressions are doubly 
subjective in the sense that the points of comparison between texts are not (unlike with 
representational painting for example) ‘out there’ to be objectively pointed at or directly 
perceived by our senses but rather created through (i) the reader’s imagination and (ii) 
the unique context of the actual scene of reading and what has been sensed during the 
act of reading. 
As we saw above, ‘le côté Dostoïevski de Mme de Sévigné’ is first mentioned when the 
voice of the adult Narrator, looking back on his first train journey to Balbec with his 
grandmother, links these two seemingly different kinds of text together:
[J]’ouvris le volume que ma grand-mère m’avait tendu et je pus fixer mon 
attention sur les pages que je choisis çà et là. Tout en lisant je sentais grandir mon 
admiration pour Mme de Sévigné. […] [D]éjà cet après-midi là, dans ce wagon, 
en relisant la lettre où apparaît le clair de lune […], je fus ravi par ce que j’eusse 
appelé un peu plus tard (ne peint-elle pas les paysages de la même façon que lui 
les caractères?) le côté Dostoïevski des Lettres de Madame de Sévigné.
 
    A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 13-14
The use of visual imagery is prominent in this passage, as well as in the Narrator’s later 
elaborations on the Sévigné-Dostoyevsky connection: Mme de Sévigné ‘paints’ the 
landscapes in her text in the similar manner that Dostoyevsky ‘paints’ his characters. 
The Narrator’s choice of the verb ‘paint’ here seems to reinforce the overall significance 
of the senses in the reading experience and also points back to the rather complicated 
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relationship between the visual perceived through the eyes and the visual created by 
imagination, discussed earlier in Chapter Three.31
What is also noteworthy here is the mood that the Narrator employs. The narrating 
voice belongs to the older Narrator who looks back on the experience in the Balbec train 
and who has later acquainted himself with Dostoyevsky, thus using the pluperfect 
subjunctive in examining the aspects in Sévigné he ‘would have later called’ (‘ce que 
j’eusse appelé un peu plus tard’) ‘le côté Dostoïevski des Lettres de Madame de 
Sévigné’ (RTP II, 14). But more importantly, the mood can be read as an implication of 
a certain level of incertitude, pointing here to the way in which a literary impression 
may be quite impossible to define – even for the subject of the experience himself. 
The visual also becomes predominant later when the Narrator attempts to explain the 
connection between Dostoyevsky and Sévigné’s ‘peinture’ to Albertine, and it is right to 
ask whether such a comparison can, in fact, be regarded as further evidence of how the 
visual in Proust is often used as a means to put one’s finger on the ‘unspeakable’ other. 
The Narrator resorts back to a comparison between literary and visual artworks, placing 
Dostoyevsky side by side with Elstir’s impressionist paintings:
[J]’avoue que ce que j’avais dit là était assez bête. Mais je l’avais dit pour deux 
raisons. La première est une raison particulière. Il est arrivé que Mme de Sévigné, 
comme Elstir, comme Dostoïevski, au lieu de présenter les choses dans l’ordre 
logique, c’est-à-dire en commençant par la cause, nous montre d’abord l’effet, 
l’illusion qui nous frappe. C’est ainsi que Dostoïevski présente ses personnages. 
Leurs actions nous apparaissent aussi trompeuses que ces effets d’Elstir où la mer 
a l’air d’être dans le ciel. Nous sommes tout étonnés après d’apprendre que cet 
homme sournois est au fond excellent, ou le contraire. 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 880
The Narrator’s remark on how, in Dostoyevsky’s texts, the words on a page first strike 
us with an impression, instead of following a logical sequence of cause and effect, can 
be read as a statement as much about our perception of the text as about the method of 
the writer. Also, the way he relies on comparisons with paintings and compares the 
methods of a writer to those of painters, suggests that his aesthetic experience of 
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Dostoyevsky entails a deeply sensuous dimension, which is not something distinct from 
the textual experience but in fact inseparably intermingled with it. Whether the Narrator 
even sincerely tries to explain this connection (or simply fails to) is unclear. It is almost 
as if he anticipates the failure to completely explain his meaning by saying: ‘[J]’avoue 
que ce que j’avais dit là était assez bête.’ (RTP III, 880) 
It is interesting in its own right that the moment the Narrator starts talking about ‘[la] 
création d’une certaine âme’ that he finds in the texts of a particular writer and 
comparing it with other texts, we seem to feel the need to explain this connection and to 
pinpoint the meaning and method behind this connection. If we, in contrast, consider for 
example the Narrator’s remark about how, on returning to Balbec for the second time, 
Elstir’s Impressionist paintings of Balbec beaches have taught him to look at the sea 
differently, we do not seem to require further elaboration on this statement. The 
Narrator’s comment that his ‘yeux instruits par Elstir [...] contemplaient longuement ce 
que la première année ils ne savaient pas voir’ (RTP III, 179) seems perfectly plausible 
and natural to us, whereas with the ‘Dostoyevskian impression’ we, like Albertine, seem 
to call for more detailed explanation for what exactly these ‘Dostoyevskian’ elements in 
Mme de Sévigné might be.
This intrinsic urge to ‘open up’ the Narrator’s term ‘Dostoyevskian’ points to the doubly 
subjective quality of the literary impressions I mentioned earlier, as the referentiality 
between two texts is always dependent on the reader’s interpretation. The Narrator’s 
usage of an adjective which is created out of a proper name to label these impressions is 
interesting as well: it seems almost as if the experience of the text written by 
Dostoyevsky has been diffused with the Narrator’s life experiences in such a personal 
way that it is impossible for him to take these two experiences apart and define or 
explain the former objectively. Just like other proper names in Proust, the names of 
painters or writers are reservoirs for highly personal webs of associations – as Roland 
Barthes puts it in his essay ‘Proust et les noms’, ‘le Nom Propre est en quelque sorte la 
forme linguistique de la réminiscence’ which offers in itself ‘une catalyse d’une richesse 
infinie’.32 The idea that certain impressions become attached to an experience of a text 
in a similar way that highly ‘personal’ associations get clustered around proper names 
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may partly shed light on the Narrator’s problem of explicating the ‘Dostoyevskian side’ 
of Mme de Sévigné to Albertine.
The exact connection between Dostoyevsky and Mme de Sévigné remains unexplored, 
however, and the Narrator does not, in fact, ever get around to explaining his ‘other 
reason’ either. When Albertine reminds him by saying ‘oui, mais un exemple pour Mme 
de Sévigné’ (RTP III, 881), the Narrator simply resorts to another comparison with 
paintings (and comparison between Dostoyevsky and paintings, not Sévigné):
 
[J]e peux au moins croire que Baudelaire n’est pas sincère. Tandis que 
Dostoïevski... Tout cela me semble aussi loin de moi que possible, à moins que 
j’aie en moi des parties que j’ignore, car on ne se réalise que successivement. 
Chez Dostoïevski je trouve des puits excessivement profonds, mais sur quelques 
points isolés de l’âme humaine. Mais c’est un grand créateur. D’abord, le monde 
qu’il peint a vraiment l’air d’avoir été créé par lui. Tous ces bouffons qui 
reviennent sans cesse, tous ces Lebedev, Karamazov, Ivolguine, Segrev, cet 
incroyable cortège, c’est une humanité plus fantastique que celle qui peuple La 
Ronde de Nuit de Rembrandt. Et peut-être n’est-elle fantastique que de la même 
manière, par l’éclairage et le costume, et est-elle, au fond, courante. En tous cas 
elle est à la fois pleine de vérités, profonde et unique, n’appartenant qu’à 
Dostoïevski.
      
     A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 881-2 
According to the Narrator, the world Dostoyevsky ‘paints’ really seems to be created 
by him and is full of ‘vérités, profonde et unique, n’appartenant qu’à Dostoïevski’, 
but these truths nevertheless address ‘quelques points isolés de l’âme humaine’ (RTP 
III, 881). This observation adds almost a kind of pseudo-Platonic ring to the 
Narrator’s words, as if the truths that the Dostoyevskian text touches upon were, like 
Platonic Ideas, somehow universal and unique at the same time. And yet, as universal 
as the Narrator might consider these truths, Proust’s text here manifests how 
‘Dostoyevskian’ clearly means different things to the Narrator and, for example, 
Albertine. The Narrator’s comments on how these ‘Dostoyevsky-specific’ truths 
travel straight to the mysterious ‘points isolés’ in the soul, as if bypassing the 
contingent phenomena, also seems to suggest that such truths are not accessible 
through deliberate, cogent interpretation of the properties of the artwork alone. 
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Rather, these ‘life-like’ impressions are always stylised, personal, and different for 
each reader. 
This idea of highly individualised reading experiences leads us to ask, then, why does 
the Narrator deem this in many ways isolating and subjective approach as ‘le moyen de 
bien lire’ (RTP IV, 610)? To conclude with, let us consider the aesthetic reading mode 
through a set of objections to the communicative possibilities of literature in Proust 
presented by Bailey in his study Proust’s Self-Reader; examining Bailey’s arguments, 
which stand in such a strict opposition to the views expressed in this study, in more 
detail will allow me to elaborate on the hermeneutic interpretation of the nature and 
value of the Proustian reading experience as I see it.
To begin with, Bailey accuses Proust’s Narrator of rejecting direct verbal 
communication ‘because he turns to a solipsistic subjectivism to rationalise and 
accommodate his emotional inability to empathise and sympathise with others’ by 
‘setting up a communicative hierarchy of art over life, of writing and reading over 
conversation.’33 Moreover, Bailey suggests that the Narrator’s hierarchy of art over life 
is incoherent, ‘because it is absurd to pretend we can empathise while writing and 
reading, but not while listening and speaking.’ 34 While it is true that the Narrator does 
not seem to be too empathetic in his own relationships, Bailey seems to ignore two 
important aspects of the Narrator’s proposal regarding literature’s communicative 
power. 
Firstly, Bailey makes no distinction between the younger Narrator, who himself uses art 
as an escape route from boredom and later on occasion employs his aesthetic punditry 
as social currency, and the writer-Narrator who at the end of the novel finally presents 
his revelation about how a work of art needs not to be invented but pre-exists us (RTP 
IV, 459). The statements about reading as communication with the self only come after 
the great revelations of time and memory in Le Temps retrouvé; it is therefore 
inconsistent to take the Narrator as a prime example of the way of reading literature he 
postulates at the end of the book and through which he, perhaps, wishes to prevent 
168
33 Bailey, p. 147 (emphasis in the original).
34 Bailey, p. 147.
others from making the same mistake of reading, in some sense, life through art and not 
the other way around.35
Secondly, Bailey sets out to compare different forms of communication through 
language (both spoken and written) primarily as communication with others. As far as 
literature is concerned, it is not, however (not at least merely, or even primarily) 
communication with others that Proust’s Narrator accentuates at the end of the 
Recherche, but rather the reader’s communication with his or her own self. Although 
Bailey does acknowledge the Narrator’s idea of a book as a magnifying glass that 
enables its readers to ‘lire en eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610), he dismisses it simply as a 
remark made in order to ‘tolerat[e] the misunderstandings of imperfect 
communication,’ suggesting that the Narrator ‘even predicts and accommodates this 
inevitable miscommunication in offering the reader several different lenses through 
which to read’.36 Bailey’s perspective, thus, is based on an assumption that there is such 
a thing as a ‘correct’ reading of a text and that communication through literature should 
transmit particular meanings between the writer and the reader or between different 
readers in order to be considered successful (or ‘privileged’). With this kind of starting 
point, Bailey’s argument overlooks one of the most vital aspects of reading in Proust’s 
novel: the contrast between communication with others and communication with one’s 
own self, as well as the importance of how one’s everyday life experiences become 
merged with the reading process. 
In Le Temps retrouvé, the Narrator acknowledges the process of self-understanding as 
one of the most pivotal aspects of literary experience and explicitly renounces his 
authority over his impending book – not because he thinks it cannot reveal essences or 
communicate meanings, but because he recognises that these cannot be accessed as 
objective elements in the text but rather need to be discovered by the reader through 
reflecting the text ‘en soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610). An artwork can house something 
universal (something which addresses ‘quelques points isolés de l’âme humaine’ (RTP 
III, 881)) but these universal essences are only ever attainable through subjective 
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experience – through an experience that activates a range of personal memories, 
sensations and emotions, through which the reader can recognise ‘en [soi]-même’ (RTP 
IV, 610) what they read.
It is through this kind of hermeneutic and phenomenological approach, which relies on 
the reconciliation between the inner and the outer world of the reader through 
imagination while still acknowledging that the way one uses one’s imagination is 
always tied to the material, sensuous emotional reality (of which the reader always 
remains part while reading), that the grounds for art’s communicative potential in Proust 
can be revealed and defended. While reading does not necessarily offer experiences that 
are ‘deeper, sharper, and more precise than much of what takes place in life’, as Martha 
Nussbaum points out, they can enable the reader to experience life in a deeper and 
sharper way.37 Nussbaum continues:
[Proust’s] novel’s procedures do not bring everything about the soul into a 
perspicuous ordering; but this is part and parcel of its view that not everything 
about the human soul is perspicuous, that the deepest depths are dark and shifting 
and elusive. A form of representation that would imply otherwise would be 
artificial and untruthful.38
The novel, as it were, takes its readers on a journey the destination of which is not 
clearly defined. While Bailey’s suspicion concerning the ‘redemptive’ uses of literature 
as far as interpersonal communication and relationships are concerned may be valid (for 
indeed, within the narrative, the reading of literature hardly releases the reader from the 
uncertainty and disappointments of dealing with other people), the supremacy of art in 
the Recherche seems to arise from the way it may help us to acknowledge the temporal, 
changeable and obscure nature of life and ‘reality’, and, in so doing, help us to 
experience life and to savour it – even when things go wrong.
This brings us back to the problem of aesthetic consciousness discussed earlier. In the 
Narrator’s attempts to explain the Dostoyevskian side of Sévigné to Albertine by 
analysing the aesthetic quality and the formal properties of these works, it seems that 
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indeed something which is ‘really much more intimately familiar’ to him gets 
alienated.39 The experience of the text written by Dostoyevsky has become so entangled 
with the Narrator’s subjective sphere of experience that it becomes impossible for him 
to define or explain it objectively. This reminds us of how closely our imagination, 
through which we ‘paint the scenes’ of a book, relies on our previous experience, which 
is the ‘much more intimately familiar’ within us that the artwork addresses.40 As 
Crowther notes, ‘there are no raw facts vis-a-vis perception, memory, and imagination. 
Rather these are given a distinctive character by virtue of the unique personal history of 
the subject who experiences or projects them. In a word, experience is [always] 
stylised.’41
This kind of ‘stylisation’ is the germ of the self-revelatory potential of the aesthetic 
reading mode, and it also works the other way around: ‘Dostoyevskian’ for the Narrator 
becomes a means of encompassing his experiences in the same way that Elstir’s 
paintings ‘train’ his eyes. As Shattuck eloquently puts it, while ‘literature cannot ever be 
a substitute for experience’, it is ‘not therefore excluded from any role of shaping our 
experience.’42 In the last chapter I explore this connectedness between reading and 
being (or becoming) oneself and return to the paradox discussed in Part One of the 
thesis of how one can become ‘le propre lecteur de soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610) through 
someone else’s words.
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41 Crowther, p. 172 (emphasis in the original).
42 Shattuck, Proust's Way, p. 226 (my emphasis).
6. ‘Le moyen de lire en eux-mêmes’: Reading and Being 
In Le Temps retrouvé, finally setting out to write his book, the Narrator describes his 
goals as follows:
[J]e pensais plus modestement à mon livre, et ce serait même inexact que de dire 
en pensant à ceux qui le liraient, à mes lecteurs. Car ils ne seraient pas, selon moi, 
mes lecteurs, mais les propres lecteurs d’eux-mêmes, mon livre n’étant qu’une 
sorte de ces verres grossissants comme ceux que tendait à un acheteur l’opticien 
de Combray; mon livre, grâce auquel je leur fournirais le moyen de lire en eux-
mêmes. De sorte que je ne leur demanderais pas de me louer ou de me dénigrer, 
mais seulement de me dire si c’est bien cela, si les mots qu’ils lisent en eux-
mêmes sont bien ceux que j’ai écrits (les divergences possibles à cet égard ne 
devant pas, du reste, provenir toujours de ce que je me serais trompé, mais 
quelquefois de ce que les yeux du lecteur ne seraient pas de ceux à qui mon livre 
conviendrait pour bien lire en soi-même).
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 610 
This passage is closely linked, especially through the beautiful imagery of ‘[l]es verres 
grossissants’,1 to the writer-reader relationship, which I discussed previously in Chapter 
Two. In the following, however, I ask shall ask what happens after the ‘optical 
instrument’ has been handed to the reader and focus on the process of becoming ‘le 
propre lecteur de soi-même’.
In order to investigate the Narrator’s statement – which seems inherently paradoxical in 
the sense that it suggests we only arrive at the self by going outside the self, through the 
other – we must begin by returning to the question of what the Proustian ‘soi-même’ in 
fact consists of. Is the Proustian notion of ‘self’ based on some (Platonic) essences, or 
does Proust’s novel, and especially the motif of reading ‘en soi-même’, imply a far 
different notion of subjectivity – one which is not based on the idea of the self as a fixed 
essence but one much more subject to temporal contingency, the chance juxtapositions 
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of experience and mediation through aesthetic experience? Or, even more radically, is 
the aesthetic experience something in which the subject-object distinction, the 
distinction between the self and the other, effectively disappears altogether? In this 
chapter I consider these different options, by returning to the discussion that was raised 
in Part One about the primacy of experience and its mediation, memory, imagination 
and the Proustian notion of ‘la réalité’. 
The Narrator’s comments above prompt us to ask not only how the ‘soi-même’ should 
be understood but also what the word ‘propre’ here actually refers to. Instead of merely 
considering ‘propre’ as marking an emphasis (in the sense of ‘the very readers of their 
own selves’) or referring to ownership (‘the readers of their own selves’2), it is also 
worth considering other possible interpretations of the word, to which I return in the 
course of this chapter. The immediate question that arises, however, is: does ‘propre’ 
suggest that there is a unified self that can be found, grasped and ‘owned’? Or should 
we, on the contrary, consider the reading experience as moving towards a kind of trans-
subjective state, a dispersion of ‘eux-mêmes’ across time and in the face of the 
‘otherness’ of the text, and take this to be somehow the ‘truest’ or ‘fundamental’ state of 
being?3
There are passages in Proust, such as the opening scene of the novel, which seem to 
describe experiences on an almost pre-individual level – experiences of someone who is 
not yet experiencing them ‘as himself’. These moments prompt us to ask whether such 
experiences, in fact, are experiences of the self at all; in other words, whether there is a 
level of existence where the self is not an appropriator of experience but in fact is the 
experience. Such an idea of selfhood as a series of singular experiences, without there 
being any one ‘governing’ subjective consciousness behind these ‘singularities’, has 
been explored for example by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Guattari’s theory 
implies a radical notion of selfhood, in which the idea of a ‘whole’ sustainable self 
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disappears, and proposes that our existence is based on ‘singularités’ – events or 
experiences that ‘operate at a pre-personal, pre-individual level’.4 ‘Singularité’, for 
Guattari, is the basis of existence, a genuine experience in which the ‘imposed’ object-
subject distinction is not in operation. These ‘singularités’ are only linked together 
through ‘pseudo-narratifs’ – through repeated discursive practices and institutional and 
social conditions.5
As Guattari’s theory is based on such an opposing view of the one that has been 
emphasised throughout this study – the self as fundamentally continuous, unified, 
substantial and at least potentially accessible to knowledge – I will not engage with it in 
detail here. However, such experiences as a ‘pre-self’ that Guattari emphasises are 
described in the Recherche, and their role must be acknowledged in order to make my 
interpretation of the Proustian notion of selfhood stronger. I therefore begin my 
discussion of reading ‘en soi-même’ by analysing the opening passage of the Recherche, 
in which the Narrator wakes up and ‘recomposes’ his self. I consider his initial 
experience of ‘l’obscurité reposante’ and his ‘sentiment de l’existence [dans sa 
simplicité première]’ (RTP I, 5) not as something which repels the idea of continuous 
selfhood but rather as an essential part of the process of becoming oneself. I then move 
on to consider the Narrator’s suggestion of literary experiences as ‘le moyen de lire en 
eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610), exploring the parallels between the process of becoming 
oneself and the process of reading.
One aspect of Guattari’s theory that I wish to respond to in the following is his critique 
of the phenomenological approach as something which ‘se trouve handicapée par un 
“réductionnisme” systématique qui la conduit à rétrécir ses objets à une pure 
transparence intentionnelle’.6 As has already been demonstrated in the context of 
different aesthetic experiences in the previous chapters, the emphasis that Proust’s novel 
places on the role of impressions, sensation and ‘les épaisseurs d’art’ within the 
aesthetic experience ensures that phenomenological reflection of these experiences in 
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Proust does not reduce the artwork to ‘une pure transparence intentionnelle’. For while I 
argue that there is a self which remains as a unifying core at the centre of these 
experiences, the genuine aesthetic experience in Proust – the kind of experience which 
may enhance one’s self-understanding – is never a mere act of ‘re-confirmation’ of the 
self. As Gadamer puts it, ‘the real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability 
to see what is questionable,’ and in the true hermeneutic process, the subject and the 
object, the self and the other, are not considered as opposite poles charged with 
‘intention’ but rather brought together in the interpretative space of in-between.7
There are two prominent aspects in the Recherche I explore in the following which 
seem to support the view of subjectivity with a unifying core at the centre of 
experiences – that the self is not merely a succession of singular experiences but also 
able to build and reflect upon these experiences. The first one is the idea of ‘[le] temps 
incorporé, des années passées non séparées de nous’ (RTP IV, 623) and the ‘layered’ 
quality of selfhood this theory of time proposes. The second aspect arises from the 
Narrator’s comment that ‘la réalité ne se forme que dans la mémoire’ (RTP I, 182) and 
the emphasis on the creative interlinking of past and present and mediated and primary 
experience as the sole means to access reality (which, in turn, suggests there must be 
continuity behind these experiences, something which links them together). 
The phenomenological approach to selfhood, while acknowledging that the self is 
subject to constant change in time and through its experiences in-the-world, considers 
the continuity of experience and the dialogue between the familiar and unfamiliar, the 
past and the present, the self and the other, as the fundamental basis for self-
understanding of the human subject. This way of experiencing the self, as already 
suggested in Part One of this study, could be regarded as processual. In such a notion of 
selfhood, any ‘disclosure’ of the world and of our own selves can only come about 
through the process of interpretation which is based on (and indeed enabled by) what is 
shared between the new experience and past experiences. I now move on to discuss the 
overture of Proust’s novel – the passage describing the process of the Narrator waking 
up and recomposing ‘peu à peu les traits originaux de mon moi’ (RTP I, 5-6), which 
addresses the very question of what it means to ‘be oneself’. 
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6.1. ‘Je ne savais même pas au premier instant qui j’étais’: Being Oneself
The Recherche opens with the Narrator’s description of the movement between sleeping 
and waking, between dreaming and reality. In this process, reflections on reading take 
over his mind and bring him to the edge of his ‘knowable’ self:
[L]a pensée qu’il était temps de chercher le sommeil m’éveillait; je voulais poser 
le volume que je croyais avoir encore dans les mains et souffler ma lumière; je 
n’avais pas cessé en dormant de faire des réflexions sur ce que je venais de lire, 
mais ces réflexions avaient pris un tour un peu particulier; il me semblait que 
j’étais moi-même ce dont parlait l’ouvrage: une église, un quatuor, la rivalité de 
François 1er et de Charles Quint. Cette croyance survivait pendant quelques 
secondes à mon réveil; elle ne choquait pas ma raison mais pesait comme des 
écailles sur mes yeux et les empêchait de se rendre compte que le bougeoir n’était 
plus allumé. Puis elle commençait à me devenir inintelligible, comme après la 
métempsycose les pensées d’une existence antérieure; le sujet du livre se détachait 
de moi, j’étais libre de m’y appliquer ou non; aussitôt je recouvrais la vue et 
j’étais bien étonné de trouver autour de moi une obscurité, douce et reposante 
pour mes yeux, mais peut-être plus encore pour mon esprit, à qui elle apparaissait 
comme une chose sans cause, incompréhensible, comme une chose vraiment 
obscure.
    A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 3 (my emphasis)
What is described here is a state of being only half awake, and half asleep, and therefore 
the reader cannot take everything the Narrator says at ‘face value’. However, what this 
passage illustrates beautifully is exactly the kind of sense of non-subjectified existence 
one may experience in the very first instance of regaining consciousness and awaking 
from sleep.8 While what is primarily described here seems to be the reassertions of the 
subject-object relationship which one obtains in waking life – negotiation between the 
reality and the imaginary – this passage is also connected to reading: the Narrator’s 
comment about the book that he has been reading before falling asleep manifests the 
effects of reading on the Narrator’s mind and draws attention to the way an experience 
of a text may linger in our unconscious in the same way that a ‘lived’ life experience 
can. The Narrator’s ‘recomposition’ of ‘[s]on moi’ (RTP I, 6) thus also becomes 
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8 For example Edward Hughes discusses sleep as a partial escape from selfhood. See Hughes, pp. 50-56.
communication between his ‘known’ previous self and a new one that has been born in 
the reading process.
In the initial stages of waking up, the Narrator notes how he feels as if himself has 
momentarily become ‘ce dont parlait l’ouvrage’ (RTP I, 3) – what the book he had been 
reading before falling asleep was talking about. What is particularly noteworthy here is 
that ‘ce dont parlait l’ouvrage’ does not simply offer the Narrator an alternative to 
reality but is merged with reality (even though the Narrator here is partly in the state of 
dreaming). The role of language in shaping what we call reality is also illustrated 
poignantly in this passage, where the Narrator states that he sees himself not as a 
character in a book but an inanimate object (‘une église’), an artwork (‘un quatuor’) and 
even as something as abstract as a rivalry – a word, a concept rather than a feeling and 
thinking subject or even an immaterial object. Without the immediate bodily and 
sensuous experience (being half asleep in his bed) it almost seems as if he himself in 
this instance becomes language, being freed from the conceptualisation that we use 
language for in everyday life (and in a fully conscious state of mind). The Narrator 
notes how his self seems initially and temporarily to be ‘lost’ in the world of the book 
but a little later ‘le sujet du livre se détachait de moi, j’étais libre de m’y appliquer ou 
non.’ (RTP I, 3) 
It is right to ask, however, how ‘free’ the Narrator in fact is: once he steps into this 
cognitive state of mind, he steps out of the de-subjectified existence in the dream world 
and becomes conditioned to establish his relation to the book and its subject matter as 
something external to him. Reading on, we see how the sensuous imprint that the past 
has left on the Narrator’s mind (and body) takes a central role: when his senses, 
memory and his intellect begin to awake, the Narrator is able to resort to individuality 
again. First, however, he enjoys being in this ‘obscurité, douce et reposante pour mes 
yeux, mais peut-être plus encore pour mon esprit, à qui elle apparaissait comme une 
chose sans cause, incompréhensible, comme une chose vraiment obscure.’ (RTP I, 3). 
This obscurity might be regarded as the kind of pre-individual experience that Guattari 
refers to. 
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The experience of obscurity is described predominantly as pleasurable, and the terms in 
which this pleasure is presented here are also interesting. The obscurity ‘douce et 
reposante [...] pour mon esprit’ in fact seems to imply a similar kind of liberation from 
the task of analysing and labelling (or even simply recognising) things that the Narrator 
occasionally experiences in the context of art – especially with Elstir’s Impressionist 
painting and Vinteuil’s music. It is incomprehensibility that is described as ‘douce et 
reposante’ here, rather than any kind of certainty or knowing. Indeed, the Narrator’s 
comment of how liberating such incomprehension may be resonates with the certain 
accounts of his aesthetic experiences, which allow him ‘[un] retour sincère à la racine 
même de l’impression’ (G, 712) – seeing the world without interpreting it. This prompts 
us to ask whether art can offer us a return to a similar kind of ‘obscurité reposante’ and 
if so, we must further ask: how can ‘[un] retour à l’inanalysé’ (RTP III, 762) become a 
process of understanding oneself better?
The ‘letting go of the self’ in sleep means that the Narrator needs to rediscover, and 
indeed, recompose his self – ‘put on’ a self – every time he wakes up: 
Un homme qui dort, tient en cercle autour de lui le fil des heures, l’ordre des 
années et des mondes. […] Mais il suffisait que, dans mon lit même, mon 
sommeil fût profond et détendît entièrement mon esprit; alors celui-ci lâchait le 
plan du lieu où je m’étais endormi, et quand je m’éveillais au milieu de la nuit, 
comme j’ignorais où je me trouvais, je ne savais même pas au premier instant qui 
j’étais; j’avais seulement dans sa simplicité première, le sentiment de l’existence 
comme il peut frémir au fond d’un animal: j’étais plus dénué que l’homme des 
cavernes; mais alors le souvenir—non encore du lieu où j’étais, mais de quelques-
uns de ceux que j’avais habités et où j’aurais pu être—venait à moi comme un 
secours d’en haut pour me tirer du néant d’où je n’aurais pu sortir tout seul; je 
passais en une seconde par-dessus des siècles de civilisation, et l’image 
confusément entrevue de lampes à pétrole, puis de chemises à col rabattu, 
recomposaient peu à peu les traits originaux de mon moi.
 
   A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 5-6 (my emphasis)
This passage crystallises the competing views on selfhood in Proust. The Narrator’s 
remark ‘je ne savais même pas au premier instant qui j’étais’ – a sentence which marks 
the initial (temporal) absence of the knowable self – deserves particularly close 
attention. Before I move on to analyse it in detail, a note on what is meant in the 
following by ‘knowable self’: the distinction I am keen to make is that between simply 
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being conscious of being the subject of one’s own experiences and having some kind of 
clear, conceptual ‘knowledge’ of oneself. For example for Heidegger, subjectivity is a 
defining feature in any ‘true knowledge’ we can possess of the world, which seems to 
imply, unlike many relativist theories that there are truths in the world to be not only 
‘known’ but to be experienced. It is the former aspect on which I focus in the following, 
and to which, I argue, Proust’s Narrator refers when he talks about ‘les propres lecteurs 
d’eux-mêmes’ and ‘le moyen de lire en eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610).
Giorgio Agamben, in his History and Infancy: Essays on the Destruction of the 
Experience analyses descriptions of regaining consciousness in a number of literary 
texts and suggests, on the basis of these descriptions, that there are ‘experiences which 
do not belong to us, which we cannot call “ours”, but which, for this very reason, 
precisely because they are experiences of the inexperiencible, constitute the extreme 
limit against which our experience can press, straining towards death.’9 Agamben 
argues that the object of Proust’s Recherche, for example, ‘is not a lived experience, but 
quite the contrary something that has been neither lived nor experienced’ – such as the 
very first moments described in the opening scene. As already noted, these 
‘inexperiencible’ states occur in Proust’s novel on several occasions, but acknowledging 
this does not need to mark the disappearance of subjectivity altogether. 
Indeed, the very fact that we have these ‘inexperiences’ as a yet-to-be-defined self and 
that we are able to register and acknowledge them as such in retrospect (we are all 
familiar with how it feels to wake up, for example) or indeed talk about them at all, 
suggests that even these moments are experienced by a subject that shares something 
with the present, conscious, actively observing self. If we take the experience of 
dreaming and waking up for example, as Edward Hughes points out, 
one might say that sleep is always a pleasant non-activity for the Narrator [b]ut to 
imply from this that he relentlessly strives after a state of mindlessness would be 
overstating the point, clearly; the mood would seem to be a much more 
intermittent one. Besides, he realises that the escape from individual 
consciousness into sleep is never quite total. Vestiges of the self linger on – and, 
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9 Giorgio Agamben, History and Infancy: Essays on the Destruction of the Experience, trans. by Liz 
Heron (London, New York: Verso, 1993), p. 39. Agamben discusses the moments of regaining one’s 
consciousness through analysing the descriptions of such ‘in-experiencible’ states in Montaigne, 
Rousseau, Baudelaire and Proust.
paradoxically, it is this very residue that enables the Narrator to savour the 
experience.10
Thus there seems to be, in the Narrator’s sphere of experience, an undercurrent of 
continuity and unity which, rather than being something objective recognised and 
‘grasped’, is in fact what enables us to ‘grasp’ our experiences in the first place and link 
them together in time and different physical, psychological and emotive states of being. 
The inexperiences – ‘the experience with neither subject nor object’ as Agamben 
describes them – can also be considered as an essential part of a hermeneutic process of 
understanding the self: a process which is not ‘conceptual’ but disclosive in nature and 
which ‘requires that the unconscious elements involved in the original act of knowledge 
are brought to consciousness,’ as Gadamer puts it.11 Thus, the hermeneutic process of 
self-understanding is based neither on the search for ‘obtainable’ objective knowledge 
nor on imposing meanings intentionally, but rather on the dialogue with what is yet to 
be revealed.
To unravel this idea, let us look more closely at the Narrator’s sentence ‘je ne savais 
même pas au premier instant qui j’étais’ (RTP I, 5). The germ of this sentence is in the 
difference between the first ‘je’ and the second; while the first ‘je’ can be considered as 
a purely linguistic shifter, it nevertheless suggests that there is something there, 
preceding the second recognised self in the nominal clause ‘qui j’étais’ – something or 
someone not yet knowing what or who he is. This sentence opens up the movement 
from un-localised, unidentified subjectivity (or in Guattari’s terms ‘singularity’) to the 
positioning of the nominal self, ‘myself’ (‘qui j’étais’), which is suspended in the 
interim. Rather than reading this sentence as a proof of there being no subjectivity 
beyond ‘an infinite drifting and casual colliding of objects and sensations,’12 one could 
argue that it in fact illuminates the processing nature of selfhood in Proust: in a way, 
everything that happens in Proust’s novel happens between these two ‘je’s – that is, the 
process of becoming oneself.13 
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10 Hughes, p. 56.
11 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 45.
12 Agamben, p. 42.
13 I am grateful to Patrick ffrench for these insights and the discussions that helped me to pursue and 
develop this line of inquiry.
The Narrator’s ‘not yet knowing who he is’ is followed by ‘dans sa simplicité première, 
le sentiment de l’existence comme il peut frémir au fond d’un animal’ (RTP I, 5). Here 
he moves on to some kind of recognition of a singular, embodied, phenomenological 
experience of existence. This is still, however, a kind of pre-subjectified moment, the 
sense of something which ‘frémit’ in animals and men alike; considering the etymology 
of the word ‘animal’, deriving from Latin anima, ‘soul’ is almost the word to use here, 
referring to a semi-individual state of existence which is not yet quite subjectivity.14 
From a Platonic viewpoint, this sentiment of existence could indeed be read as a sense 
of an ‘essence’, which is separable from ‘ce dont parlait l’ouvrage’ for example. 
However, this sentiment still does not yet count as a recognition of a nominal self but 
something far less fixed, something which merely ‘frémit’. 
This kind of primal, ‘lingering’ sense of self resonates in some ways with Plato’s 
allegory of the cave: like the beings in the cave who are chained to the wall, the self 
here has a mere sentiment of existence, a mere shadow of reality, at his disposal.15 It is 
only when the ‘light’ of memory and imagination is shed on this ‘lingering’ essence that 
the sense of self becomes ‘fleshed out’. The same kind of enhancement seems to take 
place in Proust with some aesthetic experiences, such as Elstir’s Impressionist paintings 
or the Vinteuil Septet, which first allow us liberating and restful obscurity, ‘[un] retour à 
l’inanalysé’ (RTP III, 762), are then fleshed out with the help of memory and 
imagination which make the experience ours, allowing us to become aware not merely 
of ‘what is’ but of ‘what might be’. 
What is still primary here, however, prior to the arrival of memory and imagination, are 
the sensations of the body. The body here described as more ‘fidèle’ than the ‘esprit’, 
which also brings an evaluative dimension to the Narrator’s comment: what is 
suggested here is that the ‘esprit’ which ‘n’aurait jamais dû oublier’ in the first place, 
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14 The etymology of ‘animal’ derives from Latin etymon anima (n.), which is defined by the OED as ‘the 
animating principle in living things, the soul; some part or aspect of the soul, esp. the irrational part of the 
soul as distinguished from the rational mind’ and as ‘the vital principle of life, physical life’ as opposed to 
animus, ‘the spiritual, reasoning, willing principle, the human will’. Oxford English Dictionary, ‘anima, 
n.’ <http://oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/7734> (Oxford University Press, http://oed.com) 
[Accessed 6 November 2012].
15 Plato, The Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 240-45.
has forgotten, and it is the sensations that at this first stage attach him back to the world 
outside the dream. At first such a comment seems to resort to the Cartesian separation 
between the body and the mind, but looking at this phenomenon of waking up as a 
whole, we see how the two in fact collaborate inseparably in order to bring the subject 
into a conscious state of mind and restore the ‘knowable’ self.
Next, in steps memory: ‘le souvenir’ comes to the Narrator’s assistance, pulling him out 
of the first ‘je’ – ‘du néant d’où je n’aurais pu sortir tout seul’ – and leads him into the 
process of recomposing ‘peu à peu les traits originaux de mon moi’ (RTP I, 6). ‘Mon 
moi’ here suggests that there are indeed several selves from which the Narrator is to 
draw in recomposing his current self (and that some of these selves seem to indeed 
represent a kind of non-moi) in order to resort to individuality again. ‘Les traits 
originaux’ seem to suggest that there are some fundamental, pre-existing characteristics 
in our being (but which nevertheless need to be recomposed). However, instead of 
reading ‘les traits originaux’ as ‘characteristics,’ we may also consider them as original 
marks of the self that are being drawn back together to form a coherent whole. 
‘Traits’ in this sense may suggests a metaphor of inscription: we may regard the ‘non-
moi’ who is waking up as a foundation, a space, or a canvas, on which our cognition is 
able to reassemble the marks of our previous experiences and rearrange them in the face 
of our new experiences. Through a metaphor drawn from visual arts, such 
‘recomposition’ could be considered as a process similar to that of adding new layers of 
paint, colours and shades, into a painting. The idea of a nominal self (‘qui je suis’) as a 
finished painting parallels interestingly to the proposition presented in Chapter Three 
about certain ‘auratic distance’ in visual representation: how a painting in a way fixes 
our perspective and ‘trains’ our eyes to see in a particular way. In this chapter, however, 
I focus explicitly on literary art, as it seems that the process of reading offers the most 
fertile ground to examine the process of what happens in between the two ‘je’s.
In the opening scene, the process of recomposing the self seems to resemble the 
experience reading of literature in many respects. When we read fictional texts we shift 
between the real and the imagined, somewhat in a similar manner to the way we 
sometimes very gradually move from the state of dreaming to the state of being awake. 
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In the Narrator’s observation ‘je ne savais même pas au premier instant qui j’étais’, the 
interim between the two ‘je’s, between ‘le sentiment de l’existence’ and the nominal 
‘self’ seems to bear resemblance to what happens within the process of reading a book 
and a novel in particular – to how the reader’s view of the book at hand changes 
between reading the first pages of a novel and the last ones. The act of reading seems to 
bring out the connection between the more ‘direct’ immediate experiences in-the-world 
and something obscure but essential and permanent within the reader – ‘dans sa 
simplicité première, le sentiment de l’existence’ (RTP I, 5) if you like – which needs to 
be brought to light not merely by seeking it but by creating also (RTP I, 45). I now turn 
to look at these parallels between reading ‘en soi-même’ and the process of ‘becoming 
oneself’ – the movement between the first ‘je’ and ‘qui j’étais’ – in more detail.
6.2. Being in-between: Discovering Books, Creating Reality
When the Narrator presents his ‘theory’ of reading, the clause ‘lire en eux-mêmes/ soi-
même’ is repeated three times, which prompts us to consider the role of the preposition 
or adverbial pronoun ‘en’ here. It seems to suggest that whether we interpret ‘le moyen 
de lire en eux-mêmes’ as the readers ‘reading (with)in themselves’ or ‘reading for or 
about themselves’, in any case the Narrator is not promising his readers a means to 
directly ‘read themselves’ (‘se lire eux-mêmes’). Since we are looking at the experience 
of reading as self-understanding, this a distinction worth pointing out, as simply 
‘reading oneself’ would indicate a that the self can be grasped conceptually as an object 
and somehow owned or known as a whole. 
The recurring use of ‘en’ here seems to point to the idea of selfhood as a space, in which 
the subject constantly interacts with the unfamiliar, new, and the other, and yet is always 
assisted by a web of personal associations, memories and sensations deriving from past 
experience. I propose that the ‘soi-même’ in the Narrator’s agenda should indeed be 
considered not so much as an agent or a proprietor, but as a space – a mental and bodily 
space in which experiences take place and take shape.16 This idea is supported by a 
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16 This idea that life events only turn into ‘la réalité’ when they enter the self-space, sometimes a long 
after the actual event has taken place, is illustrated germanely in the context of the Narrator’s 
‘intermittences du cœur’ which I discuss shortly.
range of comments the Narrator makes throughout the Recherche. For example, in 
describing his relationship to the Méséglise and Guermantes ways in Du Côté de chez 
Swann I, he talks about ‘des gisements profonds de mon sol mental’17 (RTP I, 182), and 
later on in Sodome et Gomorrhe II about ‘l’existence de notre corps, semblable pour 
nous à un vase où notre spiritualité serait enclose’ (RTP III, 153-4). The Narrator’s 
spatial imagery also prompts us to consider another alternative meaning of ‘propres 
lecteurs’: they could be readers who are ‘soigneux, qui entretiennent les objets, les lieux 
qui [les] entourent’18 – conscientious readers who ‘look after’ things and the 
environment which they ‘inhabit’.
If our past, as the Narrator suggests, forms the ‘gisements profonds’ (RTP I, 182) of our 
mental soil, it seems these layers of experience – the unique combination of ‘minerals’ 
which underlies our perception of the world – at least partly determine how the ‘seeds’ 
of new experience take root and prosper; the rest is up to the reader’s skills of 
cultivation, as it were. This imagery reveals something essential about the nature of the 
Proustian experience of reading ‘en soi-même’, too: it is never our intellect or our will 
alone, nor merely our previous experience, that dictates the outcomes of aesthetic 
reading. Rather, the self-revelatory potential subsists in the way our intellect perceives, 
interacts with and adapts (or not) to our intuitive reactions to the text that are 
fundamentally based on our experience in the world.
To acknowledge this contingent nature of reading, especially reading ‘aesthetically’, 
also resonates with the hermeneutic view that language is not merely a tool with which 
we conceptualise the world, but a precondition for understanding in a much more 
intrinsic sense. As Gadamer puts it, ‘Learning to speak does not mean learning to use a 
preexistent tool for designating a world already somehow familiar to us; it means 
acquiring a familiarity and acquaintance with the world itself and how it confronts us.’19 
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17 For example William Carter discusses these geological analogies in Proust, noting how these images 
‘applied to the artist function on a vertical axis’ on which ‘upward movement gives the artist a larger view 
of the society and the world, allowing him to gauge accurately the spectacle of human folly and [...] 
explore the vistas of time and space’, while ‘a descent along the vertical axis into one’s own inner self 
makes possible the discovery of truths about emotions, memory, art [...] and allows access to ‘the region 
of the “moi profond”’. Carter, p. 218.
18 http://www.larousse.com/en/dictionaries/french/propre. See ‘propre’, sense 2: ‘qui est soigneux, qui 
entretient les objets, les lieux qui l’entourent’ [Accessed 3 August 2012].
19 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 63.
Similarly, in Proust’s novel, language and unmediated experience, instead of rivalling 
with each other, are inseparably intermingled, and the collaboration between these two 
modes of experience (the abstract, linguistic, mediated one and the concrete, sensuous, 
direct one) offers the key to reading oneself. The personal, singular experiences in-the-
world through which the reader approaches the text make the reading experience 
unique, and, in this way, they also become a proof of the existence of a unique reader-
subject – of a self. 
Towards the end of Proust’s novel, the underlying scepticism regarding language’s 
capacity to mediate truths starts to break down. The ‘disclosive’ potential of language is 
recognised by the Narrator in Le Temps retrouvé, and he ultimately considers literary 
presentation as a means to convey things as ‘réels sans être actuels, idéaux sans être 
abstraits’ (RTP IV, 451). The idea that our experiences are not ‘colonised’ or 
‘captivated’ by language is suspended, and this is replaced by an altogether opposing 
view that language can actually ‘dress up’ and ‘safe-guard’ our experiences.
In discussing ‘le moyen de lire en eux-mêmes’, the Narrator reflects his own role as a 
writer and concludes that instead of building his book ‘ambitieusement comme une 
cathédrale’, he will craft it ‘tout simplement comme une robe’(RTP IV, 610). If writing a 
book is like making a dress, then reading it may be regarded as something similar to 
wearing one. This metaphor, in a way, also breaks down the subject-object opposition 
between the reader and the text: if the reader indeed ends up ‘wearing’ the text, the 
artwork-object becomes a part of the subject, in so far as what we wear affects the way 
we behave, look, and feel. And yet a garment does not transform us completely; there is 
something essential of our being which remains the same whatever we ‘wear’. 
In view of the Narrator’s metaphors of the book as a dress and ‘les verres grossissants’, 
we may deem the Narrator’s proposed ‘moyen de lire en eux-mêmes’ not so much as a 
model or method to ‘read the self’ but as hermeneutical experience of the self in the 
fullest sense: as disclosure rather than designation. As Gadamer points out, ‘the nature 
of hermeneutical experience is not that something is outside and desires admission’ but 
‘rather, we are possessed by something [our past experience] and precisely by means of 
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it we are opened up to the new, the different, the true.’20 The idea that the familiar, lived 
experience forms the basis for any new, non-familiar experience (as well as always 
contributes to our imagination) seems to resonate with the Narrator’s remark in Le 
Temps retrouvé about how a great book needs not to be ‘invented’ by the author but is 
something which pre-exists within us, which is ‘à la fois [...] nécessaire et cachée’, and 
which we need to, ‘comme nous ferions pour une loi de la nature [...] découvrir’ (RTP 
IV, 459, my emphasis). 
According to this line of thought, both the ‘actively’ registered experiences of the reader 
and, perhaps even more crucially, those experiences that the reader has had but not yet 
registered as his or hers, affect the reading experience. The latter in particular seem 
crucial in making the readers ‘les propres lecteurs d’eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610), as it is 
these unmarked impressions in our ‘sol mental’ (RTP I, 182) which our encounter with 
the text may ‘dig up’. Instead of fracturing the reader’s sense of self, these ‘pre-
individual’ experiences can be regarded as something which together with the 
cognitively ‘recognised’ experiences form the unique standing point from which a 
reader approaches the text. 21 Indeed it seems, in view of Proust’s novel, that these 
experiences that our ‘nominal’ self is not yet aware of may, in fact, enhance the sense of 
individuality and reality when they are realised (or indeed released) through an aesthetic 
experience.
This sense of ‘la réalité’ in the aesthetic experience prompts us to consider the links 
between reality and literature. The proposition that ‘nous ne sommes nullement libres 
devant l’œuvre d’art’ because it ‘pre-exists’ us was discussed in the previous chapter – 
the way our perception is always ‘stylised’, as Crowther puts it, through our previous 
experiences. 22 The idea that a book is not created but ‘discovered’, whereas reality and 
the past cannot be simply ‘discovered’ but always need to be created also (‘Chercher? 
pas seulement: créer.’ RTP I, 45), seems, at first, contradictory to say the least. One way  
to start to unravel this apparent paradox is to acknowledge the recurring difference (and 
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20 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 9 (my emphasis).
21 A good example of this are the Narrator’s ‘Dostoyevskian’ impressions discussed in the previous 
chapter, which shows how the reader’s experience in Proust does not merely happen and produce 
meanings on the level of thought but is tied to the immediate reality in which the reading takes place.
22 Crowther, p.172 (my emphasis).
occasional clash) between ‘le fait’ and ‘la réalité’ in Proust’s novel. This difference is 
most wonderfully described in the context of ‘les intermittences du cœur’ (RTP III, 
152-7), to which the Narrator later refers in Le Temps retrouvé, remarking how he had 
‘perdu [sa] grand-mère en réalité bien des mois après l’avoir perdu en fait’ (RTP IV, 
491). 
The intermittences illustrate the overwhelming sense of ‘la réalité’ experienced in the 
present moment – the realisation that the grandmother is gone forever and the intense 
suffering that comes with this realisation, ‘la sécheresse de l’âme’ (RTP III, 153). And 
yet at the same time, ‘les intermittences du cœur’ point to the idea that the Narrator 
expresses much earlier in Du côté de chez Swann I of how ‘la réalité ne se forme que 
dans la mémoire’ (RTP I, 182). The grandmother’s absence is realised through the 
memory of her presence: as the Narrator states, ‘je retrouvais dans un souvenir 
involontaire et complet la réalité vivante’ (RTP III, 153). However, the Narrator also 
notes that in order for the impression or the memory to actually become ‘réalité’, it 
needs to be recreated by our cognitive faculties: ‘Cette réalité n’existe pas pour nous 
tant qu’elle n’a pas été recréée par notre pensée’ (RTP III, 153). What is also 
emphasised in this process is the actual experience of becoming aware, which takes 
place in the present moment: thus, even if ‘la réalité’ is only formed ‘dans la mémoire,’ 
it requires movement between the past and present moment, the movement of ‘la 
pensée’, to emerge.23
‘Les intermittences du cœur’ strike the Narrator with an overwhelming sense of being 
alive and seem to point to some kind of unity of the self or selves across time – unity, 
which does not rely on conceptual understanding or coherence but one which seems 
rather to be based on emotions and impressions we gather and carry around in the 
‘container’ of our body throughout our life: 
Car aux troubles de la mémoire sont liées les intermittences du cœur. C’est sans 
doute l’existence de notre corps, semblable pour nous à un vase où notre 
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23 This idea that comprehension requires memory and re-creation was discussed earlier in Chapter Four in 
the context of music; listening to the Vinteuil Sonata played by Mme Swann, the Narrator remarks: 
‘Aussi n’a-t-on pas tort de dire “entendre la première fois”. Si l’on n’avait vraiment, comme on l’a cru, 
rien distingué à la première audition, la deuxième, la troisième seraient autant de premières, et il n’y 
aurait pas de raison pour qu’on comprît quelque chose de plus à la dixième. Probablement ce qui fait 
défaut, la première fois, ce n’est pas la compréhension, mais la mémoire.’ (JF I), 520 (my emphasis).
spiritualité serait enclose, qui nous induit à supposer que tous nos biens intérieurs, 
nos joies passées, toutes nos douleurs sont perpétuellement en notre possession. 
     A la Recherche du temps perdu III, 153-4
It is the fact of the existence of our body which, according to the Narrator, makes us 
think of our ‘spiritualité’ as something enclosed, but the Narrator’s expression here – the 
way the word ‘semblable’ followed by a conditional (‘serait’) casts doubt upon the 
opinion that is being expressed – indicates that this might still be an erroneous 
conclusion. There is thus, at this point, a certain ambivalence as to whether the Narrator 
truly believes that our past experiences are in fact ‘contained’ within us. This skepticism 
seems not to be overcome until at the very end of Le Temps retrouvé in fact, where we 
witness the Narrator’s deliberation of the artistic process and his growing fear of death 
and the decay of the body, arrive at this very conclusion – that the mind and the body 
are inseparably interlinked: ‘Car le danger intérieur, comme celui d’une hémorragie 
cérébrale, est extérieur aussi, étant du corps. Et avoir un corps c’est la grande menace 
pour l’esprit.’ (RTP IV, 613)
This comment also links to what was said earlier about the ‘propre lecteurs’ and the idea 
of ownership, as the Narrator’s words here seem to suggest that we are in some ways 
the proprietors of our experiences. However, we can detect here a similar kind of 
emphasis that is used in the Narrator’s ‘moyen de lire en eux-mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610): 
just as we are not promised ‘le moyen de nous lire nous-mêmes’, the Narrator’s remark 
here does not suggest that we actively possess our past experiences (he does not say 
‘nous les possédons’) but rather that these are ‘perpétuellement en notre 
possession’ (RTP III, 153-4, my emphasis). In fact, it seems that these experiences are, 
for most of the time, inaccessible to us – at least in this intense sense of yielding to us 
‘la réalité vivante’ (SG, 153).
Thus, the intermittence passages also manifest how realisation, the process of 
understanding, is based neither on mere intellectual awareness, ‘la pensée’, nor on 
memory alone: ‘les faits’ have long since given the Narrator the knowledge that his 
grandmother is dead, but it is the memory of her presence and not of her death which 
leads him to understand what has happened. In Du côté de chez Swann I, discussing the 
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Méséglise and Guermantes ways, the Narrator contemplates the role of ‘la pensée’ and 
the mediation of experience as follows:
Sans doute [la vie intellectuelle] progresse en nous insensiblement et les vérités 
qui en ont changé pour nous le sens et l’aspect, qui nous ont ouvert de nouveaux 
chemins, nous en préparions depuis longtemps la découverte; mais c’était sans le 
savoir; et elles ne datent pour nous que du jour, de la minute où elles nous sont 
devenues visibles. 
 
       A la Recherche du temps perdu  I, 181 
The Narrator thus proposes that there are certain ‘vérités’ which we can access through 
‘la pensée’. While it is suggested here that there are ‘truths’ to be discovered (and in 
Proust, ‘les vérités’ seem to most often refer to the effects of our own subjective 
experiences in the past that we have yet to acknowledge, rather than to ‘universal 
truths’), it seems that these truths as such are not somehow the same as ‘reality’. ‘La 
réalité’ resides in the process of arriving at these truths, our travels across ‘toutes les 
diverses vies que nous menons parallèlement’ (RTP I, 182), in a certain mode of being 
‘in-between’.
While ‘les faits’ provide the framework for our nominal self (‘qui je suis’), the pre-
subjectified ‘inexperiences’ (such as the moment of waking up or regaining 
consciousness) seem to reside beyond ‘les faits’, creating otherness within the one who 
experiences – creating the difference between the first ‘je’ and the second, as it were. 
Thus, the encounter with otherness (both in the sense of the other within the self, as 
described in the opening scene of Proust’s novel, and the other of/ in the text when we 
are reading a book) ‘discloses the reality of alternative possibilities not presently [one’s] 
own but which might yet become [one’s] own’. 24 Understanding, from the perspective 
of hermeneutic ontology, is not a result but, as Nicholas Davey puts it, ‘an event 
[which] does not merely interpret the world but changes it’.25 This approach may also 
shed light on the Narrator’s proposition that reality needs to be created and can never 
simply be discovered.
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New York University Press, 2006), p. 15.
25 Davey, p. xiv.
But if reality and self-understanding are both creative processes and cannot be pinned 
down to objectively graspable ‘faits’, what is, then, the process of recomposing ‘peu à 
peu les traits originaux de mon moi’ (RTP I, 5-6) based on? Is it the existence of the 
body or maybe that of involuntary memory (as far as the two are inseparable in Proust) 
which allows the subject a space in which to experience his or her ‘spiritualité’ as 
something unified? At this point, the idea of a ‘livre intérieur’ which needs to be 
discovered (RTP IV, 459) becomes crucial: the Narrator’s plea to his readers to ask 
themselves ‘si les mots qu’ils lisent en eux-mêmes sont bien ceux que j’ai écrits’ (RTP 
IV, 610) suggests that reading is a trans-subjective process in which the difference 
between the self and the other in fact starts to break down. This process of highly 
subjective evaluation, then, does not necessarily require but may lead to the reader 
becoming more fully aware of his or her ‘point of departure’ – of the person he or she 
has been and is at the time of reading. According to hermeneutic tradition, this is an 
essential part of the process that eventually helps us to define our unique standing-point 
from which we arrive into this ‘disclosive’ space of the in-between. 
Reading in hermeneutic practice does not thus stop at recognising the other and then 
dispelling the apparent difference between the self and the other. Rather, reading is a 
process which continues beyond this point as communication between the otherness and 
the sameness and also prompts the reader to ask what his or her sense of familiarity or 
difference is in fact based on. The Narrator’s idea of the readers reading the same words 
that he has written ‘en eux-mêmes’ does not necessarily mean the reader’s individuality 
‘exploding’ in the face of the text, ‘la différence entre les deux textes pouvant être 
souvent imputée non à l’auteur mais au lecteur’ (RTP IV, 490). This remark suggests 
that there must be something within the reader which makes them respond to a text in a 
particular way. If it is indeed the reader who ultimately makes one reading different 
from another, the question of how this happens far from inconsequential.
To examine the question of how the readers appreciate and appropriate a text, let us 
return now to the comparison presented earlier in this chapter of how reading a book 
may be considered parallel to the process that takes place between the first ‘je’ and ‘qui 
j’étais’. In the beginning of a book, the reader is faced with strangeness, otherness and 
undertakes a task of not only imagining but making sense of this otherness. The 
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Narrator, waking up, is in a similar position when ‘le souvenir – non encore du lieu où 
j’étais, mais de quelques-uns de ceux que j’avais habités et où j’aurais pu être – venait à 
moi comme un secours d’en haut pour me tirer du néant d’où je n’aurais pu sortir tout 
seul’ (RTP I, 5). In alike manner, the reader starts to unravel the textual ‘space’ into 
which he or she has entered, by searching amongst ‘quelques-uns de [les lieux] que 
j’avais habités et où j’aurais pu être’ – that is, though contrasting and comparing the 
experience of the text to his or her previous experience of other texts or outside the text. 
In this way, page by page, the reader’s past (personal) experience and his or her 
experience of other texts becomes intertwined in the text at hand. Evidence of life 
experience having been woven into the experience of text this way can be found for 
example in a passage in Le Temps retrouvé where the Narrator, while waiting in the 
Guermantes library to be let into a party, comes across François le Champi and a book 
by Bergotte he used to read as a boy. With François le Champi he suddenly comes face 
to face with ‘l’étranger [qui] était l’enfant que j’étais alors, que le livre venait de 
susciter en moi’ (RTP IV, 463) and browsing in the volume by Bergotte takes him back 
to a particular day of reading the book: ‘[D]u volume lui-même, la neige qui couvrait 
les Champs-Elysées, le jour où je le lus, n'a pas été enlevée. Je la vois toujours’ (RTP IV, 
465). This passage brings out both the sensuous and self-revelatory dimensions of the 
act of reading, and I shall discuss it in more detail shortly.
It is once again demonstrated through these reading-related memories of the Narrator 
that the appropriation of a text is never a project for the conscious mind alone. In an 
aesthetic experience, it is precisely the liberation from the continuous striving for 
knowledge and clarity which may enable the vestiges of the self that have not been 
glimpsed in a long time to surface and thus take us closer to a fuller understanding of 
our being. This part of the Narrator’s proposal links to the Gadamerian idea that ‘it is 
not so much our judgements as it is our prejudices that constitute our being’ – and 
Gadamer uses the word ‘prejudice’ here in its original non-negative sense as simply 
referring to ‘the conditions whereby we experience something – whereby what we 
encounter says something to us’.26 While reading something for the first time evokes 
impressions rather than necessarily memories, these impressions are never detached 
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from ‘the conditions whereby [the text] says something to us’ and therefore the reading 
experience, especially when revisiting a text, can reveal to us what is the same in the 
experience of a past self and the current one. 
This thematic prominence of ‘le souvenir’ in Proust’s novel seems to challenge the view 
of ‘exploding’ subjectivity that for example Agamben takes in suggesting that in Proust 
‘there is no longer really any subject, but only [...] an infinite drifting and casual 
colliding of objects and sensations.’27 As we already saw in Part One of the thesis, in 
order to truly investigate the role of memory in selfhood we need to consider it in view 
of the ways in which ‘le souvenir’ renders itself to us – both in mediation through 
language and in establishing the parameters of our experience of the tangible, sensuous 
reality.28 Even if memory alone cannot help us to understand who we are, the emphasis 
that Proust’s novel gives especially to involuntary memory as a provider of a supreme 
(even if fleeting) sense of selfhood, seems to be recognised, developed and understood. 
In the last part of this chapter, I examine the role of such ‘souvenir’ and the sensuous 
impressions attached to it in the reading process.
6.3. ‘La lecture prolongée du livre’: Reading-in-the-World
What has been suggested in this chapter so far is that the process of reading literature –  
by making us go ‘outside’ ourselves, opening us to the otherness of the text – may both 
reveal what is familiar to us and lead to a new, enhanced understanding of ourselves. 
This familiarity through which the new and unfamiliar is approached seems to be 
largely based on the personal social and psychological circumstances of the reader-
subject as well as the socio-cultural (intellectual) traditions to which the reader belongs. 
However, ‘interiority is only one aspect of the reading experience,’ as Adam Watt notes 
in analysing the Narrator’s reading experiences in the Combray garden.29 This passage, 
together with the Narrator’s memories of François le Champi and the novel by Bergotte 
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described in Le Temps retrouvé, call to our attention another ‘affective’ dimension of the 
experience of reading: the role of sensuous experiences during the act of reading.
As the examples from the Recherche in the previous chapters demonstrate, the act of 
reading (and especially the reading of literary texts) is far from indifferent to the 
sensory stimuli drawn from the physical surroundings in which reading takes place. On 
the one hand, this dimension of the reading experience, being applicable to everyone 
and anyone who reads, seems to make it less dependent on the reader’s socio-cultural 
context and ‘abstract’ cultural models of thinking. On the other hand, the sensuous 
impressions attached to the experience also make each reader’s experience more 
personal, adding even more variables to the experiences between individual readers.30 
This leads us to consider further parallels between the reading experience and the 
process of ‘becoming oneself’: the Narrator, in moving from a pre-subjectified 
existence (‘le sentiment de l’existence comme il peut frémir au fond d’un animal’ (RTP 
I, 5)) on to recomposing the ‘traits originaux’, first through the ‘knowledge’ of the body. 
He starts by observing his surroundings through sensuous impressions, which his 
intellect and memory then gradually arrange into the ‘narrative’ of the nominal self (‘qui 
j’étais’). In the same way, the reader, constantly subject to physical sensations and time 
during the act of reading, moves from the ‘blank’ landscape of the first pages of the 
book into a ‘living’ narrative, by intertwining into the text the sensuous, emotive and 
temporal impressions evoked during the reading experience and drawing from what has 
been experienced prior to it. 
This phenomenological dimension of reading seems particularly relevant to the question 
of what kinds of memories a book is able to evoke. In Le Temps retrouvé, the Narrator 
notes how ‘un livre que nous lûmes ne rest[e] pas unis à jamais seulement à ce qu’il y 
avait autour de nous; il le reste aussi fidèlement à ce que nous étions alors’ (RTP IV, 
464). With François le Champi, he comes face to face with ‘l’étranger [qui] était moi-
même, c’était l’enfant que j’étais alors, que le livre venait de susciter en moi’ (RTP IV, 
463) while with the Bergotte novel he is not able to ‘retrouver les pages que j’aimais 
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tant’ (RTP IV, 465). The sense of self here seems to be inherently linked to the reader’s 
emotive reality at the time of the reading and, especially in the context of the Bergotte 
novel, also to the sensuous reality of the reading experience. Skimming through the 
pages seems to make the Narrator simultaneously aware of the strangeness within the 
self and, by making him reflect on the multiple stages through which he has become 
who he is now, also yield to him a sense of a continuum between now and what came 
before.
The Narrator refers to this experience of continuity as ‘la lecture prolongée du 
livre’ (RTP IV, 465), acknowledging the ‘long-term’ effects of the reading experience: 
the ways in which a book we have read can both ‘safeguard’ experiences from our past 
for us as well as function as a catalyst for new understanding, by having made us open 
to the otherness of the text in the first place and then to the change that has taken place 
in our very selves between now and when we first read it. In other words, a book can 
reveal to the reader both what is the same and what is different between past and present 
on a very personal level, because of the way the reading experience has been 
‘animated’ through hitherto partly unconscious or unremarked experiences.; this kind of 
‘personification’ is the germ of the self-revelatory potential that the aesthetic reading 
process may offer to the reader. This tendency is manifested in the Narrator’s own 
literary impressions as a reader in the novel, as well as, of course, in what a novel like 
the Recherche itself may conjure up for its readers. 
This sensuous and contextualised dimension of the reading experience thus offers 
another angle on the paradox of how we can arrive at self-understanding by initially 
moving away from the self. Let us consider the ‘escapist’ appeal of literary texts for 
example, to which the young Narrator himself is by no means impartial: reading in 
Combray, he tries to forget ‘des incidents médiocres de [son] existence personnelle’ and 
replace them with ‘une vie d’aventures et d’aspirations étranges au sein d’un pays 
arrosé d’eaux vives,’ (RTP I, 87). At first, it seems paradoxical that this kind of 
endeavour could ever result in an enhanced sense of selfhood. However, it is his own 
dreams and aspirations that keep cropping up and developing while his imagination is 
being ‘fed’ by the books. What remains with him throughout the years is not so much 
the contents of these books, but the emotive and sensuous imprint these hours of reading 
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have left on his mind:
Beaux après-midi du dimanche sous le marronnier du jardin de Combray, 
soigneusement vidés par moi des incidents médiocres de mon existence 
personnelle que j’y avais remplacés par une vie d’aventures et d’aspirations 
étranges au sein d’un pays arrosé d’eaux vives, vous m’évoquez encore cette vie 
quand je pense à vous et vous la contenez en effet pour l’avoir peu à peu 
contournée et enclose — tandis que je progressais dans ma lecture et que tombait 
la chaleur du jour — dans le cristal successif, lentement changeant et traversé de 
feuillages, de vos heures silencieuses, sonores, odorantes et limpides.
      
   A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 87 (my emphasis)
This passage prompts the question of what we actually tend to remember of a reading 
experience. For the Narrator, these ‘heures silencieuses, sonores, odorantes et 
limpides,’ contain the aspirations and dreams that reading once mobilised in his young 
mind rather than the contents of the books he was reading. Finding one’s past self in a 
text once read is not a straightforward process of simply rereading the words on the 
page, but rather attached to the entire psycho-physical reality of the reading situation. 
The following excerpt from Le Temps retrouvé, in which the Narrator finds a copy of 
the Bergotte novel in the Guermantes library, describes beautifully the kind of 
‘involuntary’ sensuous dimension that has been evoked in the reader during the act of 
reading: 
Certes, pour bien des livres de mon enfance, et, hélas, pour certains livres de 
Bergotte lui-même, quand un soir de fatigue il m’arrive de les prendre, ce n’est 
pourtant que comme j’aurais pris un train dans l’espoir de me reposer par la vision 
de choses différentes et en respirant l’atmosphère d'autrefois. Mais il arrive que 
cette évocation recherchée se trouve entravée au contraire par la lecture prolongée 
du livre. Il en est un [livre] de Bergotte […] lu jadis en entier un jour d’hiver où je 
ne pouvais voir Gilberte, et où je ne peux réussir à retrouver les phrases que 
j’aimais tant. Certains mots me feraient croire que ce sont elles, mais c’est 
impossible. Où serait donc la beauté que je leur trouvais? Mais du volume lui-
même la neige qui couvrait les Champs-Elysées le jour où je le lus n’a pas été 
enlevée, je la vois toujours.
                                                            A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 464-5
The subject matter is not even mentioned, and ‘les phrases que j’aimais tant’ cannot be 
found; instead, the Narrator faces the memory of the snow that covered the Champs-
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Elysées and made it impossible for him to go and play with Gilberte in the park, making 
him stay in and read his books. Thus, instead of discovering his previous self or state of 
mind simply by decoding the words on the page, it seems that a crucial part of the 
revelatory potential of a reading experience is in fact attached to the sensuous 
impressions drawn from the world outside the book at the time of reading: browsing in 
the book does not only remind the Narrator of Gilberte but takes him back to the actual 
sensuous universe of those snowy winter days when he was reading it. The question, 
then, is: if the memory of the book is not traceable in the words themselves and we 
cannot access the previous self by reading the words on the page but only through 
impressions we have attached to them, how does a book improve on eating another 
madeleine?
Let us consider this question further through another description of how a text has 
become charged with highly personal associations. Just before finding the Bergotte 
book, the Narrator has been browsing in a copy of François le Champi, a book in which 
his ‘souvenirs d’enfance et de famille étaient tendrement mêlés’ (RTP IV, 463), and 
remarks that
Aussi ce livre que ma mère m’avait lu haut à Combray presque jusqu’au matin, 
avait-il gardé pour moi tout le charme de cette nuit-là. Certes, la ‘plume’ de 
George Sand, pour prendre une expression de Brichot qui aimait tant dire qu’un 
livre était écrit “d’une plume alerte”, ne me semblait pas du tout, comme elle avait  
paru si longtemps à ma mère avant qu’elle modelât lentement ses goûts littéraires 
sur les miens, une plume magique. Mais c’était une plume que sans le vouloir 
j’avais électrisée comme s’amusent souvent à faire les collégiens, et voici que 
mille riens de Combray, et que je n’apercevais plus depuis longtemps, sautaient 
légèrement d’eux-mêmes et venaient à la queue leu leu se suspendre au bec 
aimanté, en une chaîne interminable et tremblante de souvenirs.
       A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 463
A book does not ‘contain’ the past in itself but rather ‘guards’ it. It is the ‘mille riens’, 
the insignificant details that have been attached to it unintentionally (‘sans le vouloir’) 
that seem to hold the key to ‘la réalité’ of those hours we spent reading, after which we 
were never quite the same again. This passage bears a striking resemblance to the 
Narrator’s comparison of memories to Japanese paper flowers in the madeleine passage 
in Combray: the ‘magnetised’ nib of the writer’s pen here produces an expansion of 
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detail in a somewhat similar fashion of ‘la queue leu leu’ to those Japanese paper 
flowers which, when placed in water, open out, ‘se contournent, se colorent, se 
différencient, deviennent des fleurs, des maisons, des personnages consistants et 
reconnaissables.’ (RTP I, 47) 
There is, however, a difference between the emergence of the past from the pages of a 
novel and from one’s teacup: in the madeleine passage, where ‘Combray et ses 
environs, tout cela qui prend forme et solidité est sorti, ville et jardins, de [sa] tasse de 
thé (RTP I, 47), the Narrator feels the connection but cannot explain this connection. 
The impressions produced by the pen come somehow more organised and collected 
than those produced by the madeleine: the magnetised nib represents reconfiguring 
experience into a structure as opposed to the expansive profusion of Japanese paper 
flowers. 
This shift from the flower to the pen also marks the great thematic shift in the novel as a 
whole between Combray and Le Temps retrouvé: from memory to art and to the 
possibility of accessing the former via the latter. With the pen, the nib of which has 
collected things, the explanation is embedded in the way we ourselves have linked 
abstract representation to our own emotional, sensuous and psychological reality. It is 
the writer’s ‘plume’ but the reader is the one who charges it with electricity, and it the 
creative work that the reader (as much as the writer) needs to put into encoding the 
truths or the past from a book that makes a book a more powerful ‘vessel’ than a 
madeleine. 
Thus, as the above examples show, access to one’s past is not granted simply by re-
reading a text. Rather, it only seems to become available through (non-deliberate) 
evocation of the impressions associated with a book at the time of reading:
Ce que nous appelons la réalité est un certain rapport entre ces sensations et ces 
souvenirs qui nous entourent simultanément – rapport que supprime une simple 
vision cinématographique, laquelle s’éloigne par là d’autant plus du vrai qu’elle 
prétend se borner à lui – rapport unique que l’écrivain doit retrouver pour en 
enchaîner à jamais dans sa phrase les deux termes différents. [...] [La] vérité ne 
commencera qu’au moment où l’écrivain prendra deux objets différents, posera 
leur rapport [...] et les enfermera dans les anneaux nécessaires d’un beau style. 
Même, ainsi que la vie, quand en rapprochant une qualité commune à deux 
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sensations, il dégagera leur essence commune en les réunissant l’une et l’autre 
pour les soustraire aux contingences du temps, dans une métaphore.
     A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 468 
This passage illustrates the parallel ways in which ‘la réalité’ is revealed to us in both 
life and literature: it resides within ‘un certain rapport entre ces sensations et les 
souvenirs qui nous entourent simultanément’ and this rapport being grasped by the one 
who is ‘at the centre’ of these sensations and memories. This relation cannot be 
comprehended through a mere ‘cinematographic vision’ that would only set forth one 
‘truth’ at the expense of others, thus destroying the very possibility of genuine 
disclosure, the understanding of what is ‘in-between’ these different experiences. 
The Narrator notes how ‘la vérité’ only begins when the writer recognises the 
relationship – the concurrent similarity and the difference between two things – and 
then links these two things together in words. One of the means of literary language to 
embrace this relation of sensations and memories is a metaphor, which in Proust, as 
Genette remarks, ‘n’est pas un ornement, mais l’instrument nécessaire à une restitution, 
par le style, de la vision des essences, parce qu’elle est l’équivalent stylistique de 
l’expérience psychologique de la mémoire involontaire qui seule permet, en rapprochant  
deux sensations séparées dans le temps, de dégager leur essence commune par le 
miracle d’une analogie’.31 In the reading experience, then, the power of metaphor 
resides precisely in the fact that this kind of creative combination of words and concepts 
always necessitates ‘opening up’ by the reader. Heidegger calls this process ‘the setting-
itself-into-work truth’ and deems it as the very ‘essence of art’.32 The reading process 
thus becomes an essential part of releasing these ‘suspended’ truths – truths that can 
only ever begin in a text. 
While in the frame of deconstructionist theories the indeterminability within language 
often seems to result in some kind of deferral or dissemination of meaning, in the 
hermeneutic tradition it is what invites one to participate through the process of 
interpretation, to experience language as an integral part of how one experiences things 
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and one’s own self. The task of interpretation, which is inherently connected to the use 
of language, is precisely what makes the experience of reading particularly interesting 
from the self-revelatory angle: the freedom of interpretation (and on the other hand also 
the necessity of interpretation) in reading always compels the reader to choose, which, 
in turn, leads to communication with oneself.
The openness that marks literary language and the reading experience is not thus 
openness in the sense that it would allow the reader to project some specific 
interpretations on to the text – this would, in a way, be like reading ‘la réalité’ through 
cinematographic vision. Rather, the openness that an artwork allows us and that is 
required in the process of genuine self-understanding is openness in its most intrinsic 
hermeneutical sense: being open to the extent of being vulnerable – openness as 
something which ‘may lead towards the possibilities of translation and transcendence 
but such a path cannot be taken without the risk of transforming one’s self-
understanding and hence one’s relations with others’.33 
The concept of openness in hermeneutics has been criticised for being, as Davey puts it, 
‘openness that is only open to opportunities for imposing one’s own sense of meaning 
and purpose upon the environment’ while not really ‘responding’ to otherness; this 
criticism is fundamentally flawed however, as philosophical hermeneutics does not 
understand interpretation as ‘an epistemological schema or projection [but rather as] a 
process of involvement and engagement’.34 This kind of openness includes the 
acknowledgement of otherness, not its suppression, and thus enables true 
communication with the other. The empowering effects of hermeneutic openness are 
fundamentally based on the ways in which it is ‘not only open to the other but to the 
difference that the other is able to open within ourselves,’ thus allowing ‘a little more 
than a liberal tolerance of other points of view’.35 This aspect of hermeneutic and 
phenomenological practice also answers to Guattari’s critique of the assumed 
‘réductionnisme systématique’ which would ‘rétrécir ses objets à une pure transparence 
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intentionelle’.36
It may seem paradoxical indeed that we should arrive at clearer or more real self-
understanding through someone else’s mediated experience of the world, but once we 
acknowledge how much more the process of reading is than mere reception of 
mediation, we may consider the process as one through which the readers are able to 
both read and (re)create their subjectivity. The reader of literature is not merely an 
active participant in transferring meanings or ideas expressed in the text, but actually 
provides the ultimate space for truth-making and self-creation to happen. The 
phenomenological approach suggests we may actually feel ourselves being a part of the 
world and coherent only through acknowledging that separation between our experience 
and its representation is in fact artificial. Subjectivity, like a life experience, therefore, is 
not something that simply is ‘out there’ (or even ‘in there’) to be represented, but rather 
representation is part and parcel of our subjectivity and the way we experience things. 
However, just as the familiar can only be grasped through difference (e.g. readers needs 
to go ‘outside’ themselves to see what lies within themselves), the difference cannot be 
grasped without the familiar, and this is the germ of Gadamerian hermeneutics, the true 
locus of which is ‘the in-between’.37 Thus, rather than the subject merging into the 
other, the process of understanding it is a mode of ‘being in-between’ the familiar and 
the different. The process of reading that may result in enhanced self-understanding is 
not a subjectivist exercise of self-confirmation, carried out by projecting one’s beliefs 
and prejudices on the other; rather, its germ lies precisely in allowing the possibility of 
transformation – not by but with the other. As Davy puts it,
The narratives we inhabit are rarely singular. That an other is able to offer me a 
transformation of myself and to bring into fruition aspects of myself that were 
present within me and yet withheld from me does not necessarily mean that I will 
travel the particular path that they open. 38
 
    
Thus hermeneutic openness does not lead into de-subjectification or disappearance of 
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selfhood either: it relies on the idea that ‘it is experience itself that opens us to the 
possibility of further experience’ and that the ‘complete openness of outlook’ is a 
contradiction in terms and ‘would render us hermeneutically blind’.39 What this means 
to the reader-subject, then, is that it is his or her experiences (both direct everyday 
experiences and mediated experiences) that form a certain ‘sol mental’ (RTP I, 82) into 
which the new and unfamiliar experience may be sown. 
We can only understand the transformation that has taken place within us in retrospect – 
that is, in time – and in this sense ‘la réalité ne se forme que dans la mémoire’ (RTP I, 
182), as the Narrator suggests already in Du Côté de chez Swann I in contemplating his 
walks along the Méséglise and Guermantes ways:
Mais c’est surtout comme à des gisements profonds de mon sol mental, comme 
aux terrains résistants sur lesquels je m’appuie encore, que je dois penser au côté 
de Méséglise et au côté de Guermantes. C’est parce que je croyais aux choses, aux 
êtres, tandis que je les parcourais, que les choses, les êtres qu’ils m’ont fait 
connaître, sont les seuls que je prenne encore au sérieux et qui me donnent encore 
de la joie. Soit que la foi qui crée soit tarie en moi, soit que la réalité ne se forme 
que dans la mémoire, les fleurs qu’on me montre aujourd’hui pour la première 
fois ne me semblent pas de vraies fleurs.
 
       A la Recherche du temps perdu I, 182 
The ‘gisements profonds’ in the Narrator’s ‘mental soil’ mark all the experiences that 
have been gathered along the two ‘côtés’: the idea of being ‘positioned’ by our past is 
also present in this passage (‘les choses, les êtres que [les deux côtés] m’ont fait 
connaître’), as ‘les fleurs qu’on me montre aujourd’hui pour la première fois’ are 
inevitably compared to the ‘vraies fleurs’ he knows from his walks in Combray. While 
the connection between the flowers and the ‘soil’ metaphor is delightful, it is worth 
noting that in this passage, as in so many others, the Narrator explores his philosophical 
ideas in reference to the experience of actual physical objects, such as in this case the 
actual flowers that grow along the Méséglise and Guermantes ways. The prominence of 
these ‘tangible’ examples in Proust’s novel and the linking of involuntary memory to the 
sensuous experiences prompt us to consider the subject’s physical existence also in the 
reading process. 
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Discussing the magical ‘rapport’ between sensations and memories, the Narrator 
remarks how ‘la nature’ sets example for this relation, which is the sole source of ‘la 
réalité’ and which the writer must grasp in order to perform his ‘tâche de 
traducteur’ (RTP IV, 469). Nature, as the Narrator remarks, is in this sense the beginning 
of all art: ‘La nature ne m’avait-elle pas mis elle-même, à ce point de vue, sur la voie de 
l’art, n’était-elle pas commencement d’art elle-même, elle qui ne m’avait permis de 
connaître, souvent longtemps après, la beauté d’une chose que dans une autre, midi à 
Combray que dans le bruit de ses cloches [...]?’ (RTP IV, 468) 
The memory of bodily ‘appropriation’ of the world around us is thus as essential for our 
sense of ‘la réalité’ as the cognitive ‘mapping’ of our experiences. As Paul Crowther 
puts it:
The human subject is in constant state of reciprocity with a world in which it 
inheres. [...] In our most basic pre-reflective engagement with the world, all our 
sensori-motor and cognitive capacities operate inseparably as a unified field. This 
unity, however, does not simply happen. It is a process of growth involving bodily  
co-ordination and the acquisition of language on the basis of complex and 
continuing social interchange. [...] We become persons gradually.40
  
    
The way we associate abstract ideas to our ‘in-the-world’ experiences is here viewed as 
a part of an individual ‘process of growth’. Following this line of thought, the Proustian 
‘moyen de lire en soi-même’ (RTP IV, 610) can be considered as a kind of process of 
‘reading-in-the-world’, acknowledging the role of the direct, embodied in-the-world 
experience on the one hand, and that of imagination and intuition on the other, in 
grasping (and indeed, recomposing) what we call ‘reality’. 
The Narrator’s idea of ‘embodied time’ suggests that the subject can come to realise his 
or her unique standing point (from which an experience can be counted as his or her 
‘own’) through the continuities of sensation between different experiences at different 
points in time; this is where the analogy between the past and the present is 
imaginatively drawn from the real experience and the sense that there is something 
essentially shared between the two. This sensation is also fundamentally characteristic 
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of reading literature, not least because of the way we learn language in the first place: 
through an endless mnemonic process of (personal) association of words and concepts 
with our experience in-the-world. 
In this chapter, and in the course of this study, I have explored the Proustian notion of 
selfhood and reading through an approach which emphasises the processual nature of 
truth and self-understanding. The self-understanding gained through the aesthetic 
reading experience is essentially ‘a process of encounter [which] resides in the 
continuous generation of the in-between’ – the in-between which ‘is no “no man’s land” 
between isolated subjects’ but rather ‘the disclosive space of the hermeneutic encounter 
itself. It is this space which subjectivizes the participating individuals.’41 This process of 
self-understanding involves acknowledging the reciprocal relationship between primary 
experience, imagination and mediation, as well as the role of all three in our way of 
shaping what we call ‘reality’, the world and our own selves. As Adam Watt notes, ‘the 
reading of fiction opens our eyes to the fragility of what we take to be ontological and 
epistemological certainties, and destabilises the traditional distinctions between the 
intellectual and the empirical, between the real and the imaginary’.42 In this sense one 
major aspect in which literature may alleviate the perceptual uncertainty of life is, 
paradoxically, that it shows us how much of what we consider as ‘epistemologically’ 
sound and unshakable is, in fact, constantly understood via our personal experience in-
the-world and imagination and not just ‘pure’ intellect or reason.
In Proust’s novel, the metaphors of body and the brain as containers of experiences – 
containers of time itself in fact – indicate the inseparability of the mind and the body of 
the Proustian subject and of how our ‘spiritualité’, our intellect, and our memories are 
never detached from the bodily experience nor from time. We travel through life as 
psycho-physical beings, so deeply affected by the sensuous that it becomes, in a way, 
the basis for our thought processes, including our imagination. Accordingly, Proust’s 
Narrator presents literary work as able to offer us the means to read ‘en [nous]-
mêmes’ (RTP IV, 610) rather than simply reading ‘nous-mêmes’ full stop. The self-
understanding that reading provides is thus not conceptual understanding; rather, it leads 
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into enhanced sense – even if only temporary – of one’s place in and experience in the 
world and of the world. As the self is continuously taking shape and evolving (or 
deteriorating), the subject’s self-understanding and any ‘knowledge’ can only be 
accessed through a process which both opens us up for the new and unfamiliar and 




‘Votre Grand-mère Est Perdue’
Watching the trees of Hudimesnil quiver on the horizon, the Narrator remarks how the 
trees seem to take a human form and in their attempt to communicate to him the secrets 
of his forgotten past,
semblaient me demander de les emmener avec moi, de les rendre à la vie. Dans 
leur gesticulation naïve et passionnée, je reconnaissais le regret impuissant 
d’un être aimé qui a perdu l’usage de la parole, sent qu’il ne pourra nous dire 
ce qu’il veut et que nous ne savons pas deviner. 
    A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 78-79 
This comparison of the trees to a beloved person who has lost the ability to speak is not 
merely auxiliary; as so often in Proust, it anticipates a future event in the narrative, 
where this very scenario takes place in the context of the grandmother’s paralysis. The 
grandmother, affected by a serious stroke, becomes physically unable to speak and later 
also seems to lose her mental capacity to contribute to or even necessarily comprehend 
a conversation. Both of these passages emphasise the role of mediation and 
communication in the process of ‘being oneself’ and demonstrate, in their own 
respective ways, the manner in which the workings of the mind are inseparable from our 
somatic existence and our perception through the senses. 
While the Hudimesnil episode focuses on the (attempted) communication with one’s 
own self, the episode describing the grandmother’s last days underscores the role of 
interaction with the outside world and other people in making us who we are. In this 
thesis I have mainly focused on the former aspect – the urge to communicate with one’s 
own self or selves – by examining its origins as well as its different manifestations in 
the context of aesthetic experiences in Proust. Now, to end with, I wish to stand back 
and reflect briefly on what has been said by examining the passage that depicts the 
grandmother’s loss of self and illuminates this other important dimension – 
interpersonal relationships – in the composition of Proustian selfhood. The Narrator’s 
206
extensive contemplation on the loss of the grandmother and Albertine, especially in Le 
Temps retrouvé when he is finally about to set to work on his book, probes into the 
question of to what extent the self is understood and constantly recomposed through the 
subject’s relationships with other people and brings an ethical impetus into the 
Narrator’s discussion about art’s redemptive potential.
In Le Côté de Guermantes II, the Narrator’s grandmother suffers a severe attack during 
their outing in the Champs-Elysées. The Narrator becomes aware of the seriousness of 
her condition from very early on, as it is he who takes her to the doctor’s. After 
examining the grandmother, the doctor takes the Narrator to another room and without 
much discretion declares: “Votre grand-mère est perdue” (RTP II, 614). Indeed, the 
grandmother’s state deteriorates rapidly after the attack. Up to a point she is capable of 
hiding the signs of her suffering through strict self-discipline and refrains from weeping 
and wailing whenever her daughter or grandson are in the room. As the Narrator reports, 
it is only when ‘elle croyait que nous n’étions pas dans la chambre, elle poussait des 
cris: “Ah, c’est affreux!”’ (RTP II, 619); when she notices her daughter’s presence in the 
room, she gathers ‘toute son énergie à effacer de son visage les traces de douleur’ and 
hurries to explain that what in fact is ‘affreux’ is that they all should be locked up 
indoors on such a beautiful day.1 
Soon the grandmother’s attempts to conceal the marks of her illness become impossible, 
however: she first temporarily loses her eyesight and soon thereafter her hearing. The 
most frightful situation for the Narrator, however, is the moment when he leans to kiss 
her only to realise that ‘elle ne m’avait pas reconnu’ (RTP II, 630). This is the ultimate 
horrific proof of the fact that the illness has conquered her mind as well as her body. 
Here again, like the carriage in the Hudimesnil passage, life seems to be taking him 
‘loin de ce que je croyais seul vrai’ (RTP II, 78) – in this case the grandmother’s 
affection. 
This passage describes beautifully the fear of a complete loss of a beloved one during a 
period of illness which transforms (or rather deforms) her into a complete stranger. 
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pleure de rage contre vos prescriptions. […] Je n’ai pas mal.” (RTP II, 619).
Affected by this fear, both the Narrator and his mother are desperate to hold on to the 
memories of the grandmother before her illness. The mother, for example, refrains from 
looking at the grandmother’s deformed face, ‘peut-être pour mieux garder plus tard 
intacte l’image du vrai visage de sa mère, rayonnant d’esprit et bonté’ (RTP II, 615). For 
the Narrator, the most tragic loss seems to be that of verbal communication with the 
grandmother. After the paralysis has rendered the grandmother speechless, the role of 
words in absentia becomes accentuated: the Narrator states how his grandmother, 
although still physically there, has already disappeared, together with her ability to carry  
on conversation and fantastic allusions the way she used to. He also notes how the cruel 
new reality seems to make the precious moments they have spent together seem illusory 
and fleeting:
Elle n’était pas morte encore. J’étais déjà seul. Et même ces allusions qu’elle 
avait faite aux Guermantes, à Molière, à nos conversations sur le petit noyau, 
prenaient un air sans appui, sans cause, fantastique, parce qu’elle sortaient du 
néant de ce même être qui, demain peut-être, n’existerait plus, pour lequel elles 
n’auraient plus aucun sens, de ce néant – incapable de les concevoir – que ma 
grand-mère serait bientôt.
      A la Recherche du temps perdu II, 609
In the light of this quotation, it seems that it is the grandmother’s inability to 
‘concevoir’, to mediate, which ultimately estranges her from her beloved ones and (very 
likely) also from her own self. The memory of the grandmother and her witty 
conversation suddenly gains a new value and importance, standing in a strict contrast 
with the present grandmother who has become a mere ‘néant’ and to whom these 
fantastic allusions ‘n’auraient plus aucun sens’.
At first, this description of the grandmother’s ‘slow death’ seems to steer back to the 
Cartesian separation between the mind and the body: earlier on during her illness, the 
grandmother uses words as a kind of camouflage to hide the suffering of the body. Later 
on, even though still physically there but unable to communicate, she is considered, at 
least by the Narrator, as quite ‘gone’. The event of her death takes place soon after, 
although the Narrator’s true realisation of having lost her only follows much later, 
during his second visit to Balbec in Sodome et Gomorrhe II. 
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However, what this description of the grandmother’s paralysis also shows us, almost as 
if through negation, is the way in which, as Crowther puts it, ‘human perception is itself 
creative and expressive [...]. The world’s transcendence – its refusal to be absolutely 
fixed by our body’s contact with it – obliges the embodied subject to be itself 
transcendent: to constantly change its perceptual positioning in relation to the world.’2 
The grandmother’s senses are numbed by the paralysis, which terminates her contact 
with the world in a much more profound sense than merely in making her unable to 
perform certain bodily functions; indeed, the paralyses seem to lead to a more or less 
total loss of self – she truly becomes ‘perdue’. Thus, through this example Proust in fact 
strikes right at the core of the dilemma of Cartesian duality, showing us what happens 
when both words and sensuous perception cease to act as a bridge between the world 
and ourselves and how inseparably the subject and her cognitive faculties are tied to 
what is happening to the ‘object-like’ body.
Moreover, the description of the grandmother’s estrangement and loss manifests the 
extent to which our subjectivity is intertwined with and shaped by our relationships with 
other people. The grandmother’s gradual ‘disappearance’ as well as later on the death of 
Albertine compel the Narrator to reconsider and rearrange his experiences – and not just 
the experiences of his current self but, as demonstrated earlier in the context of ‘les 
intermittences du cœur’ (RTP III, 152-7) and the barber’s visit in Albertine disparue 
(RTP IV, 13-5), a range of selves – past, present, recurring, habitual, forgotten. The 
suffering, so unbearable at first that it needs to be muted, suffocated, eventually leads to 
the urge to communicate and mediate. ‘La souffrance’, in Proust, is a part and parcel of 
the experience of the real, and the time that passes without its presence seems in many 
ways to remain almost ‘unlived’.3 As Shattuck remarks, this ‘growing conviction that 
suffering and grief are ultimately salutary and provide a form of spiritual 
knowledge’ (together with the theories about involuntary memory) allows Proust to 
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in a single sentence, for example) seem to support this idea of how the absence ‘la douleur’ – or of love 
and relationships causing it – in many ways dilutes the experience of being alive, as well as one’s 
experiences of art. As we see in the course of the novel, the Narrator’s aesthetic experiences (as well as 
those of Swann) seem to be energised and deepened by the emotional upheavals caused by love, desire, 
jealousy and death. 
‘raise up out of the mind a landscape of thoughts and feelings that otherwise lies at too 
low a level to be seen’.4
The death of these two characters allows Proust to describe in detail the gradual process 
through which the loss of the loved ones is comprehended, and moreover, the way in 
which, as the Narrator points out, parts of the self die along with them. It is of course 
right to ask how healthy or ethically sound the way in which these relationships become 
accentuated is – that the Narrator only seems capable of appreciating these two women 
after they are dead, and how ‘les vrais paradis sont les paradis qu’on a perdus’ (RTP IV, 
449). The fact that the Narrator seems to be incapable of having entirely succesful 
relationships does not however mean that he is not affected by other people – quite the 
contrary. For Proust, his neurotic protagonist offers a very fertile ground to explore such 
effects, as the Narrator’s suppressed guilt and (to some extent self-inflicted) suffering 
make him speculate and reflect on his relationships endlessly inside his head.
The Narrator, finally about to set to work on his book, declares that for a writer, ‘les 
années heureuses sont les années perdues, on attend la souffrance pour travailler’ (RTP 
IV, 488). This perspective and the fact that the Narrator only seems to fully understand 
the significance of his relationships after the death of the other person have often been 
deemed to manifest a certain overemphasis of art over life in Proust – or considered, at 
least, as something which problematises the relationship between aesthetics and ethics 
in the Recherche.5 What some of these criticisms overlook, however, is that aesthetic 
processes in Proust are never completely detached from life: the emotive and sensuous 
undercurrent with which we create or open up a work of art, as we have seen in the 
examples throughout this study, is dependent on our life experience and a kind of 
precondition for a genuine aesthetic experience. As the Narrator notes, ‘l’imagination 
[et] la pensée’ – the two domains through which we appropriate a work of art (and 
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found for example in Malcolm Bowie’s ‘The morality of Proust’, his inaugural lecture delivered before 
the University of Oxford 25 November 1993 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); in David Ellison’s A Reader’s 
Guide to In Search of Lost Time (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. pp. 44-46, 153; and 
in Rosa Slegers’s recent book Courageous Vulnerability: Ethics and Knowledge in Proust, Bergson, 
Marcel, and James (Leiden; Brill; Biggleswade: Extenza Turpin, 2010), esp. pp. 8, 57-68, 218 (and 
elsewhere).
which are required in creating one) – ‘peuvent être des machines admirables en soi’, but   
it is ‘[l]a souffrance’ which ultimately ‘les met en marche’ (RTP IV, 487). 
In a way in these statements make the idea that art somehow ‘redeems’ what has been 
missed, lost or destroyed in life seem like a logical impossibility. The Narrator remarks 
that ‘les chagrins sont [...] des serviteurs atroces, impossibles à remplacer et qui par des 
voies souterraines nous mènent à la vérité et à la mort’ (RTP IV, 488, my emphasis). The 
Narrator’s standpoint here is quite clear: without these feelings, we would remain 
incapable of emotive responses in a very basic sense – remain handicapped, as it were, 
in any situation that requires intuition and sensibility, including aesthetic experiences. 
But there is more: the fact that these sorrows are irreplaceable suggests that they are 
indeed something highly personal and preciously unique. Therefore, when our 
encounter with a work of art reawakens these emotions, the aesthetic experience may 
take us straight down to the ‘riche bassin minier’ (RTP IV, 614) of our ‘sol 
mental’ (RTP I, 182), enabling us to understand something about the way we are in the 
world, how we are affected by it and how we respond to it. This proposition also allows 
us to consider aesthetic experience as something more than a mere instrument for 
‘reading the self’ full stop; once again, the germ of the Proustian ‘moyen de lire en soi-
même’ (RTP IV, 610) is not what we read but how we read, and the Narrator’s 
expression ‘lire en eux-mêmes’ reminds us of the idea of subjectivity as a space within 
which the people in our lives and those relationships which shape us emotively are also 
always present.
Secondly, it is not suggested by the Narrator that art, even if it may deepen and 
illuminate our life experiences in a very special way, would make us somehow less 
vulnerable in life (or in the face of death). At the end of the Le Temps retrouvé, the 
Narrator elaborates on the limits of the body in which the years have been ‘contained’:
Il fallait partir en effet de ceci que j’avais un corps, c’est-à-dire que j’étais 
perpétuellement menacé d’un double danger, extérieur, intérieur. Encore ne 
parlais-je ainsi que pour la commodité du langage. Car le danger intérieur, comme 
celui d’hémorragie cérébrale, est extérieur aussi, étant du corps. Et avoir un corps, 
c’est la grande menace pour l’esprit.
      A la Recherche du temps perdu IV, 612-13
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This double danger reminds him also of some moments during his life where vivid 
intellectual activity has taken place with a complete suspension of physical activity – 
such as leaving the restaurant in Rivebelle inebriated – noting how in these moments, he 
was able to ‘sentir très nettement en moi l’objet présent de ma pensée, et de comprendre 
qu’il dépendait d’un hasard non seulement que cet objet n’y fût pas encore entré, mais 
qu’il fût, avec mon corps même, anéanti’ (RTP IV, 613). Faced with his realisation of 
‘cette dimension énorme que je ne savais pas avoir,’ the Narrator describes his feelings 
in bodily terms: ‘J’avais le vertige de voir au-dessous de moi et en moi pourtant, comme 
si j’avais des lieues de hauteur, tant d’années’ (RTP IV, 624, my emphasis).6 Having 
discovered that his vocation lies in ‘l’approfondissement d’impressions qu’il fallait 
d’abord recréer par la mémoire’ (RTP IV, 612), he now needs to overcome his vertigo 
and dive in – before it is too late.
In this study I have considered the nature of Proustian subjectivity primarily by 
examining the subject’s interaction with the phenomenologically perceptible world, art, 
and the ways of communicating with one’s own self/selves. The grandmother’s struggle 
and the effects of the disease on her mind and personality also emphasise the 
inseparability of physical and mental dimensions of the self and how in the Proustian 
world, imagination and thought are tied to the ‘direct’ experience – or the lack of it. 
Aesthetic, artful, creative and imaginative processes in Proust do not belong to the 
realm of art alone, but feature as an essential element in the appropriation of the most 
basic immediate experiences and in all human understanding. The description of the 
paralysis and the slow death of the grandmother furthermore illustrates the extent to 
which selfhood is affected and comprehended through our relationships with other 
people. In drawing all these different twines of ‘being oneself’ together, the 
grandmother’s ‘disappearance’ creates the optimal conditions for Proust to explore the 
inseparability of emotions, memory, sensuous experience, imagination, and mediation, 
and the crucial role of all of these elements in the process of making us who we are, in 
making us unique individuals – ‘dans le Temps’ (RTP IV, 625).
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Hitchcock’s film Vertigo (1958). See Goodkin, Around Proust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), Chapter Four ‘Proust’s Vertigo and Hitchcock’s Vertigo’ pp. 89-102.
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